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INTRODUCTION

For more than the last thirty years, Jfirgen Habermas
has been among the preeminent social theorists and
philosophers in the world. His influence in the American
legal academy, however, has been relatively limited until
recently. Law, while a background topic of the comprehensive social theory Habermas constructed through the
1970s and early 1980s, was not an independent topic of
Habermas's analysis until his 1986 Tanner Lectures.' Since
then, Habermas has published a full-scale theory of law,
entitled Faktizitdt und Geltung, recently translated into
English as Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a
Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy.! With completion
of this work, Habermas has moved toward the center of
legal-theoretical debate.3
Habermas's project has two parts. The first is the
"discourse theory of law and democracy" proper, which
Habermas describes as a "reconstruction" of the "normative
self-understanding of... modern legal orders."' The central
theme of this part of the project is that legitimate law and
radical democracy mutually presuppose one another.
1. Jirgen Habermas, Law and Morality, in 8 THE TANNER LECTURES ON
HUMAN VALUES 217-79 (Sterling M. McMurrin ed. and Kenneth Baynes trans.,

1988).
2. JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William H. Rehg trans., 1996)
(1992) [hereinafter BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS].

3. At least three English-language symposia have been organized to
consider Habermas's work on law. See Nancy Ehrenreich, Exploring Habermas
on Law and Democracy, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 927 (1999); Michel Rosenfeld,
Habermas on Law and Democracy: CriticalExchanges, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 767
(1996); Symposium, Habermas, Modernity, and Law, 20 PHIL. & SOC. CRITICISM
1 (1994). Further, while a full listing of the critical literature is unnecessary, it
is worth noting that the list of leading American legal scholars who have
reviewed or otherwise systematically discussed Between Facts and Norms
includes Frank Michelman, Cass Sunstein, and Richard Posner.
4. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 82 (emphasis omitted).
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Habermas's normatively ambitious discourse theory first

develops an account of the "system of rights" that must be
recognized, in one form or another, for a legal order to be
legitimate, then turns to the "principles of the constitutional state" that would be required to secure those rights.
Habermas then "test[s] and elaborate[s] the discourse
concept of law and democracy" against, first, contemporary
discussions in legal theory, and second, contemporary
controversies in constitutional practice and theory.5
The second part of Habermas's project locates this
discourse theory in a model of modern complex societies.
Habermas has two purposes here. First, he wants to
examine whether the discourse theory, developed through
normative "reconstruction," actually has a purchase on
factually existing social conditions. Second, elaborating his
theory of law and democracy through social-theoretical
concepts allows him to deepen, and to make more concrete,
his normative theory.6
This article addresses only the first part of Habermas's
work on law and democracy-the normative "discourse
theory" proper-leaving the social-theoretical elaboration to
a companion article.7 I begin, in Part I below, by setting out
the basic concepts of social action and social theory that
Habermas incorporates from his work of the late 1970s and
1980s. I then examine, in Part II, Habermas's "reconstruction" of modern law's "normative self-understanding." I
discuss in Part II.A Habermas's account of the basic
problematic of modern law-the risk of dissensus that has
increased with social modernization-and I analyze the
tension between law's "facticity" and law's "validity" that
organizes Habermas's entire theory of law and democracy.
With that as background, I critically examine in Part II.B
Habermas's analysis of the "system of rights." There I

5. Id. at 7.
6. Michael Power nicely explains the two moments of Habermas's thinking:
the "reconstructive-transcendental," exemplified by Habermas's investigation
into the conditions of legal and political legitimacy, and the "critical-reflective,"
in which the "realizability" of what is discovered through reconstruction "is a
relevant preoccupation." Michael K. Power, Habermas and the Counterfactual
Imagination, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY: CRITICAL EXCHANGES 207,

220-21 (Michael Rosenfeld & Andrew Arato eds., 1998) [hereinafter HABERMAS
ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY].

7. See Hugh Baxter, System and Lifeworld in Habermas's Theory of Law, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming 2002).
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suggest skepticism about Habermas's largest claims for this
system: that it reconciles longstanding tensions between
"private" and "public autonomy" and between the idea of
basic rights and the idea of popular sovereignty. I then
criticize, in Part II.C, Habermas's account of the constitutional state, particularly his reliance on what he calls "the
discourse principle." This principle is the basis for
Habermas's theory of law and democracy, but I argue that
it cannot bear the weight that Habermas places upon it.
In Part III, I turn to Habermas's "testing" of the
discourse theory against recent developments in the theory
and practice of adjudication. Part III.A addresses the
general theory of adjudication that Habermas develops in
dialogue with Dworkin's theory of "constructive interpretation," and Part III.B considers the special case of
constitutional adjudication. In both parts, I am critical of
the uses to which Habermas puts the notion of judicial
"discourses of application"-a notion that is central to
Habermas's idea of courts' appropriate role in a separationof-powers scheme. An additional defect of Habermas's
theory is its inability to account for-and Habermas's
understandable unwillingness to exclude as illegitimatethe common-law adjudication process that is basic to AngloAmerican law. I criticize also the distinction Habermas
tries to establish between his "proceduralist" theory of constitutional adjudication and the "neorepublican" theory of
Frank Michelman. Finally, I consider the implications that
Habermas's proceduralist theory might have for constitutional adjudication. I argue that Habermas's theory needs
to be much more concretely specified and more closely
connected to particular constitutions, not just to the idea of
the modern constitution in general.
I.

BACKGROUND: HABERMAS'S THEORIES OF ACTION AND
"RATIONALIZATION"

As I suggested in the Introduction, Habermas's theory
of law and democracy depends upon an array of philosophical and sociological concepts developed in his earlier work.
Between Facts and Norms does not much discuss those
notions; instead, it invokes them with minimal explanation.
This decision is understandable-the past work develops
those ideas at great length. But for the reader unfamiliar
with Habermas's past work, some explanation is in order. I
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focus on the concepts basic to Habermas's present theory of
law and democracy: the distinction between communicative
and strategic action (Part I.A), the notions of discourse and
communicative rationality (Part I.B), the idea of the "life-

world" and its "rationalization" (Part I.C), and the notion of
social "systems" (Part I.D).8

A. Communicative and StrategicAction
Since the 1960s, a recurring focus of Habermas's work
has been the theory of action, and particularly rational action.9 His most systematic taxonomy of action types appears
in his 1981 magnum opus, Theory of Communicative Action.
With qualifications I will make clear, that taxonomy still
structures Habermas's present work.
The three kinds of rational action Habermas identifies
are instrumental action, strategic action, and communicative action. Instrumental action is the solitary performance
of a task according to "technical rules."" As solitary action,
it differs from communicative and strategic action, which
Habermas defines as forms of social interaction.1"
Habermas's focus is decidedly on interaction rather than
solitary action. Accordingly, instrumental actions are
significant to his analysis only so far as they function as the

8. This account is a somewhat abbreviated version of the parallel discussion
in Baxter, supra note 7, at Part II. Readers familiar with that discussion will
not find surprises here.
9. Habermas's focus on rational action is connected to his longstanding
project of reformulating Max Weber's theory of "occidental rationalism." See
JURGEN HABERMAS, Technology and Science As "Ideology," in TOWARD A
RATIONAL SOCIETY (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., 1970) (1968), at 82 (introducing
the distinction between "labor" and "interaction" to "reformulate," id. at 91, 94,
Weber's theory of rationalization); see also 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY 1-7, 75141 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) (1981) [hereinafter 1 THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTION] (explaining why social theory is bound up with the
problematic of rational action and setting the stage for a reformulation of
Weber's theory of rationalization). For a critique of Habermas's decision to focus
on rational action, see Hans Joas, The Unhappy Marriage of Hermeneutics and
Functionalism, in COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: ESSAYS ON HABERMAS'S THEORY OF
COMMUNICATIVE ACTiON 97, 99-101 (Axel Honneth & Hans Joas eds., Jeremy
Gains & Doris L. Jones trans., 1991) (1986) [hereinafter COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION].
10. 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 285.

11. See id.
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"task elements" of patterns of communicative or strategic
action.2

That leaves the more difficult distinction between

communicative and strategic action. Habermas first
characterizes the distinction in terms of different "action
orientations." In communicative action, Habermas says,
actors are oriented toward mutual "understanding"
(Verstdndigung). In strategic action, by contrast, actors are
oriented toward "success," as measured by their "egocentric
calculations" of interest.
This first characterization does not get Habermas very
far. Both communicative and strategic action, Habermas
acknowledges, are goal-directed, and so the orientation
toward "success" says too little by itself to distinguish the
two types." Nor does the term "communicative" clearly
mark a difference. Communicative action, Habermas
acknowledges, does not consist wholly in speech acts, 4 and
further, strategic action often includes the use of speech. 5
The difference between communicative and strategic
action lies not so much in the actors' "orientations" as in the
different mechanisms by which individual actions are
coordinated, i.e., linked together to form patterns of
interaction and to establish social relationships among
actors. Habermas's distinction between these coordinating

12. See id.

13. See Jurgen Habermas, Reply to My Critics, in HABERMAS: CRITICAL
DEBATES 219, 265 (John B. Thompson & David Held eds., 1982); JURGEN
HABERMAS, Remarks on the Concept of Communicative Action, in SOCIAL ACTION
151, 154 (Gottfried Seebass & Raimo Tuomela eds., Ruth Stanley trans., 1984);
OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note
9, at 214, 264. Nor is the goal of communicative action only the goal of reaching
an understanding with another. See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra
note 9, at 101 ("[Clommunicative action is not exhausted by the act of reaching
understanding in an interpretive manner.").
14. See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 101 ("[T]he
communicative model of action does not equate action with communication.").
15. See Habermas, Reply to My Critics, supra note 13, at 264.
16. See, e.g., 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 101
("Concepts of social action are distinguished ... according to how they specify
the coordination among the goal-directed actions of different participants."); id.
at 298 ("From the standpoint of a sociological theory of action, my primary
interest has to be in making clear the mechanism relevant to the coordinating
power of speech acts."); id. at 273-74 (criticizing "analytic action theory" for
failing to "consider the mechanisms for coordinating action through which
interpersonal relations come about"); id. at 282 ("Social actions can be

Jurgen Habermas, A Reply, in 1 THEORY
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mechanisms is a distinction between two different uses of
language. He explicates these different uses of language
through what he calls "formal pragmatics."
Both parts of the term "formal pragmatics" are
significant. With "pragmatics," Habermas signals his focus
on language in use-on utterances or "speech acts"-as
opposed to a semantic focus on the meaning of isolated
sentences or propositions. 7 By "formal," Habermas means
that he seeks not to describe and classify the "communicative practice of everyday life""s as it operates within a
"empirical"
(that would be
language"
particular
the
reconstruct"
pragmatics), but instead, to "rationally
What
practice.
necessary presuppositions of communicative
Habermas pursues in his formal pragmatics, and what he
means by "rational reconstruction," is a theory of the
unreflectively mastered, pretheoretical communicative
capacities of ordinary competent speakers." He first
explicates the idea of communicative action, then analyzes
strategic action.
The central idea in Habermas's formal pragmatics, and
the basis for his conception of communicative action, is the
notion of a speech act's "validity." Habermas distinguishes
among three forms of validity to which speech acts may lay
claim: propositional truth (Wahrheit),2" normative rightness
22 Typically,
(Richtigkeit), and sincerity (Wahrhaftigkeit).
Habermas observes, just one of these validity claims is
distinguished according to the mechanisms for coordinating individual
actions. .. ").
17. This, at any rate, is how Habermas characterizes the difference between
pragmatics and semantics.
18. 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 328.
19. See id. at 319-20 (describing J.L. Austin's typology of speech acts).
20. See, e.g., JOtRGEN HABERMAS, What Is Universal Pragmatics?, in
COMMUNICATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIETY 1, 9 (Thomas McCarthy trans.,
1979) (1976) (reconstructive procedures "systematically reconstruct the
intuitive knowledge of competent subjects") (emphasis omitted); id. at 14
("[RIeconstructive proposals are directed to domains of pretheoretical
knowledge, that is.... to a proven intuitive foreknowledge.") (emphasis
omitted).
21. Or, at least the claim that the utterance's "existential presuppositions"
are satisfied. See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 99, 30607. This qualification is necessary to account for speech acts that do not directly
assert matters of fact.
22. See, e.g., id. at 75, 99. One might ask: why these three and only these
three forms of validity? For a brief discussion of Habermas's answer to this
question, see Baxter, supra note 7, at Part II.A.1.
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thematic in a particular speech act: in a confession, for
example, the claim to sincerity is thematic, as is the claim
to truth in a factual assertion." Habermas's formulation of
the main categories of speech acts reflects this insight: in
"constative," "regulative," and "expressive" utterances, the
claims to truth, rightness, and sincerity are (respectively)
thematic.24
Nonetheless, Habermas contends, any speech act in
communicative action raises simultaneously all three
claims, even if ordinarily the speaker raises only one
directly or thematically.25 This contention seems counterintuitive. We would not ordinarily say, for example, that a
speaker's request for a glass of water "raises a truth
claim"-that she claims it to be true that a glass of water
can be obtained and brought in a reasonable amount of
time. 6 But Habermas's argument does not depend upon this
point. For his purposes, and for ours, it is enough to say
that at least in principle, any speech act can be criticized
along any of the three dimensions of validity. 7 For example,
a hearer might respond to the request for a glass of water
by objecting that, as a matter of fact, no water (or no glass)
is readily available. Or the hearer might object that the
request is normatively inappropriate, because the hearer is
23. See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE

ACTION,

supra note 9, at 308-09.

24. See JORGEN HABERMAS, Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning, in
POSTMETAPHYSICAL THINKING: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS

57, 77 (William Mark

Hohengarten trans., 1992) (1988) (describing these kinds of speech acts as the

"three basic modes"); 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE

ACTION,

supra note 9, at 325-

26. Habermas also distinguishes "communicative" and "operative" speech acts,
see id. at 326, but the definitions of those classes are unimportant for present
purposes.
25. See MAEE COOKE, LANGUAGE AND REASON: A STUDY OF HABERMAS'S
PRAGMATICS 59 (1994) (distinguishing between "direct" and "indirect" raising of
validity claims).
26. Cf. 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 306 (using this
example).
27. Compare 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 99
(asserting that a communicative actor "must raise at least three validity claims
with his utterance"), with id. at 306 (justifying this claim by noting that even if
one claim is thematic, the other two may come into play with a hearer's
criticism). See also HABERMAS, Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning,
supra note 24, at 76-77 (only one claim may be "thematically emphasized in any
explicit speech act," but "[elvery speech act as a whole can always be criticized
as invalid from three perspectives"); COOKE, supra note 25, at 60-61 ("The fact
that any given speech act can be contested from more than one point of view
supports Habermas's claim that every speech act raises three validity claims
simultaneously.").
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not someone who can be expected to fetch water for the
speaker. Along the same lines, the hearer might object that
the request is insincere-motivated by a desire to control
the hearer more than to obtain needed water.28 What
Habermas means is this: every speech act constitutive for
communicative action involves all three "validity claims" in
that, in principle, a hearer can challenge the utterance in
each of the three different ways.
This emphasis on hearers' possible criticisms marks an
important theme in Habermas's notion of communicative
action. Validity claims, Habermas maintains, are
essentially criticizable. 29 By "criticizable," he means that in

communicative action the hearer may respond to the claims
by taking a "yes or no position"-either accepting the
speech act's claims or oyposing them with criticism or
requests for justification. And at least to the extent the
interaction between speaker and hearer is to remain
communicative,31 the speaker assumes the obligation of
providing such justification if necessary. 2 Further,
particularly in the case of regulative speech acts (such as a
promise), mutual acceptance of a validity claim may impose
obligations relevant to future interaction." In these senses,
the mutual acceptance of validity claims, or further
discussion between speaker and hearer aimed at consensus
concerning those claims, is the "mechanism of
understanding" that coordinates communicative action.
The mechanism coordinating strategic action, by
contrast, is not "understanding" or "consensus"-mutual
acceptance
of
validity
claims-but
"influence"
(Einfluflnahme) 4 The term "influence" requires explication.
28. The example is Habermas's. 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra
note 9, at 306.
29. See, e.g., id. at 301 ("[V]alidity claims are internally connected with
reasons and grounds" and "can be rejected only by way of criticism and
defended against a criticism only by refuting it.").
30. See, e.g., id. at 38-39, 101, 305-07.
31. Habermas is not always careful to include this qualification expressly,
but it follows from his position. The alternatives to providing a requested
justification are either breaking off interaction or switching over to strategic
action. See HABERMAS, What Is Universal Pragmatics,supra note 20, at 3-4.
32. See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 99.
33. See id. at 303-04.
34. See, e.g., id. at 286 (distinguishing between "causally exerting an
influence upon" one's partners in interaction and "coming to an understanding
with them"); Habermas, A Reply, supra note 13, at 242 (distinguishing between
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In one sense of the word, communicative actors may seek to
influence each other. In discussing a problematic claim, one
may try to persuade the other that his position is correct,
and the other may try to convince the other of her criticism.
But by "influence," Habermas says, he means "exert a
causal influence," 35 independent of the convincing force of
reasons that could support claims to validity. So far,
however, the characterization of "influence," and thus the
characterization of strategic action, is only negativeinfluence operates in some way other than mutual
recognition of validity claims.
Habermas tries to characterize the mechanism of
influence more precisely by distinguishing between two
subtypes-"open" and "concealed" strategic action. Of these
two subtypes, Habermas has given far more attention to
concealed strategic action. The kind of "influence"
characteristic of concealed strategic action is, in effect,
deception 36 -primarily conscious deception. 37 The technical
criterion Habermas adopts for concealed strategic action
concerns the "avowability" of the parties' intentions or aims.
In concealed strategic interaction, at least one participant
pursues aims that he knows could not be avowed without
jeopardizing that participant's success, while at least one
participant assumes that all are acting communicatively. A
"influencing one's opponent" and "reaching understanding"); JtORGEN HABERMAS,
Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of PhilosophicalJustification, in MORAL
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 43, 58 (Christian Lenhardt &
Shierry Weber Nicholson trans., 1991) (1983) (distinguishing between exerting
"influence" upon another with the threat or promise of sanctions and
coordinating action plans "consensually"); JORGEN HABERMAS, Erliuterungen
zum Begriff des kommunikativen Handelns, in VORSTUDIEN UND ERGANZUNGEN
zuR THEORIE DES KOMMUNIKATIVEN HANDELNS
VORSTUDIEN

UND

ERGANZUNGEN]

571, 572-73 (1984) [hereinafter

"influence"
between
(distinguishing
(Einverstdndnis) as mechanisms for

(Einflu/inahme) and "consensus"
coordinating interaction).
35. See HABERMAS, Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning, supra note
24, at 79; HABERMAS, Remarks on the Concept of Communicative Action, supra
note 13, at 153.

36. See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE

ACTION,

supra note 9, at 332-33.

37. He also mentions the possibility of unconscious deception, which he calls
"systematically distorted communication." See id. at 333. In this form of
interaction, the parties believe that they are acting communicatively, but at
least one party is in the grip of an individual psychopathology or powerful social
ideology that distorts, and in distorting subverts, the process of reaching
understanding about claims to validity. For a brief treatment in Habermas's
recent work, see Habermas, A Reply, supra note 13, at 226.
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simple example: one person requests a loan from another
person without disclosing that the money will be used for a
criminal purpose. Assuming that the person from whom the
loan is requested has no reason to endorse the criminal
purpose, the aim is nonavowable, in Habermas's sense,
because to declare it is to make tender of the loan unlikely.
This kind of action is parasitic on communicative action,
Habermas believes, because the success of the coordinating
speech act depends upon the hearer's belief that the
speaker could redeem the claim to have spoken his
intentions sincerely or truthfully. 8
Habermas has given less attention to the notion of open
strategic action. This relative lack of attention is curious,
given the prominence Habermas gives open strategic action
in his conception of the economic and administrative
systems. But from his general characterization of strategic
action-that it operates through "influence" rather than
"understanding" or "consensus"-we can assume that
openly strategic actors do not presuppose or seek a
consensus in plans or goals, or at least not a consensus
resting on mutual acceptance of validity claims. But how
can open strategic action be characterized positively?
In Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas
attempted to specify open strategic action with formalpragmatic analysis. Focusing on the variant of open
strategic action most difficult to distinguish from communicative action-the sort that, like communicative action, is
coordinated by speech acts-Habermas assumed that the
characteristic kind of coordinating speech act is the
"simple" or "pure imperative." By "simple" or "pure"
imperative, Habermas meant a command that is a sheer
assertion of power of speaker over hearer. To these simple
imperatives Habermas contrasted speech acts that are
similar in form-involving a command or order-but which,
on Habermas's analysis, belong to communicative action.
These sorts of commands or orders Habermas called
"normatively authorized" requests."

38. As I have explained elsewhere, Habermas's usual account of concealed
strategic action relies on an idiosyncratic reinterpretation of J.L. Austin's
notion of "perlocutions." See Baxter, supra note 7, at Part II.A.1. The
avowability criterion described in the above text, however, is much less
problematic. See id.; see also COOKE, supra note 25.
39. See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 300-01.
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Since his publication of Theory of Communicative

Action in 1981, Habermas has acknowledged the untenability of any "sharp distinction between normatively
authorized [requests] and simple imperatives. ' ° Instead,
Habermas now argues, from a sociological perspective we
see a "continuum between" purely "de facto" yower and
"power transformed into normative authority." While at
one end of the continuum is the pure or simple imperativehis standard example is the bank robber's "hands up"
demand-Habermas now admits that such an imperative is
only an "extreme case" or "limit case."42 Rather than a
"categorial" difference between pure imperatives and
normatively authorized requests, Habermas has come to
recognize, there is only a "difference of degree."43
But if the "pure imperative" is only the limiting case of
open strategic action, then what is the paradigm case?
Habermas has not much elaborated on this point. Still,
from his preliminary specification of strategic action,
together with other remarks scattered throughout his work,
we can construct at least a sketch. The paradigmatic case of
open strategic action seems to be competition among
rational opponents, each pursuing self-interested goals
according to rules of rational choice. Each tries to influence
or steer each other's choices, and each is aware that the
other is operating in this way. The choices of each are
conditioned by their respective predictions of the other's
choices as well as by the consequences of their interaction.
Game theory, rational choice theory, and decision theory,
Habermas sometimes suggests, formalize this paradigmatic
case of open strategic action."
But this paradigmatic case differs in important ways
from the norm-free, purely power-driven form of action that
the "pure imperative" model described. Strategic competition, Habermas acknowledges, typically takes place against
a normative backdrop.45 Strategic action in the marketplace,
40. See Jirgen Habermas, Reply to Skjei, 28 INQUIRY 105, 112 (1985).
41. See HABERMAS, Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning, supra note
24, at 83.
42. See id. at 84; Habermas, A Reply, supra note 13, at 239.
43. Habermas, A Reply, supra note 13, at 239.
44. See, e.g., id. at 242 (game theory as model for strategic action); id. at 243
(game theory and decision theory as models, though actual strategic action
usually falls short of the standards of rationality these models postulate).
45. See, e.g., BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 25 ("Naturally,
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for example, presupposes general acceptance of a variety of
legal norms-such as criminal-law norms that forbid some
tactics or strategies and permit others, norms of property
law that outfit some with more market power than their
opponents, rules that define the possibilities for different
kinds of transaction, and the like. These legal norms
structure the participants' choices among strategies and
tactics. Further, apart from state-enforced law, informal
social norms may shape strategic interactions in particular
spheres of economic activity. Even paradigmatic cases of
strategic action, then, may involve the mutual recognition
of legal and social norms. The distinction between
communicative and strategic action cannot be as sharp as
Habermas had thought originally.
Habermas now recognizes this consequence. His
account in Between Facts and Norms describes interactions
as "fall[ing] along a continuum" between purely
communicative and purely strategic action,"' with most
actual situations presenting a "melange" of these types.47 In
fact, Habermas's "discourse theory of law" preserves an
important place for action that reflects elements of both
pure types: regulated bargaining and fair compromise."'
What Habermas insists upon is not an on-or-off distinction
among actual interactions in the world, but a difference
between two approaches to the dimensions of validity he
distinguishes. Habermas expresses this difference as one
between a "performative" attitude, constitutive for
communicative action, and the "objectivating" attitude that
is constitutive for strategic action.
By "performative," Habermas means (in this context)
something like "oriented toward validity." Within the
self-interested action has always been fused with, or limited by, a normative
order.").
46. See id. at 139. In this passage Habermas uses the terms "value-oriented"
and "interest-governed" rather than "communicative" and "strategic." But
Habermas associates the former pair of terms with the various concepts he uses
to distinguish communicative and strategic action. Habermas explicates "valueoriented" action in terms of an orientation toward reaching understanding,
consensus, and the "performative attitude" (discussed below in text); he
analyzes "interest governed" action in terms of a balance of interests, "power
positions," "threat potentials," and the "objectivating attitude." See id. at 13940. And just above he speaks of "mutual understanding" and "influence" as the
relevant mechanisms by which action is coordinated. See id. at 139.
47. See id.
48. See infra Part II.C.3.
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performative attitude, social norms are criticizable and in
need of justification.49 By "objectivating," Habermas means
that social norms appear not so much as potentially
justifiable or criticizable, but simply as social facts, with
more or less calculable consequences attaching to their
violation or obedience. Within this objectivating attitude,
norms are primarily conditions for, or obstacles impeding
the success of the actor's self-interested pursuits.
(Holmes's "bad man" is a good illustration.51 ) From the
"performative" perspective, Habermas speaks of
"validity" (Geltung) of social norms. From the
the
"objectivating" perspective, he refers to norms' "facticity"
(Faktizitdt). This distinction between validity and facticity,
we will see, is the organizing device for Habermas's theory
of law and democracy.
The various distinctions Habermas uses to distinguish
communicative from open strategic action 5 -distinctions
between influence and consensus, validity and power,
performative and objectivating-do not unequivocally and
uncontroversially classify actual interactions as purely
communicative or purely strategic. Even interactions
Habermas would classify as paradigm cases of strategic
action-such as marketplace competition-operate against
the background of rules and norms. Participants in
strategic action may recognize these norms as binding not
just in a "factual" sense (because of potential sanctions) but
also as normatively obligatory. Further, actions may be
"communicative" with respect to the immediate participants
but "strategic" with respect to others-as when one
deliberates with another to produce an optimal business
plan.
For present purposes, however, the question is not so
much whether Habermas's scheme works as a classificatory

49. See HABERMAS, Toward a Critique of the Theory of Meaning, supra note
24, at 80.
50. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 524 n.18 ("[Sitrategic
actors encounter normative contexts, as well as other participants, only as
social facts."); see also id., at 121, 448.
51. See O.W. Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459
(1897).
52. See infra Part II.A.
53. Those other distinctions include: consensus and influence, validity and
power, reasons and sanctions, rational and empirical motivation, cooperation
and pursuit of self-interest.
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scheme for pigeonholing particular interactions. The more
relevant question, instead, concerns the further theoretical
purposes to which Habermas wishes to put the idea of
communicative action.
B. Discourse and Communicative Rationality
One such purpose is to provide an account of the ways
modern societies manage conflict and dissensus. As will
become more clear below, a central premise of Habermas's
theory of modernity is that the risk of dissensusdisagreement as to plans of action or as to claims about the
world-increased with the demise of traditional forms of
authority and traditional world-views. 4 Habermas distinguishes three basic alternatives for handling dissensus in
simple interactions: attempting to resolve the disagreement
communicatively, continuing the interaction under premises of strategic action, and breaking off the interaction
entirely.55 Law, it will turn out, institutionalizes all three
possibilities. It creates spheres of action in which individuals may pursue their interests without securing the
agreement of others-whether by refusing to interact, or by
opting to interact strategically. And law also establishes
procedures through which disagreements can be resolved
more or less communicatively. The mechanisms of action
coordination Habermas distinguishes in his typology of
social action find analogues in his discourse theory of law.
A second purpose of Habermas's action theory is to
rethink and expand the idea of rationality. Most familiar
accounts of rationality-such as those found in economic
theory, game theory, decision theory, and rational choice
theory-are keyed toward the problematics of instrumental
or strategic action. Beginning from the notion of
communicative action, Habermas hopes to develop a new
conception of rationality, which he calls, unsurprisingly,
"communicative rationality." The idea of communicative
rationality, like the idea of communicative action, depends
centrally upon the notion of criticizability. Claims to

54. See, e.g., BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 25-27.
55. See HABERMAS, What Is Universal Pragmatics, supra note 20, at 3-4.
Sometimes Habermas mentions other possibilities, such as "carrying out
straightforward 'repair work,' " or continuing the interaction but avoiding the

controversial issue. See

BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS,

supra note 2, at 21.
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validity are essentially criticizable, and they may be
supported or opposed with reasons and argument. The
criticizability of validity claims creates the rational
potential of communicative action-the possibility of
communicative rationality.
One way to develop the dimensions of Habermas's
notion of communicative rationality is to distinguish
between everyday and more reflective
forms of
communicative action.56 Consider, as an instance of
everyday communicative action, an example Habermas
provides in Theory of Communicative Action: a flight
attendant's request that a passenger put out a cigarette." If
the passenger responds to the request by demanding
reasons, the flight attendant likely will invoke the relevant
federal regulation and explain that he has authority to
enforce it. Should the passenger demand more justification
than that-by, for example, questioning the FAA's
authority to pass such a regulation, or by invoking a
putative constitutional right to smoke at will-the flight
attendant likely will switch over to strategic action,
mentioning the sanctions for failure to comply and, if
necessary, deploying those sanctions. And so while the
regulation offers a reason for compliance, and one not
entirely reducible to the mere fact of potential sanctions,
the role of rational criticism and justification is sharply
circumscribed. The fact that a claim is criticizable in
principle does not mean that criticisms and demands for
justification always are in place. In everyday contexts, the
pressures of action often limit the rational potential of
communicative action.
When removed from the pressures of immediate action,
however, this rational potential may be developed more
fully. Habermas refers to various forms of "argumentation"
or "discourse,"" in which participants pursue more
56. See 1 THEORY

OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra

note 9, at 25;

JORGEN

HABERMAS, MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note

34,
at 158; see also Habermas, Reply to My Critics, supra note 13, at 235
(distinguishing between "communicative action in the naive attitude" and
"reflectively achieved understanding").
57. See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 300-02.
58. Sometimes Habermas has given the term "discourse" a more narrow
meaning than "argumentation." See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra
note 9, at 23, 41-42. In more recent writings, however, the terms seem to be
synonymous. See COOKE, supra note 25, at 31-32.
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methodically the task of criticizing and defending the
claims to validity that Habermas has identified. Here
validity claims serve less as a means of coordinating
participants' goal-directed plans of action-as in everyday
communicative action-and more as an explicit theme of
communication and debate.
Habermas introduces the idea of discourse through
various "idealizations." Participants in discourse must have
equal opportunities to raise topics, arguments, and
criticisms. 9 The situation must exclude all force "except the
force of the better argument," and it must exclude "all
motives except a cooperative search for the truth.""
Habermas sometimes has referred to these idealizations as
describing an "ideal speech situation,"61 or alternatively, an
"ideal communication community."' 2 While Habermas
describes these conditions as "general pragmatic presuppositions" of discourse,63 he is aware that they are never
completely fulfilled. Here it is a matter of more and less,
and Habermas is willing to speak of "discourse" when these
demanding conditions are "sufficiently fulfilled."' The ideal
conditions are "presupposed" in actual communicative
practice to the extent that significant deviations are a
prima facie reason to question an apparent consensus that
is reached-though these deviations are of course not
sufficient by themselves to refute a claim upon which the
participants have reached agreement.
Discourses, Habermas recognizes, are exceptional forms
of communicative action-"islands in the sea of practice." 5
59. See JOIRGEN HABERMAS, Wahrheitstheorien, in VORSTUDIEN UND
ERGANZUNGEN, supra note 34, at 127, 177.
60. See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 25.
Habermas's reference to "truth" should be read to consider the other "truthanalogous validity claims" he identifies.
61. See, e.g., HABERMAS, Wahrheitstheorien, supra note 59, at 174-83; 1
THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 25; JORGEN HABERMAS,
Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Turn, in ON THE PRAGMATICS OF COMMUNICATION
343, 365, 367 (Maeve Cooke ed., 1998); BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note
2, at 322-23; JQRGEN HABERMAS, Remarks on DiscourseEthics, in JUSTIFICATION
AND APPLICATION: REMARKS ON DISCOURSE ETHICS 50 (Ciaran P. Cronin trans.,
1993) (1990) [hereinafter JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION].
62. See, e.g., HABERMAS, Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Turn, supra note 61, at
365; BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 322-23 (describing "ideal
speech situation" and "ideal communication community" as "equivalent").
63. 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 25.
64. Id. at 25; BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 178.
65. Habermas, Reply to My Critics,supra note 13, at 235.
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Nonetheless, Habermas claims, the institutionalization of
discursive practices-in contexts such as scientific research,
democratic procedure, and legal procedure-is a characteristic feature of modern societies. These developments
Habermas interprets as a progressive realization of the
rational potential implicit in communicative action. In this
way Habermas recasts the great sociologist Max Weber's
theory of "rationalization," focusing on the realizationthough only a partial and selective realization-of
communicative rationality.
C. The "Lifeworld"and Its Rationalization
In developing his account of communicative "rationalization," Habermas supplements his formal-pragmatic
analysis of rational action with social-theoretical concepts.
The concept with which he begins is the notion of society as
the "lifeworld" of social actors.
The term "lifeworld" requires some explanation. It
originated in the later work of the philosopher Edmund
Husserl, who used it to mark a contrast between the world
of everyday experience
and the world as constructed by the
"objective sciences."67 The lifeworld, for Husserl, was the
pretheoretical world of taken-for-granted certainties. This
"realm of original self-evidences"" provides the "grounding
soil"69 for all human activities, including the scientific
activity of constructing the "objective-scientific" world.7"
Husserl's idea of the lifeworld was developed further-and
made more fruitful for social theory-by Alfred Schutz, a
sociologist and philosopher who was much influenced by
Max Weber as well as Husserl.71
Habermas's initial presentation of the lifeworld concept
largely tracks Schutz's analysis."2 The lifeworld is the
66. See

HELMUT R. WAGNER, ALFRED SCHuTz: AN INTELLECTUAL BIOGRAPHY

288 (1983) (Alfred Schutz, who made the concept fruitful for social-scientific
inquiry, "accepted Husserl's authorship of this conception").
67. See EDMUND HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY 121-127 (David Carr ed. & trans., 1970)
(1954).
68. Id. at 127.

69. Id. at 131.
70. Id. at 130; see id. at 121-35.
71. On Weber's early influence on Schutz, see WAGNER, supra note 66, at 1316.
72. Habermas refers mostly to a work Schutz left unpublished at his death
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unproblematic, taken-for-granted setting7 3 in which actors
are located spatially, temporally, and socially.74 Actors
encounter both an objective or natural world of things and a
social world of other human beings.75 Their encounters with
those worlds are shaped by their past experiences." But
this lifeworld is essentially shared or "intersubjective," not
the creation or private preserve of individual subjects. 7 The
"segment of the lifeworld" in which particular actions or
interactions take place is the "situation" of action." The
situation is a "context of relevance" 79 circumscribed by a
"horizon"" rather than by fixed boundaries: what is within
the horizon of relevance, and thus included in the situation
of action, depends upon the "theme" of action and the
actors' "glans."81 Actors interpret and define their
situation, and formulate their plans, in reliance upon a

in 1959, entitled Strukturen der Lebenswelt (Structures of the Lifeworld).
Schutz's student, Thomas Luckmann, has completed part of the work-using
much of what Schutz had left behind, but deleting some of it and adding some of
his own material. See Thomas Luckman, Preface to ALFRED SCHUTZ & THOMAS
LucKMANN, THE STRUCTURES OF THE LIFE-WORLD, at xvii-xviii, xxi-xxiv (Richard
M. Zaner & H. Tristram Engelhardt Jr. trans., 1973) (1973). For reasons of
convenience, however, I refer to "Schutz" rather than "Schutz and Luckmann"
in text.
73. See 2 JURGEN HABERMAS, THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION: LIFEWORLD
AND SYSTEM 124 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1987) ((1981) [hereinafter 2 THEORY
OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION]; SCHUTZ & LUCKMANN, supra note 72, at 3-4.
74. See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 123; SCHUTZ
& LUCKMANN, supra note 72, at 19, 35-92.
75. See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 120, 122;
SCHUTZ & LUCKMANN, supra note 72, at 5.
76. See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 121, 122
(describing examples of misunderstanding that could arise if participants do not
sufficiently share common experiences); SCHUTZ & LUCKMANN, supra note 72, at
7-8.
77. See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 125-26;
SCHUTZ & LUCKMANN, supra note 72, at 4-5, 15.
78. See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 123; SCHUTZ
& LUCKMANN, supra note 72, at 113-18.
79. See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 122-23;
SCHUTZ & LUCKMANN, supra note 72, at 19 (describing contexts of relevance); id.
at 182-228 (discussing the "relevance structures" of the lifeworld)
80. See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 122-23;
SCHUTZ & LUCKMANN, supra note 72, at 114-15.
81. See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 121-23;
SCHUTZ & LUCKMANN, supra note 72, at 19, 116-18 (on the "plan" of action); id.
at 186-95 (on "thematic relevance").
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"stock of knowledge"-socially conditioned and transmitted8
and differentially distributed among a society's members. 1
Action, on this view, is "mastery of the situation, ,4 or, the
realization of a plan.
But even in his preliminary sketch of the lifeworld
concept, Habermas introduces an important variation on
Schutz's account. Schutz links the lifeworld to the
problematic of action in general, and even "subjective
experience" in general. 5 Habermas, by contrast, introduces
the lifeworld as the background not to experience in
general, or even to action in general, but as the background
and "horizon" for specifically communicative action. The
concept of the lifeworld, Habermas
87 says, is "complementary
to that of communicative action."

Accordingly, Habermas develops his concept of the
lifeworld in terms familiar from his theory of communicative action. In interpreting their situations and pursuing
their plans, he says, communicative actors in "lifeworld"
situations proceed consensually. Their actions presuppose,
or are directed toward establishing, "common situation
definitions."88 On the basis of these common situation
definitions, they seek to harmonize their plans of action.89
The mechanism for this cooperative process of interpretation and action is the mechanism of communicative
82. See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 121-23; see
SCHUTZ & LUCKMANN, supra note 72, at 113-16 (discussing actors'
"determination of the situation").
83. See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 124-25 (on
the notion of a "stock of knowledge"); id. at 122 (describing an example of locally
or occupationally shared custom unknown to an outsider); SCHUTZ &
LUCKMANN, supra note 72, at 122-25 (on the stock of knowledge); id. at 304-18
(distinguishing between "subjective" stocks of knowledge and the "social" stock
of knowledge, and analyzing the non-uniform distribution of the social stock of
knowledge).
84. 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 135; see SCHUTZ
& LUCKMANN, supra note 72, at 116; see also id. at 116-18 (on "mastering the
situation").
85. See SCHUTZ & LUCKMANN, supra note 72, at 28-32 (on fantasy); see id. at
32-35 (on dreaming).
86. See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 119 (the
lifeworld is "the horizon within which communicative actions are 'always
already' moving").
87. Id. at 119; see also id. at 144, 204 (discussing "complementary concept of
communicative action").
88. Id. at 121, 127.
89. Id. at 127.
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action: mutual acceptance of claims to validity. The
lifeworld, Habermas says, is "so to speak, the transcendental site where speaker and hearer meet, where they
can reciprocally raise claims. . . , and where they can
criticize and confirm those validity claims, settle their
disagreements, and arrive at agreements."9"
Habermas introduces further amendments to Schutz's
phenomenological conception of the lifeworld. A main target
to
according
emphasis-overemphasis,
Schutz's
is
Habermas-on the "stock of knowledge" as a basic structure
of the lifeworld. This stock of knowledge, which Habermas
interprets as "cultural 9 patterns of interpretation,
evaluation, and expression, "' cannot be the only lifeworld
resource on which communicative actors rely. According to
Habermas:
The one-sidedness of the culturalistic concept of the lifeworld
becomes clear when we consider that communicative action is not
only a process of reaching understanding; in coming to an
understanding about something in the world, actors are at the
same time taking part in interactions through which they develop,
confirm, and renew their memberships in social groups and their
own identities. Communicative actions are not only processes of
interpretation in which cultural knowledge is 'tested against the
world'; they are at 92the same time processes of social integration
and of socialization.

Thus, the lifeworld resources on which communicative
actors rely, in interpreting their situations and
harmonizing their plans, include group memberships and
personal identities, as well as the cultural stock of
knowledge.93
As Habermas acknowledges, his account of the lifeworld's resources tracks the culture/society/personality
90. Id. at 126.
91. Id. at 134.
92. Id. at 139; see also id. at 138 (Schutz's account of the lifeworld's
resources is "abridged in a culturalistic fashion").
93. See also id. at 135 ("Action, or mastery of situations, presents itself as a
circular process in which the actor is at once both the initiator of his
accountable actions and the product of the [cultural] tradition in which he
stands, of the solidary groups to which he belongs, of socialization and learning
processes to which he is exposed."). The criticism of Schutz is not entirely fair.
At the very least, he includes in the "stock of knowledge" many of the skills,
competences, and know-hows that Habermas places under the heading of
"personality."
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schema that Talcott Parsons famously developed in
American sociology.94 In a further transformation of
Schutz's phenomenological lifeworld concept, Habermas
proposes that we consider social formations as a whole, not
just particular situations of action, as lifeworlds.95 From
this perspective, he says, culture, society, and personality
are "the structural components of the lifeworld."96 He

defines these "components" as follows:

I use the term culture for the stock of knowledge from which
participants
in
communication
supply
themselves with
interpretations as they come to an understanding about something
in the world. I use the term society for the legitimate orders
through which participants regulate their memberships in social
groups and thereby secure solidarity. By personality I understand
the competences that make a subject capable of speaking and
acting, that put him in a position to take part in processes of
reaching understanding and thereby assert his own identity.

These initial definitions require two clarifications.
First, rather than refer to "society" as a "component" of
society seen as lifeworld, it would be better to refer (as
Habermas
sometimes
does)
to
the "institutional
component" 9 8-that is, the system of social institutions99

94. See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 158 (referring
to the "customary (since Parsons) division into ...society ....culture, and...
personality"); see also 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at
133-34 (attributing the schema to Durkheim).
95. See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 136 (if the
lifeworld concept is to be "theoretically fruitful," one must develop "areference
system for descriptions and explanations relevant to the lifeworld as a whole
and not merely to occurrences within it"); id. at 137 (aim is to develop a theory
of how a lifeworld, seen as a whole, maintains and reproduces itself).
96. Id. at 134; see also id. at 138, 145, 153, 255, 308, 356. I have criticized
elsewhere the idea of culture, society, and personality as "components," as well
as Habermas's more general idea of the lifeworld. See Baxter, supra note 7, at
Part III.C.4.
97. 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 138.
98. See id. at 366.
99. See id. at 134 (referring to the societal component as "institutional
orders"); id. at 141 (suggesting that "institutions" constitute the societal
component); id. at 146 (referring to the societal component as "the institutional
system"); id. at 153 (referring to the "institutional system"); id. at 174 (referring
to "the societal component of the lifeworld-the system of institutions"); id. at
262 (societal component as "institutional orders"); id. at 318 (referring to "the
system of institutions, that is .... the societal component of the lifeworld"); id.

at 366 (referring to "the institutional components of the lifeworld").
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that define group memberships and coordinate interaction
through binding norms and institutionalized values. Law
figures prominently in Habermas's account of this institutional component. He includes the constitutional framework
of state offices, and central "legal institutions" like contract
and property,

°°

as well as "the bases of constitutional law,

the principles of criminal law and penal procedure, and all
regulation of punishable offenses close to morality. "

°'

Second, the "personality" component includes not just
the speech- and action-related competences that Habermas
mentions in the above definition, but also motivations. 2
Habermas, of course, is working at a high level of
abstraction when he refers to competences and motivations
as a structural component of the lifeworld, not just
attributes of individual persons. What he has in mind is
something like a social stock of typical personal
competences and motivations, some subset of which
individuals develop through processes of socialization and
continuing social interaction. As with the distribution of
knowledge, the distribution of these competences and
motivations is far from uniform.
This account of culture, society, and personality as
structural components of the lifeworld is not just an
abstract classification of the resources on which communicative actors rely. Habermas uses it to address the basic
social-theoretical question of how a society reproduces
itself-how, that is, it maintains itself through time and
changes in the content of cultural tradition, institutional
structure, and personal competences."' He distinguishes
between two aspects of social reproduction. The "symbolic
reproduction" of society as lifeworld is the reproduction of
the different lifeworld components he has distinguishedculture, society,
and personality. The
"material
reproduction" of society as lifeworld involves the "maintenance of the material substratum of the lifeworld." 4
Material reproduction implicates the "purposive" aspect of
communicative action---"goal-directed interventions into the
100. See id. at 266.
101. See id. at 365.
102. See id. at 183, 276.
103. See id. at 136-37 (in order to develop a "theoretically fruitful"
conception of the lifeworld, we must "explain the reproduction of the lifeworld
itself").
104. Id. at 138.
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objective world"-while symbolic reproduction depends
more upon the aspect of mutual understanding.1 5
To each of the components of society-seen-as-lifeworld,
Habermas attributes a particular function in symbolic
reproduction. "Cultural reproduction" consists in the
transmission and renewal of cultural knowledge, so as to
"secure[] a continuity of tradition and coherence of
knowledge sufficient for daily practice."'06 "Social
integration" establishes social solidarity through shared
norms and institutionalized values. In so doing, it
coordinates interaction and "stabilizes the identity of
groups to an extent sufficient for everyday practice." 7
"Socialization" operates to develop personal identities,
"secur[ing] for succeeding generations the acquisition of
generalized competences for action and see[ing] to it that
individual life histories are in harmony with collective
forms of life."0 8 These three reproductive processes are
interrelated, in that the reproduction of any one component
contributes to the reproduction of the other two as well." 9
And further, Habermas argues, any particular communicative interaction both draws on, and helps reproduce, each
of the lifeworld's components:
In coming to an understanding with one another about their
situation, participants in interaction stand in a cultural tradition
that they at once use and renew; in coordinating their actions by
way of intersubjectively recognizing validity claims, they are at
once relying on membership in social groups and strengthening
the integration of those same groups; through participating in
interactions with competently acting reference persons, the
growing child internalizes the value orientations 11of his social
0
group and acquires generalized capacities for action.

But under what conditions does a lifeworld's
reproduction count as its "rationalization"? Habermas
addresses this question by, first, returning to Weber's
understanding of rationalization.
As Habermas notes, Weber's notion of "rationalization"
is both broad and complex. Weber's introduction to his
105. Id. at 232; see also id. at 138.

106. See id. at 140 (emphasis omitted).
107. See id. at 140.
108. See id. at 141 (emphasis omitted).
109. See id. at 142 fig.21.

110. Id. at 137.
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studies of the world religions111 mentions the following
historical developments as aspects of "Occidental rationalism": modern empirical and experimental science; systematic theology; a systematized, formalized, and predictable
law; various developments in music, including Western
systems of harmony, written notation, and innovations in
instrumentation; the Gothic vault and dome in architecture;
the technique of perspective in painting; the development
and market circulation of printed literature; the modern
university; specifically Western forms of bureaucratic
administration, with technically and legally trained
officials; periodically elected parliaments connected to a
party system; the capitalist enterprise with its rational
organization of wage labor; rationalized forms of economic
calculation and action; capital markets; technological
employment of scientific knowledge; and a rational
vocational ethic (the Protestant ethic). 12 The breadth of this
list indicates the comprehensiveness of Weber's notion of
rationalization. But it raises questions as to how this list is
to be ordered, and whether "rationalization" bears the same
sense throughout.13
Habermas imposes order upon this "confusing" 4 list of
developments by reading Weber through the culture/society/personality schema that organizes Habermas's
own account of the lifeworld's "components." He distinguishes, accordingly, among rationalization of the cultural
tradition, rationalization of basic social institutions, and the
rationalization of personal motivations, competences, and
dispositions.
Following Weber, Habermas sees the rationalization of
culture as a process of differentiation among "spheres of
value": science in the "cognitive" sphere, law and morality
in the "evaluative" dimension, and autonomous art in the

111. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 13
(Talcott Parsons trans., 1958) (1905).
112. Id. at 13-27.
113. Weber made clear that the terms "rational," "rationalism," and
"rationalization" had different senses in different contexts. See, e.g., MAX
WEBER, The Social Psychology of the World Religions, in FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 267, 293 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. and trans.,
1958); MAX WEBER, Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions, in
FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY, supra, at 323.
114. See 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 158.
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"expressive" dimension." 5 This conception of the different
cultural spheres corresponds closely to Habermas's account
of the various validity claims raised in communicative
action. The correspondence is particularly apparent with
respect to the cognitive and evaluative spheres: science,
Habermas notes, focuses on questions of propositional
truth, and law and morality focus on questions of normative
rightness.1 ' Further, and again following Weber, Habermas
identifies in each of these three spheres of value a "cultural
system of action" that developed in early modernity. These
systems institutionalized discourse with respect to the
relevant validity claim. The "scientific enterprise,"
connected in large part with universities, professionalizes
scientific inquiry. The "artistic enterprise" produces,
distributes, and criticizes artistic and literary works.
Religious associations specialize in questions of morality.
Finally, with respect to legal questions, Habermas locates
"the legal system," which he understands to include
"specialized juridical training," professionalized scholarly
discussion of legal issues,1 7 as well as "public justice." In
these ways, cultural rationalization realizes the rational
potential in communicative action.
Habermas approaches more warily Weber's account of
the rationalization of "society" and "personality." For
Weber, what a theory of rationalization must explain in
these dimensions is, with respect to "society," the development of the modern bureaucratic state and capitalist
economy, and with respect to "personality," the origins of a
methodically rational pattern of life conduct-the
Protestant ethic of labor in one's calling-that served the
rationalizing developments in state and economy. In
Habermas's view, this explanatory strategy focuses too
narrowly on the path modernization actually took, and not

115. See id. at 167 fig.3.
116. See id. at 180. The fit is looser with respect to art. Whereas the third
validity-claim Habermas attributed to communicative action was "sincerity,"
the value-standard he connects to art is "authenticity." See id. By
"authenticity," Habermas seems to mean authenticity in the expression of an
artist's subjectivity. Id. at 161. In this way there is at least an analogical
connection between the validity claims of "sincerity" and "authenticity."
117. He refers here to "scientific jurisprudence." See id. at 165. The German
word translated as "scientific" (wissenschaftlich)has a broader connotation than
its English counterpart, meaning something like "systematic" and
"professionalized."
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enough on the rational potential left unexhausted.
Accordingly, Habermas argues, Weber cannot give
systematic significance to his occasional comments that
"rationalization," as it actually has played out, has led to
pathological and irrational consequences.118 To capture the
ambivalence of "rationalization" as it has unfolded,
Habermas argues, we need more systematic criteria that
are not so closely identified with a capitalist economy,
bureaucratic state, and the patterns of life-conduct that
serve those central social structures.
Habermas identifies three conditions that must be
satisfied if the reproduction of the lifeworld is to count as
its "rationalization." The first builds on the idea of
differentiation with which Weber approached the problem
of cultural rationalization. Habermas presents the initial
point of this rationalization process as one in which a mythbased cultural tradition reigns supreme, not only
underwriting the interpretive schemes of a society's
members, but determining social roles and group memberships, fixing a relatively concrete moral code, prescribing
procedures and standards for political institutions, fixing
the division of labor and limiting the extent of individual
economic initiative, and determining from the outset who
will be able to acquire which competences and skills. 9 Just
as the rationalization of culture involves the differentiation
of three spheres of value, so the rationalization of the
lifeworld as a whole involves the differentiation of the
"components" culture, society, and personality. Society, or,
the institutional order, differentiates itself from the
cultural tradition through a "gradual uncoupling of the
institutional system from worldviews," with the result that
"formal procedures for positing and justifying norms" rather

118. The classic instance is his closing to The ProtestantEthic and the Spirit
of Capitalism,in which Weber suggests that the religious idea of labor in one's
calling has become a morally empty compulsion, with "care for external goods"
becoming an "iron cage." But after intimating that modern Western social
orders have become coercive and instrumental-perhaps in the future a moral
"nullity"-Weber withdraws to the position of value-free scientific observation:

"this brings us," he says, "to the world of judgments of value and of faith, with
which this purely historical discussion need not be burdened." WEBER, supra
note 111, at 181-82.
119. See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 156-59.
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than mythic traditions, establish the legitimacy of social
institutions. 121
The differentiation of the personality component
appears in the "extension of the scope of contingency for
establishing interpersonal relations"-that is, the greater
possibilities for individual initiative in establishing social

relations and acquiring competences and motivations.121

And to the extent the cultural tradition is disentangled
from the operation of social institutions, "the renewal of
traditions depends more and more on individuals' readiness
to criticize and their ability to innovate."122 What Habermas
means with this sketchy account is that the cultural
tradition loses much of its prejudicial power over the course
of social interaction:
These trends can establish themselves only insofar as the yes/no
decisions that carry everyday communicative practice no longer go
back to an ascribed normative consensus, but issue from the
cooperative interpretation processes of participants themselves.

Thus they signal a release
of the rationality potential inherent in
123
communicative action.

The other two conditions Habermas sets for the
rationalization of the lifeworld-a differentiation between
form and content, and an increasing "reflexivity" in the
lifeworld's symbolic reproduction-can be considered
together in their effects on each of the three lifeworld
components. For culture, the differentiation between form
and content means that the "core, identity-securing
traditions" lose the concreteness of mythical worldviews
and develop into abstract basic values (such as autonomy,
liberty, and the like), as well as formal procedures and
structures for communication and argumentation.

24

The

increased "reflexivity" of cultural reproduction arises with
the institutionalization of the cultural systems of action
Weber mentioned: the academy and scientific laboratory,
institutions of professional legal training and scholarship,
religious associations, and the community of artistic

120. See id. at 146.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.

124. Id.
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creation and criticism.125 These institutions and practices
subject the cultural tradition to ongoing criticism and
revision. Culture is not merely reproduced, in the sense of
being carried forward unchanged; it is critically appropriated and discursively transformed.
In the institutional order, the trend toward a
differentiation between form and content brings general
moral and legal principles that are "less and less tailored to
'
concrete forms of life."126
Here Habermas might have in
mind conceptions of the moral agent and legal person that
increasingly abstract from particular characteristics, such
as status, class, religious affiliation, ancestry, and
eventually race and sex, as well as the sense that particular
norms need to be justified not just traditionally but in
terms of more general principles. Here, too, Habermas
emphasizes the development of formal procedures for
creating and justifying norms, with democratic procedures
figuring as particularly important:
Mead and Durkheim... stress the evolutionary significance of
democracy: democratic forms of political will-formation are not
only the result of a power shift in favor of the carrier strata of the
capitalist economic system; forms of discursive will-formation are
established in them. And these affect the quasi-naturalness of
traditionally legitimated domination in a similar way, even as
modern natural science, jurisprudence with specialized training,
and autonomous art break down the quasi-naturalness of
ecclesiastical traditions.12 7

The democratic process is "reflexive," in two senses.
First, the creation and justification of norms is itself normatively regulated. Second, the democratic institutionalization
of political discourse allows for a reflective, or critical,
attitude toward traditional norms and institutions.
In the "personality" component of the lifeworld, the
separation between form and content brings an increasing
' With the universalizaemphasis on "formal competences."128
tion of at least basic formal education, individuals acquire
generalized competences-reading and quantitative skills,
for example-that are applicable in many different settings,
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 146-47.
See id. at 146.
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not just in a particular task or craft.129 The professionalization of formal education, together with the
development of social-scientific disciplines surrounding
child-rearing and education, counts as an increased
"reflexivity" in the socialization process. Here, too,
traditional patterns increasingly are subjected to critical
scrutiny and revision.
In all these ways, according to Habermas, the symbolic
reproduction of the lifeworld's "structural components" has
brought a communicative rationalization, or, the "release" of
31 1
the rationality potential in communicative action. '
Running through this account is an emphasis on three
related points. First, with the communicative rationalization of the lifeworld, social interaction comes to depend
more on communicatively achieved consensus, as opposed to
consensus prescribed in advance by tradition. Second, this
rationalization has meant an increasing importance of
discourse, and not just naive or unreflective communicative
action. Third, the rationalization of the lifeworld has
brought the institutionalization of discourse, not just its
episodic eruption.
D. Rationalizationand the Development of "Systems"
But "rationalization," for Habermas, is not just the
release
and
institutionalization
of communicative
rationality. The process that has brought the communicative rationalization Habermas identifies has, at the same
time, produced a state and economy that operate on other
principles-and in ways that may be dysfunctional for what
Habermas calls the lifeworld.
Habermas's general argument on this point is as
follows. The communicative rationalization of the lifeworld
is part of a trend toward greater social complexity. If
agreement is not secured in advance by tradition, but
depends instead upon the interpretive and discursive
achievements of participants, then the possibility of

129. See id. ("[Tlhe cognitive structures acquired in the socialization process
are increasingly detached from the content of culture knowledge with which
they were at first integrated [and] ....[t]he objects in connection with which

formal competences can be exercised become increasingly variable.").
130. See id. at 147.
131. Id. at 77; see also id. at 88, 146, 180, 288.
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3 2 And
disagreement becomes more burdensome and risky."
accordingly, the problem of coordinating action becomes
more difficult. One way in which modern societies have
managed this greater risk of dissensus, according to
Habermas, is through the development of generalized
"media" such as money and power"'-' steering media," in
Habermas's preferred terminology. The systems that
develop around these media, Habermas argues, coordinate
action and integrate society in a way fundamentally
different from the way those functions are fulfilled through
communicative action and consensus concerning validity
claims.
The usual way Habermas introduces this difference is
through the distinction between action orientations and
action consequences. T Communicative action, with its
"mechanism of mutual understanding," "harmonizes the
action orientations of participants."3 By this Habermas
means that communicative actors are oriented either
toward reaching agreement with each other or toward an
agreement that already has been reached. The interaction
is coordinated through this agreement or mutual search for
agreement. And at a more encompassing level, society itself
is integrated through a general consensus about
institutionalized norms and values. So it appears, at least,
from the perspective of a theory of communicative action.
But according to Habermas, interactions steered by the
"media" around which the economic and administrative
systems develop-money and power-are coordinated
through action consequences. By this he means that actors
in, for example, a monetary transaction may be indifferent
whether they share some mutual commitment to norms or
values. Each participant is oriented toward her own
success. In that sense, then, the actors' orientations are not,
as in the case of communicative action, congruent or even
necessarily complementary. Instead, what coordinates
interaction in this situation, and particularly what binds
together a network of market transactions, is the
"functional[] intermeshing of action consequences." 6

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

See id. at 182-83, 262.
See id. at 180-81, 183, 261-63, 272, 276, 281.
See, e.g., id. at 117, 150, 186-87.
Id. at 150.
Id.
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Similarly, the administrative system, with its steering
medium of political power, operates through relations of
command and obedience. Official command, not communicative agreement, is the mechanism that coordinates action
in the bureaucratic organizations that structure the
administrative system. And official command mediates the
"interchange" relations between the administrative system
and other social spheres. Habermas uses the term "system
integration" to refer to the societal cohesion that the
steering media of money and power produce. The contrast is
to the "social integration" that binds a social lifeworld
together through normative consensus or communicatively
achieved agreement over claims to validity.137
Much of Theory of Communicative Action is devoted to
the construction of a theory that comprehends both social
and system integration. This project involves the synthesis
of two methodological approaches: one focusing on society
as the "lifeworld" of social groups and individuals, and the
other focusing on those spheres of action-the economy and
state administration, in Habermas's view-that operate as
social "systems." The culmination of this synthesis is a
systems-theoretical model of "interchange" between
communicatively organized, socially integrated "lifeworld"
spheres and the systemically integrated economic and
administrative systems.
I have criticized this model at length in other work. 38 It
suffices here to note the conclusions Habermas draws from
that model. The central aim of Theory of Communicative
Action is to account systematically for both the accomplishments and the pathologies of what Weber called
"rationalization." The accomplishments include not just the
communicative rationalization of everyday practice and
social decisionmaking
arrangements but also the
development of complex economic and administrative
systems that reduce, in a non-traditionalistic way, the risk
of dissensus. The pathology Habermas identifies is not the
development of such systems per se but their overextension.
According to Habermas, the "hypertrophic" 39 economic and
administrative systems have "colonized" informally and
communicatively organized spheres of life. The cost has
137. See, e.g., id. at 117-18, 150-51, 186-87.
138. See Baxter, supra note 7.
139. 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 332.
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been impairment of the "symbolic reproduction of the
lifeworld"-interference, that is, with the processes of
cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization.
The emphasis in Theory of Communicative Action thus

is on threats to "the lifeworld,"-i.e., to non-bureaucratic,
non-economic relations and social spheres. While Habermas
briefly discusses then-current forms of political resistance
to the "colonizing" tendencies he identifies,14 ° his main
strategy is to argue that these tendencies face unavoidable
limits, independent of any commitment to political
resistance, in the lifeworld's functional requirements of
symbolic reproduction. On one hand, this strategy avoids
tendentious assumptions about political change. On the
other hand, however, it is normatively defensive."' And
further, assessing whether a society faces a crisis in, for
example, cultural reproduction-which Habermas defines
as maintaining a "continuity of tradition and coherence of
for a
knowledge sufficient for daily practice"142-calls
substantive judgment as to whose "daily practice" matters
and how much knowledge any particular person needs to
acquire.
Habermas's recent work on law is a very different kind
of project. He presents a normative theory of law and
democracy and tries to identify the conditions under which
it could be more fully realized. To be sure, he is concerned
to argue that the normative theory is not just his own
whim, but instead, a position with deep roots in both the
theory and practice of modern law and politics.
Nonetheless, the argument is normatively ambitious in a
way that Theory of Communicative Action is not. The

central ideas of that normative theory are the notions of
communicative action, discourse, and communicative
rationality that I have sketched above.

140. See id. at 391-96.
141. See William E. Forbath, Habermas's Constitution: A History, Guide,
and Critique, 23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 967, 999 (1998); Dick Howard, Law and
Political Culture, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1391, 1403-04 (1996); James Bohmann,
Complexity, Pluralism, and the ConstitutionalState: On Habermas's Faktizitat
und Geltung, 28 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 897, 916 & n.23 (1994); John Tweedy & Alan
Hunt, The Future of the Welfare State and Social Rights: Reflections on
Habermas,21 J.L. & SOC'Y 288, 296 (1994).

142. 2
omitted).

THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION,

supra note 73, at 140 (emphasis
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II. HABERMAS'S "RECONSTRUCTION" OF MODERN LAW
A. The Two Aspects of Legal Validity and Habermas's
Method of Reconstruction
The premise of Habermas's analysis of modern law is
the social condition he has described as the "rationalization
of the lifeworld."4 Through this process of rationalization,
Habermas has argued, the cultural tradition has been
largely secularized and has lost much of its power to
prescribe in advance the division of labor and social roles.
Action must be coordinated less through an unproblematic
background consensus and more through the achievements
of participants themselves. Interest positions are more
sharply differentiated, and the possibility of dissensus and
conflict accordingly has increased. Communicative action,
Habermas has said, offers one mechanism for coordinating
action and integrating society. But attempts to secure
communicative agreement are burdensome and risky,
Habermas has maintained, and further, modern societies
are characterized by the development of spheres of strategic
(or "media-steered") interaction. Accordingly, communicative agreement cannot be the only mechanism by which
action is coordinated and modern societies integrated.
Modern law addresses these difficulties. On one hand,
law enforces compliance by strategic actors (and those
otherwise uncommitted to the law's normative claims)
through sanctions. On the other hand, if a legal order is to
provide a stable basis for social integration, it must be
accepted as generally legitimate. According to Habermas,
modern law is characterized by these two aspects: its
steering of actors' choices through sanctions and its claim to
legitimacy. Both are essential. Law, on Habermas's
analysis, "leave[s] the choice of action orientation up to the
addressees.""' In other words, it offers the alternative
between two forms of compliance: one motivated by a
concern for the sanctions that the norm's enforcement
would impose, and the other motivated by a belief that the
legal norm is legitimate. Law, then, is tailored to both the
"objectivating" and "performative" attitudes that Habermas

143. See supra Part I.C.
144. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 29.
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used to distinguish between strategic and communicative
action.145

The idea that a legal order's legitimacy buttresses its
long-run stability is a staple of social theory. And as
Habermas notes, it features particularly prominently in
Max Weber's sociology of law."6 Habermas parts company
with Weber, however, as to exactly how social theory should
understand the notion of legitimacy. For his part, Weber
distinguished between social (or de facto) validity and
"ideal" validity.14 ' With the notion of social validity, Weber
meant to address the issue whether, as a matter of
sociological fact, members of a society generally believe that
the society's legal order and its norms are obligatory. With
the notion of ideal validity, by contrast, Weber meant to
refer to the question whether, as a matter of legal or
political theory, a society's legal order and norms are
legitimate-whether, that is, a legal order's socially
accepted claim to validity genuinely may be redeemed.
Weber's sociology of law, and with it his notion of a legal
order's legitimacy, addresses only the matter of social
validity. A legal order's ideal validity, Weber says, is a
question for legal theory or jurisprudence or the philosophy
of law, not for sociology.'
Habermas's "reconstructive" approach does not so
quickly exile the question of ideal validity. His perspective
on legitimacy is more abstract than Weber's focus on actors'
actual beliefs about legal norms and the legal order.
Habermas's reconstruction of "the self-understanding of...
modern legal orders"'49 focuses on the presuppositions that
underlie modem practices of legal justification. Because the
process of rationalization has undermined the social order's
religious and metaphysical support, Habermas argues, the
only plausible form of justification is through discourse. °
An important part of Habermas's reconstructive analysis of
law, therefore, is to analyze the various kinds of discourse

145. See supra Part I.A.

146. See

eds., 1978).
147. See, e.g., 1

148. See

supra note 2, at 67-68; see also, e.g., 1
31, 213 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich

BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS,

MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY
WEBER,

supra note 146, at 31-33, 311-13.

BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS,

149. Id. at 82 (emphasis omitted).
150. See id. at 106-07.

supra note 2, at 69-70.
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involved in making and applying legitimate law.15 1 At the
same time, Habermas argues, the emphasis on discourse
does not mean that he is concerned only with law's "ideal
validity." Instead, Habermas intends his discourse theory of
law to reconstruct the presuppositions characteristic of
modern societies, not to survey law from a perspective
generated solely through an extrinsic ideal theory. As with
his notion of "rationalization," Habermas's reconstructive
analysis of a modern legal order is designed to capture its
unexhausted rational potential, but from a perspective
more or less immanent to the legal order, not a utopian
perspective.
The tensions Habermas identifies at the outset of his
theory of law-tensions between ideal and empirical
validity, and between legitimacy and enforcementexemplify a more general theoretical logic underlying
Between Facts and Norms. The German title of that book is
Faktizitdt und Geltung which, translated literally, means
"facticity and validity." This distinction
between
"facticity"'
and "validity" organizes the argument of
Between Facts and Norms at every level. With "facticity,"
Habermas associates ideas such as law's positivity,
certainty or predictability, institutional connections, and
coercive enforcement.' With "validity" he associates law's
(ideal) legitimacy and "rational acceptability""'-i.e., its
claim to be more normatively worthy of obedience. As
suggested above, Habermas considers both moments
essential. So, too, is the tension between them.
It may be worth a moment to make the architectonic of
Habermas's project more clear. Between Facts and Norms
divides into two main parts, each paired with one side of
the most comprehensive facticity/validity distinction
Habermas identifies. The first part, on the "validity" side, is

151. See infra Part II.C.3.
152. The word "Faktizitdt"is not so rare as the English word "facticity." The
latter, however, shows up at least in unabridged dictionaries, and is defined as

"having the quality of being a fact." 5

THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

652 (2d

ed. 1989).
153. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 8, 28-30, 32, 64, 198,
447-48 (connecting "facticity" and coercive enforcement); id. at 198 (connecting
"facticity" and certainty or predictability); id. at 64 (connecting "facticity" and
law's institutional dimension); id. at 28, 95, 447-48 (connecting "facticity" and
positivity).
154. See id. at 29; see also id. at 38, 64, 95, 198, 447-48.
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the reconstructive and normative theory: the "discourse
theory
of law" proper, 5
established
through
a
reconstructive account of modern legal orders' "selfunderstanding."" 6 The second part, on the "facticity" side, is
the "communication theory of society," in which Habermas
examines, from the point of view of social theory, whether
the reconstructive discourse theory is plausible under
factually obtaining conditions of modern social complexity. I
consider in this article only the first part of Habermas's
project, treating the communication theory of society in a
companion article,' 7 but Habermas makes clear that he
understands the two parts to be moments of the same
project.158
In this first division-between discourse theory proper
and the communication theory of society-the tension
between facticity and validity is, Habermas says,
"external." By this he means that he is concerned, in that
aspect of his project, with the tension between officially
legitimate democratic and legal procedures, on one hand,
and on the other hand, the systems of "social power" that
may displace or otherwise influence those procedures
"externally."'5 9
But the tension between facticity and validity,
Habermas argues, inhabits also the very notion of legal
validity itself.60 And so even in Habermas's discourse
theory proper-which occupies the "validity" side in the
"external" tension between facticity and validity-the
tension between facticity and validity reappears, this time
155. I say "proper" because Habermas also sometimes calls the whole
project his "discourse theory of law and democracy."
156. This part comprises chapters 3-6 of Between Facts and Norms. (The
first two chapters are introductory, designed to set out the basic distinction
between facticity and validity.)
157. Baxter, supra note 7.
158. See Jirgen Habermas, Reply to Symposium Participants,Benjamin N.
Cardozo School of Law, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at
381, 444 (turn to social science is "meant to make it plausible that the
reconstructed normative self-understanding of modern legal orders does not
hang in mid-air," but instead "connects with the social reality of highly complex
societies").
159. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 38 (characterizing as
an "externalrelation between facticity and validity" the problem of "the facticity
of legally uncontrolled social power that penetrates law from the outside"); see
also id. at 82 (referring to the "external tension between the normative claims
of constitutional democracies and the facticity of their actual functioning").
160. See, e.g., id. at 64, 82, 95.
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as an "internal"- tension, or, as a tension immanent in the
"validity dimension" of modern law itself. 6 ' The basic figure
of Habermas's work on law is the nesting of tensions
between facticity and validity. That is the architectonic61 2of
Habermas's reconstructive theory of law and democracy.
The structure of chapters in Between Facts and Norms
reflects this architectonic. After the first two chapters,
which sketch basic concepts in Habermas's earlier work and
introduce the facticity/validity distinction, chapters three
and four present the core of the discourse theory properthe "validity" side
of the
most comprehensive
facticity/validity division. Chapters seven and eight address
the "communication theory of society" that occupies the
"facticity" side of that distinction. The intervening chapters
five and six "test" the discourse theory, Habermas says, by
addressing adjudication-related issues in legal theory and
constitutional law.

161. Id. at 42.
162. In this respect, and ironically, Habermas's recent work seems close in
logic to the theory of autopoietic systems developed by Niklas LuhmannHabermas's long-time partner in debate, and still the object of Habermas's
polemic. Luhmann's recurring strategy is to identify an "internal" and an
"external" side of a distinction-as between "self-reference" and "external
reference," "closure" and "openness," or "system" and "environment"--then to
show that each side of the distinction presupposes the other. See, e.g., NIKLAS
LUHMANN, DAS RECHT DER GESELLSCHAFT 74 (1993) (unity of law presupposes
the distinction of law from its environment); id. at 76 (openness is possible only
on the basis of closure); id. (distinction between system and environment is
internal to the system); id. at 83 (system's closure as unity of closure and
openness); id. at 223-24 (idea of justice as the unity of a difference, or a unity in
difference); id. at 308 (legal decision as the unity of a difference among
alternatives); Niklas Luhmann, The Unity of the Legal System, in AUTOPOIETIC
LAW 12, 23 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1988) (self-reference as the "simultaneous
practice of self-reference and external reference"). As Luhmann notes, however,
the distinction between facticity and validity is not one of mutual exclusion. See
Niklas Luhmann, Quod Omnes Tangit: Remarks on Jirgen Habermas's Legal
Theory, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 157, 161
[hereinafter Luhmann, Quod Omnes Tangit]. In this respect, the
facticity/validity distinction differs from the distinctions on which Luhmann's
method thrives. Perhaps for this reason, Luhmann does not see a parallel
between Habermas's rhetorical strategy and his own. See id. (describing
Habermas's characterization of the facticity/validity relation as "not much more
than a formula for perplexity").
I have discussed systematically Luhmann's autopoietic theory of law in
Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the "RelativeAutonomy of Law," 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1987 (1998).
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Chapters three and four, devoted to the "validity" side
of the most general facticity/validity distinction, seem in
turn to divide along the lines of that same distinction.' In
chapter three, Habermas addresses, first, what he calls "the
system of rights," by which he means the categories of basic
rights (five, according to Habermas) that any modern
system of law must recognize if it is to count as legitimate.
He turns then in chapter four to an account of "the
principles of the constitutional state," addressing the
institutional mechanisms and procedures required to
implement the basic rights that he has set out abstractly,
under the heading of "the system of rights," as conditions of
any legal system's legitimacy. The account of the system of
rights thus seems to track the "validity" side of Habermas's
basic distinction, while the account of the constitutional
state develops the institutional and positive dimension of
law that Habermas connects with "facticity." Yet
Habermas's argument-a characteristic argument throughout his work on law and democracy-will be that the two
moments, analytically distinguishable, mutually presuppose and complete one another.
In Part II.B below, I examine Habermas's account of the
system of rights. In Part II.C, I will take up Habermas's
account of the principles of the constitutional state.
B. The System of Rights
The task of Habermas's "system of rights" is to mediate
two related tensions: between private and public autonomy,
and between basic rights and popular sovereignty. Here,
too, Habermas sees these tensions as expression of a more
general tension between facticity and validity."M Basic
individual rights create spheres of morally neutralized
action, thus securing individuals' private autonomy. But
these rights must be justified and made legitimate through
a "legislative procedure" that is based on the "principle of
163. I say "seem to divide" because Habermas does not make the claim
explicitly.
164. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 82 (the "system of
rights as a whole is shot through with that internal tension between facticity
and validity manifest in the ambivalent mode of legal validity"); id. at 129
(suggesting that the relation between private and public autonomy is a relation
between facticity and validity); id. at 136 ("tension between private and public
autonomy" as "tension between facticity and validity").
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popular sovereignty."'65 The idea of Habermas's system of
rights is to show that these two aspects of modern law are
not only compatible but "co-original."'66
First, however, Habermas must show that modern legal
orders' "self-understanding" manifests the tension that he
proposes to mediate.
1. The Grounds of Law's Legitimacy. Habermas's
reconstruction of modern legal orders' "self-understanding"
begins with readings of two traditions: nineteenth-century
German civil-law theory and the social contract theory of
Rousseau and Kant. Habermas draws two conclusions from
these readings. First, the ideas of human rights and
popular sovereignty are "the sole ideas that can justify
modern law."'67 Second, neither tradition succeeded in
reconciling the two ideas. This account is the background
for Habermas's own attempt to mediate the tension
between human rights and popular sovereignty, private
autonomy and civic autonomy.
In German private-law theory, Habermas sees the
primacy of individual private-law rights to property and
free contract. For the mid-nineteenth century authors in
this tradition, these rights presupposed an equality among
legal persons and were based in the mutual recognition of
all. But this mutual recognition was independent of
authorization by a democratic legislature. The justification
for these private-law rights was that they created and
maintained a zone of personal sovereignty and private
autonomy.'68 This moral grounding of private-law rights
gave way, according to Habermas, with the ascent of
positivist theories of the late nineteenth century-theories
that traced the validity of law not to its correspondence
with moral notions but to the binding will of a sovereign. 9
And according to Habermas, subsequent developments in
German civil-law theory-efforts to restore the moral
grounding of private-law rights, to add "social rights" to the
negative liberties of private law, or to explain the

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 82-83.
See id. at 127.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 85.
Id. at 85-86.
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connection between private autonomy and democratic
lawmaking-have been unsuccessful. 7 '
In Rousseau, Habermas finds the ideas of political
autonomy and popular sovereignty that are absent in
classical civil-law jurisprudence. And with Rousseau's link
between democratic lawmaking and the general will, the
exercise of political autonomy seems to guarantee the equal
liberties of all. In that sense, Habermas says, Rousseau's
emphasis on civic autonomy establishes "an internal
connection between popular sovereignty and human
rights." 7 ' But Rousseau places demanding preconditions on
this exercise of civic autonomy. If the legal order is not to be
a coercive order, the political community must be small and
already integrated through a shared cultural tradition and
its members must possess extraordinary civic virtue.1 72 In
Habermas's view, however, these conditions amount to a
denial of the basic problematic of modern law: the
differentiation of interest positions, the pluralization of
groups and conceptions of the good, and the increasing
importance of self-interested action. And thus, according to
Habermas, the promised reconciliation of private and civic
autonomy remains fictive-at least with respect to a
recognizably modern society.'73
Finally, in Kant Habermas finds both a notion of
political autonomy and an emphasis upon private
individual liberties. The grounding for these private rights
is, as in German civil-law jurisprudence, a moral notion of
autonomy and the mutual recognition of rights among
equals. These particular rights are for Kant the
specification of a more general right to equal liberties. The
requirement that these rights be specified in positive law
seems to link Kant's system of rights to the idea of popular
sovereignty. But according to Habermas, the status of these
individual rights as prepolitical natural rights creates an
"unacknowledged competition between morally grounded
human rights and the principle of popular sovereignty."'74
The morally grounded system of rights operates as a limit
on democratic legislation. Thus, rather than reconciling the

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 86-89.
Id. at 101 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 102.
See id. at 101-02.
Id. at 94 (emphasis omitted).
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idea of human rights with the principle of popular
sovereignty, Habermas claims, Kant subordinates the latter
to the former.'75
Habermas incorporates into his preliminary notion of
law several points on which his three readings converge.
Modern law, in all three, centers around a "system of
rights." These rights take the form of equally distributed,
mutually recognized individual liberties that define the
legal person as rights-bearer. Following Kant and the
German civil-law tradition, Habermas sees these individual
rights as the basis for private autonomy-the sphere of
individual decisionmaking that must be preserved if law is
to be legitimate. Further, from Rousseau and Kant,
Habermas incorporates the idea of popular sovereignty or
democratic lawmaking as a source of legitimacy. The idea
here is that a legal order is legitimate to the extent that its
norms are authored by their addressees. Habermas refers
to this idea, interchangeably, as "civic autonomy," "public
autonomy," or "political autonomy." And according to
Habermas, Rousseau and Kant saw also that these two
sources of legitimacy needed to be genuinely reconciledpopular sovereignty with individual rights, or, put
differently, private autonomy with civic autonomy. But the
reconciliations failed in each case, according to Habermas,
because each tacitly ranks one term in these conceptual
pairs over the other. Kant, Habermas maintains,
emphasizes a "moral reading of human rights" that
subordinates popular sovereignty and civic autonomy.
Rousseau provides an "ethical reading of popular sovereignty"-where, by "ethical," Habermas means "pertaining
to a particular community's form of life."'76 Kant and the
early German civil-law theorists thus grounded law in
morality. Rousseau grounded it in the shared life of a
unified and virtuous ethical community. In both cases, law's
legitimacy is established extralegally, by virtue of the
postulated correspondence between the legal order and
some other order-whether moral or (in Habermas's sense)
ethical.
According to Habermas, the subordination of law to
morality or ethical life misunderstands the place of law in
175. See id. at 105-06, 449.
176. See infra Part II.C.3. (discussing problems in Habermas's idea of
"ethical discourse").
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modern society. Legal norms are not just imperfect copies of
universal moral norms, nor are they simply emanations of
an existing, prepolitical consensus. 77 Habermas sees the
relation between law and morality as complementary, and
he understands both as differentiated from particular forms
of life belonging to ethically unified communities. 178 He
makes these points in the first instance through his theory
of rationalization.
The process Habermas calls the "rationalization of the
lifeworld" brings an increasing pluralism of forms of life,
with the customary norms and practices of each "devalued
to mere conventions." 179 This allows the differentiation of
both morality and law from traditional norms based in
particular homogenous communities. On Habermas's
reading, morality becomes increasingly universalisticHabermas focuses on Kant's moral theory, but utilitarianism would qualify as well-and moral norms are to be
justified not simply by their coherence with particular
traditions but impartially, through universalistic moral
discourses. 8 ° With the positivization of law, legal norms
come to be generated through legally prescribed procedures. 8 ' The process of rationalization, then, weakens the
connections between legal and moral norms, on one hand,
and the customs of particular communities, on the other.
The positivization of law-the generation of legal norms
through legally prescribed procedures-differentiates legal
from moral norms.'82 So too does the internal link between
the validity of a legal norm, but not a moral norm, and the
norm's enforcement.183 And so too do the different references
of the two kinds of norms-to members of a legal
community, in the case of legal norms, and (on Habermas's
view) to "humanity or a presupposed republic of world
citizens," in the case of moral norms.' But Habermas sees
the relation between law and morality not just as
differentiation: the two kinds of norms, he says, are

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 105-06.
See id. at 105.
Id. at 106.
See id. at 97-98.
See id. at 111.
See id. at 79, 110.
See id. at 155-56.
Id. at 108.
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"complementary."185 Law, according to Habermas, compensates for the heavy burdens that universalistic, postconventional moralities place upon individuals. Some of
these burdens Habermas classifies as "cognitive."
Postconventional moralities consist not in a list of concrete
duties but primarily in a universalization principle and an
idea of discursive justification. Because they require
autonomous determinations, postconventional moralities
require the individual to make difficult judgments in
justifying general principles, in deciding which of several
potentially applicable principles should apply, and in
applying an abstract principle to a factual situation.186 Legal
187
norms ease this burden with their relative concreteness.
And through their employment of sanctions to induce
compliance, legal norms address also the "weakness of the
will" problems that are exacerbated in postconventional
moralities.'
From a functional point of view, then, law
supplements morality in regulating interpersonal relations,
and it does so through institutionally bound, coercive
mechanisms that are absent from postconventional
morality.
Habermas thus rejects the idea that law is subordinate
to morality or the prepolitical customs and norms of a
particular homogenous community. And although he sees
legal and moral norms as complementary, he rejects the
idea that law's legitimacy can be established solely through
moral theory: the institutional dimension of law and its
coercive mechanisms are sufficient to differentiate law, and
the basis of its legitimacy, from morality. Thus, if human
rights and popular sovereignty are to be the grounds of
law's legitimacy, they need to be understood not in a moral
or ethical sense, but directly as legal rights and legal
procedures.'89

185. Id. at 105-06, 113, 118, 452, 453.
186. See id. at 114-15.
187. See id. at 153.
188. See id. at 115-16.
189. See id. at 107 ("Wle must not understand basic rights or Grundrechte,
which take the shape of constitutional norms, as mere imitations of moral
rights, and we must not take political autonomy as a mere copy of moral
autonomy."); id. at 105 ("Human rights, too, which are inscribed in citizens'
practice of democratic self-determination, must then be conceived from the start
as rights in the juridical sense, their moral content notwithstanding.").
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Habermas's reconstruction of the system of rights aims
at an account that "gives equal weight to both the private
and the public autonomy of the citizen."9 ° In accounting for
civic or political autonomy, Habermas says, he must
incorporate the sense in which a legal order can be said to
be authored by the members of a legal community who are
also the addressees of legal norms."1 Here he must make
room for democratic procedures of lawmaking-or as
Habermas puts it, for the "discursive processes of opinionand will-formation in which the sovereignty of the people
assumes a binding character."'92 And in accounting for
private autonomy, Habermas claims, he must leave room
for individuals not to exercise this very "communicative
freedom." 93 Legally protected private liberties involve
actors' freedom to "withdraw from the public space ...to a
position of mutual observation and influence."" In terms of
Habermas's action theory, these liberties "entitle one to
drop out of communicative action"19 5 and to act strategically
with respect to individual interests. In these respects,
private liberties are basic to the creation of morally
neutralized spheres of strategic action-spheres of action
analyzed as the economic and
that Habermas's earlier 19work
6
administrative systems.
But Habermas has in mind here more than just the
freedom to act strategically in pursuit of economic gain or
power. He speaks also of a right to "privacy" that consists in
an actor's refusal "to give others an account or give publicly
acceptable reasons for her action plans."'97 This freedom to
withdraw from the exercise of "communicative freedom"that is, the freedom to refuse to exercise one's public or
political autonomy-is a necessary condition of that

190. Id. at 118.
191. See id. at 104 (the account must "decipher, in discourse-theoretic
terms, the motif of self-legislation according to which the addressees of law are
simultaneously the authors of their rights"); id. at 120 (the idea of political
autonomy implies that "those subject to law as its addressees can at the same
time understand themselves as authors of law").
192. Id. at 104.
193. See id. at 119-20.
194. Id. at 120.
195. Id.
196. See supra Part I.D.
197. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 120.
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communicative freedom itself.'98 In that respect, public
autonomy already could be said to presuppose private
autonomy.
2. The "Discourse Principle" and the Categories of
Basic Rights. Habermas's categories of basic rights are
designed further to reconcile the tension between private
and public autonomy-a tension that appears also in the
relation between human rights and popular sovereignty.
Habermas approaches this reconciliation project with what
he calls "the discourse principle." In its general form this
principle is neutral between law and morality.'?' As
Habermas puts it, the discourse principle "merely expresses
the meaning of postconventional requirements
of
justification"--that is, the requirements of justification in
a rationalized "lifeworld," where tradition and religious or
metaphysical worldviews are no longer sufficient to
legitimate social norms or institutions. Habermas states the
principle as follows:
Just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected
.. 201
persons could agree as participants in rational discourses.

I will examine later the ambiguity of "could" in the
expression "could agree."2 ' For now, clarification of the
other terms-all of which are expressly defined 20 3 -will
198. See Klaus Guinther, Communicative Freedom, Communicative Power,
and Jurisgenesis,in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 234,
238. Ulrich Preuss suggests that on this point Habermas needs a theory of civic
obligation and virtue. See Ulrich K. Preuss, Communicative Power and the
Concept of Law, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 323,

334-35. In his reply, Habermas makes clear that he means only that there can
be no legally enforceable duty to exercise one's communicative freedom. Jurgen
Habermas, Reply to Symposium Participants, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND

DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 371, 438. Habermas does not preclude a moral
duty to exercise one's political autonomy, although Preuss is right that
Habermas does not argue for such a duty.
199. Habermas notes that his prior work has failed to distinguish
adequately between the discourse principle in general and the version
appropriate to moral discourse. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at
108.
200. Id. at 107.
201. Id.
202. See infra text accompanying note 359.
203. Niklas Luhmann makes this observation and argues that Habermas
relies on the ambiguity of the word "could." See Luhmann, Quod Omnes Tangit,
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suffice. By "action norms," Habermas means "temporally,
socially,
and
substantively
generalized
behavioral
expectations." By "affected persons" he means "anyone
whose interests are touched by the foreseeable consequences of a general practice regulated by the norms at
issue." And with the term "rational discourse," he refers to
"any attempt to reach an understanding over problematic
validity claims,"2 °4 provided that conditions permit "free
processing of topics and contributions, information and
reasons."" 5 Habermas adds a rider that will turn out to be
important: the term "rational discourse" also "refers
indirectly to bargaining processes insofar as these are
regulated by discursively grounded procedures." 06 This
rider allows him to include also processes of "compromise,"
where discursive agreement is impossible to obtainprovided that the bargaining conditions underlying the
compromise are fair.0 7 Such compromises will turn out to be
important in his account of the Rechtsstaat, or
constitutional state.
The other conceptual tool Habermas introduces is the
idea of "the legal form." Habermas seems to mean by this
term the formal characteristics of legal norms that make
them specifically legal rather than moral. 28 Habermas also
refers in this context to "the legal medium." The terms
"legal form" and "legal medium" seem to be synonymous for
Habermas. 09 But his use of the word "medium," together
supra note 162, at 164-65. I take up this point with respect to the "democracy
principle," corollary of the discourse principle. See infra text accompanying
notes 239-45.
204. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 107.
205. Id. at 108.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 108, 165-66, 283.
208. He introduces the idea in a discussion of Kant's distinction between
legal and moral norms. See id. at 111-12. He invokes it a second time in the
context of, again, distinguishing between legal and moral norms. See id. at 11819.
209. Id. at 119 ("The legal medium as such presupposes rights that define
the status of legal persons as bearers of rights."); see id. ("[Tihis legal form itself
already gives rise to the privileged position that rights occupy in modem legal
orders."); William Rehg, Against Subordination: Morality, Discourse, and
Decision in the Legal Theory of Jirgen Habermas, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND
DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 257, 262 (referring to "what Habermas calls the
'legal medium' or 'legal form' "); see also BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note
2, at 122 (seeming to use the terms "legal form" and "medium of law"
indiscriminately).
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with the unclear relation between "legal form" and "legal
medium," gets Habermas into some conceptual difficulties.
The problem with the term "medium" is that
Habermas's prior writings, as well as a number of passages
in Between Facts and Norms, use the term "medium" as
shorthand for "steering medium." As I mentioned briefly in
Part I.D, the term "steering medium" is part of Habermas's
social-theoretical vocabulary, and it refers to money and
power as "system" mechanisms that coordinate action by
circumventing the process of reaching communicative
agreement. 1 ' As Habermas explains, his idea of a "steering
medium" is a more restrictive version of what Talcott
Parsons called "generalized symbolic media," or, specialized
languages21 ' for particular social subsystems (such as the
economy and polity). In referring to "the legal medium,"
Habermas probably means something more like Parsons's
"generalized symbolic medium" than his own "steering
medium." If that is so, then law is not a "steering medium"
analogous to money and power," 2 but instead, a "language"
with a specialized vocabulary and conceptual structure that
"circulates" throughout society. 3 And if we understand the
term "legal medium" in that way, then the term "legal form"
should mean that which marks the legal medium as legalthe particular structure and characteristics of law that
make it what it is.
Even with this conceptual clarification, Habermas's
argument is difficult to follow. His initial claim is that the
"[tihe legal medium as such [or the legal form] presupposes
rights that define the status of legal persons as bearers of
rights.""4 Habermas has in mind, in the first instance, the
210. For a more extended discussion of Habermas's idea of "steering media,"
see Baxter, supra note 7, at Part II.B.2.
211. See, e.g., Talcott Parsons, Some Problems of General Theory in
Sociology, in SOCIAL

SYSTEMS AND THE EVOLUTION OF ACTION THEORY

at 240-41

(1977) ("Money... not only resembles a language, but is a very specialized
language through which intentions and conditional consequences of actions are
communicated.").
212. In Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas did claim that in at
least some of its operations, law functioned as a steering medium like money or
power. See 2 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 73, at 365-73. He

repudiates this notion expressly in Between Facts and Norms. See BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 562 n.48.
213. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 56.
214. Id. at 119. He says, in an alternative formulation, that "the general

right to liberties" is "constitutive for the legal form as such." Id. at 121.
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sort of liberties he analyzes under the heading of private
autonomy. 215 But he does not mean that the legal form (or
legal medium) by itself necessarily implies the panoply of
rights recognized in German civil-law theory or in any
particular existing legal system. What he means, instead, is
that the legal form (and legal medium) presuppose a
concept of legal personhood, and that the concept of legal
person is one of rights-bearer, whatever the particular
content of those rights might be. Habermas's perspective
here is of course abstract, but it is nonetheless familiar.
American status law historically has denied full legal
personhood to members of various groups by limiting or
denying outright the rights available to others-whether
private-law rights or rights of political participation. Those
who lack the full complement of rights ordinarily granted to
legal persons are, to that extent, not full legal persons. So
what Habermas means is that, whatever the precise
content of rights in a given legal system, the idea of modern
law uses the idea of rights to define the status of persons,
and legal personhood is a necessary condition for participation in legal communication. In that sense the form or
medium of law implies a system of rights.
But what sort of rights? This is the point at which
Habermas invokes the discourse principle. He describes
three "categories" of rights that are generated "simply from
the application of the discourse principle to the medium of
' The first category of rights he mentions is:
law as such."216
1. Basic

rights

that result from

the politically

autonomous

elaboration of the right to the greatest possible measure of equal
individual liberties.

This category needs some parsing to be intelligible. Two
aspects of Habermas's formulation particularly need explanation. The first concerns the words "greatest possible
measure of equal," just before the words "individual
liberties." Habermas has said that the legal medium-or
215. See id. at 119 ("These rights are tailored to the freedom of choice of
typical social actors; that is, they define liberties that are granted
conditionally.").
216. Id. at 122. Here he seems to equate the legal medium with "the
conditions for the legal form of a horizontal association of free and equal
persons." Id.
217. Id.

254

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

(he sometimes says) the legal form-implies the idea of
individual liberties that define the status of legal persons.
Here, however, we have the proviso that there must be "the
greatest possible measure of equal" individual liberties. The
language in quotation marks, according to Habermas, is the
contribution of the discourse principle."18 While he does not
explain this point, he likely means that we could not expect
"all possibly affected persons" to "agree as participants in
[a] rational discourse[ ,"219 as the discourse principle would
require, to a system of unequal liberties. And if equal
liberties were the outcome of this discourse, then the
participants would opt for the maximum of liberties
compatible with the liberties of all. That, at any rate, must
be Habermas's argument.22 °
The other part of this formulation that needs explanation is the phrase "politically autonomous elaboration of'
the right to equal liberties. Just as Kant saw the right to
equal liberties as a general principle that needed to be
particularized, 21 so Habermas would require "elaboration"
of this same right. 2 This first category of rights, and the
22
categories that follow, are just "unsaturated placeholders" 1
rather than lists of actual rights. And the words "politically
autonomous" before "elaboration" suggest that the elaboration of this category is for citizens to perform rather than

218. Id. at 123.
219. Id. at 107.
220. This formulation might be more Rawlsian than Habermasian. Cf
Jirgen Habermas, Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks
on John Rawls's PoliticalLiberalism, 92 J. PHIL. 109, 111-19 (1995) (criticizing
the "design" of Rawls's idea of the "original position"). But alternative
justifications for this category of rights are not readily available. Insofar as it
validates moral norms, the discourse principle takes the form of a strict
universalization principle. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at
116-17. So one might think that equality of legal liberties follows straight from
the discourse principle. But as noted in text above, the "reference system" for
legal norms is narrower-a legal community, not humanity at large. Perhaps,
though, the idea is that the discourse principle imports a more limited
universalization requirement for legal norms, such that within a legal
community the distribution of liberties must be equal. Still, the question would
remain: why the "greatest possible measure" of equal individual liberties? How
does the discourse principle imply this requirement (sensible as it might be)?
221. See supra text accompanying note 174.
222. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 123-24 ("Kant's
principle of law coincides with this general right to equal liberties" and defines
only "a legal code," not the precise content of particular rights).
223. Id. at 126.

2002]

HABERMAS'S DISCOURSE THEORY

255

for the theorist. The reason is Habermas's idea of political
autonomy. If the system of rights is to give adequate weight
to citizens' political autonomy, then the precise content of
those rights must be left up to citizens' discursive exercise
of their political autonomy. The theorist is a "nonparticipant"224 in this politically autonomous elaboration of
the right to equal liberties, and it is not for her to determine
precisely what rights citizens should accord one anotherunless, perhaps, the theorist is intervening in an ongoing
debate in an existing society, and in that case the theorist
is
25
operating in a different phase of Habermas's project.
The second and third categories of rights-relating to
membership in a legal community and to the "actionability"
of rights-are, according to Habermas, "necessary
corollaries"2 6 of the first category of rights. "Corollaries"
may not be the right word. But he seems right that the
concept of legal personhood implies both membership in a
legal community and-at least as a general matter, and in
modern societies-the "actionability" of rights. Here, too,
Habermas includes the qualification that each category
refers to rights that arise only through an exercise of
citizens' political autonomy. For that reason these second
and third categories, like the first, are only "unsaturated
placeholders." Habermas formulates these two categories as
follows:
2. Basic rights that result from the politically autonomous
elaboration of the status of a member in a voluntary association of
consociates under law.
3. Basic rights that result immediately from the actionability of
rights and from the politically autonomous elaboration of
individual legal protection.

Habermas describes briefly
these second and third categories
membership rights establishes
those who belong and those who

the sorts of rights that
implicate. The category of
the distinction between
do not belong to the legal

224. Id. at 118.
225. Another way to reach this same conclusion would be to note that the
concept of the "legal medium" (or "legal form") is too abstract to generate a list
of particular rights. There are a variety of ways to distribute liberties without
violating the idea of law.
226. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 122.
227. Id. at 122.
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community. The general subject matter concerns citizenship
rules, immigration, and emigration. Habermas suggests
that the right to emigrate must be guaranteed and
voluntary, and as to immigration matters, there must be "a
regulation in the equal interest of members and
applicants." 28 Habermas does not explain these conclusions,
and at first they sound surprisingly substantive. But the
first conclusion, concerning the right to emigrate, follows
from the idea of a legal community as voluntary rather than
compulsory. One cannot be said to "consent" to a legal or
political order if one is not free to leave it. The requirement
that immigration regulation be "in the equal interest of
members and applicants" follows, presumably, from the
discourse principle. Habermas has formulated that
principle to provide not that all members of a community be
able to agree to a particular norm, but instead that the
norm be agreeable to all those affected. And regulations
concerning immigration surely affect those who would
choose to immigrate. Here, too, the discourse principle
implies an equality of treatment.
The third category of rights, covering the "actionability"
of rights and availability of "individual legal protection,"
requires that legal remedies be available for violations of
legal rights-again, whatever those particular rights might
be.229 Habermas has argued already that the idea of a legal
norm's validity implies its adequate enforcement. The
requirement of enforcement implies, in turn, that legal
persons have access to independent courts that will decide
disputes "impartially and authoritatively according to the
law."23° Here, too, Habermas takes the discourse principle to
impose further requirements-in this instance, procedural
rights consistent with basic norms of due process and equal
treatment. 3 '
These three categories of rights, Habermas says, define
the private autonomy of citizens. But each category
requires legal institutionalization if the rights they describe
are to be effective legal rights. Habermas's description of
each category has indicated that this legal institutionalization, or "elaboration" of the abstract category, must
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 124-25.
Id. at 125.
Id.
See id. at 123.
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engage the political autonomy of citizens. Thus the fourth
category of rights comes as no surprise:
4. Basic rights to equal opportunities to participate in processes of
opinion- and will-formation in which citizens exercise their
political
autonomy and through which they generate legitimate
23 2
law.

Habermas describes this fourth category of rights as
applying "reflexively" to each of the four categories,
including the fourth category itself." What he means is
that through the processes described in the fourth category,
the rights indicated in each of the four categories can be
specified, and legal norms can be generated. In this way,
Habermas links political autonomy and private autonomy.
Only through citizens' exercise of their political autonomy,
he argues, can citizens legitimately secure their private
autonomy by law. And exercise of that political autonomy in
lawmaking must "orient" itself by the rights, described in
the first three categories, that establish the private
autonomy of a legal community's members. Private and
public autonomy, as well as basic rights and popular
sovereignty, are thus "co-original." 23" Each presupposes the
other, and neither may be ranked above the other in
analyzing the idea of legitimate law.
This reconciliation between private and public
autonomy-and between basic rights and popular
sovereignty-is located at an extraordinarily abstract level.
At this point in Habermas's presentation, we do not yet
have the institutions of a constitutional state. Rather, what
Habermas is describing is the sorts of rights that persons
must accord one another if they are to establish themselves
as a legal community with (and through) the medium of
legitimate law. 235 At this level of abstraction, the tension
between basic rights and popular sovereignty is easy to
harmonize. Our idea of legitimate law includes both terms.
Exercise of popular sovereignty does not necessarily imperil
basic rights, and basic rights are not necessarily an
external limit on the exercise of that sovereignty.

232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 127.
See id. at 118.
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The harmoniousness of Habermas's reconciliation,
however, does not necessarily carry over when the system of
rights is institutionalized in a constitutional state. Imagine
a legislative body on the brink of enacting a statute that
unquestionably would infringe upon some group's basic
rights. It would be implausible to say that enactment of this
statute would not be an exercise of sovereignty. Habermas
might contend, sensibly enough, that such a statute would
not be legitimate law, in that it would offend a basic right.
But in that case, basic rights would operate as a constraint
on the exercise of sovereignty. As Robert Alexy has shown,
similar arguments apply if we imagine the legislators to be
framing a constitution rather than a statute. 6 The tension
between basic rights and popular sovereignty, easily
mediated in an abstract account of the "system of rights,"
reappears once we imagine actual legislation, whether
constitution-making or enactment of ordinary statutes.
I would not expect Habermas to disagree with the above
analysis.237 His point, I think, is not that his account of the
system of rights has utterly resolved the tension between
popular sovereignty and basic rights. That would be
inconsistent with the main theme of his discourse theory of
law: an inescapable and ongoing tension between facticity
and validity. Habermas in fact understands this tension to
be an achievement of, and criterion for, the very rationalization processes that make the discourse principle, in his
view, the only persuasive principle of justification. 2 8 What
Habermas is arguing, instead, is that conceptual accounts
of law that privilege basic rights over democracy, or
democracy over basic rights, are misguided. The two terms,

236. See Robert Alexy, Basic Rights and Democracy in Jirgen Habermas's
ProceduralParadigmof the Law, 7 RATIO JURIS 227, 232-33 (1994).
237. Alexy points to the fact that Habermas, in describing actual

constitutional orders, sees basic rights as a constraint on majoritarian lawmaking. See id. at 233.
238. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 26 (with the
rationalization of the lifeworld, social integration depends more upon
"communicative achievements of actors for whom validity and facticity ... have
parted company as incompatible"); see id at 23-24 (describing the "fusion of
facticity and validity" in "archaic institutions"); cf id. at 42 ("[Tlhe tension
between facticity and validity. . . becomes more acute in the validity dimension
of modern law."). At least apparently inconsistently, Habermas also describes
the tension between facticity and validity as " 'given' with the fact of the
symbolic infrastructure of sociocultural forms of life." Id. at 446.
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rightly understood, mutually presuppose one another in the
idea of legitimate law.
The fourth category of rights, concerning citizens'
exercise of political autonomy, marks a shift in perspective.
describe, from the perspective of a
The first three categories
"nonparticipant,"239 the "principles" by which the authors of
law must "orient themselves ... insofar as they make use of
the legal medium at all." But beginning with the political
participation rights described in the fourth category, we
shift, Habermas says, from the standpoint of a nonparticipant to that of a participant in democratic lawmaking processes. And here we need to speak not of the
general discourse principle, but of the principle of
democracy.
Habermas's "principle of democracy" (or "democratic
principle") is a particularization of the discourse principle.
Whereas the discourse principle addresses the justification
of action norms in general, the democratic principle
concerns only the justification of the legal norms that are to
govern a particular community."' Habermas's formulation
of this principle is extraordinarily strong: "the democratic
principle states that only those laws may claim legitimacy
that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive
process of legislation that in turn has been legally
constituted .241
If Habermas means that legislation must receive
universal assent to be legitimate, then that requirement
would be excessively demanding in any world, especially
the pluralistic worlds of modern societies. But Habermas
qualifies and weakens this apparent requirement of
universal assent. For one thing, the word "can" in his
statement of the democracy principle leaves him room to
maneuver. He does not say that the only legitimate laws
are those that have received the citizenry's universal assent
in some factually occurring "discursive process." Instead, he
says only that if a statute is to "claim legitimacy," then it
must be one that "can" claim the assent of all in a
discursive process. We need to know more about the
discursive process Habermas has in mind. We know that it
239. See id. at 126.
240. Id. at 111.
241. Id. at 110. I have amended the translation, rendering Gesetze as "laws"
rather than as "statutes."
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must be an idealized and counterfactual process; otherwise,
all existing law would be illegitimate. But what outcomes
could we expect in an idealized and counterfactual
discourse? The answer depends on how much we idealize
the counterfactual discourse. It would take considerable
idealization, however, for the outcome to be universal
assent with respect to any law-unless, that is, we
understand "assent" to mean something more like
"willingness to live with" rather than univocal
endorsement. 42
Habermas, even at this point in the development of his
theory, has signaled that he might intend "assent" to mean
something weaker than univocal endorsement. Recall that
in stating the discourse principle, Habermas includes the
possibility of bargaining and compromise.2 43 A compromise

may be valid, Habermas allows, even if the parties reach
agreement for different reasons.244 It will turn out, in his
discussion of the constitutional state, that Habermas leaves
considerable room for these options-to the point of
acknowledging that "[c]ompromises make up the bulk of
political decisionmaking." 4 We will see that many of the
arrangements Habermas approves in his account of the
constitutional state are inconsistent with any strong
reading of the "universal assent" requirement. What
Habermas does with his account of the constitutional state
is to displace the problem of "universal assent" from
legislative outcomes to lawmaking procedures. The question
will be whether that solution is compelling, or whether
instead, the formulation of the democracy principle should
be weakened from the outset.
Before moving to Habermas's account of the constitutional state, I should note the fifth category in the system of
rights. I will have more to say about this category in the
242. Cf Luhmann, Quod Omnes Tangit, supra note 162, at 164-65 (noting
the ambiguity of the word "could" in the discourse principle's criterion that "all
potentially affected persons could agree as participants in rational discourses").
243. See infra text accompanying note 346.
244. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 166 (parties to
compromise need not agree for the same reasons); see id. at 108; see also id. at
140 (distinguishing between "reaching understanding" (in communicative
action) and bargaining or compromise).
245. Id. at 282; see also id. at 155 (acknowledging that politics includes
"problems of balancing interests that cannot be generalized but call instead
for
fair compromises"). On the place of compromise in Habermas's account of the
constitutional state, see infra text accompanying notes 345-46.
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concluding section of this article, but for now I will only
introduce it. While the first four categories correspond to
familiar liberal rights,246 the fifth category takes up the
"social and ecological rights" commonly associated with the
welfare state. 24 7 And while the first four categories are
"absolutely justified," the fifth category is justified only
"relatively"--that is, only so far as social and ecological
rights are necessary to guarantee exercise of the rights
described in the first four categories.248 Habermas formulates this category as follows:
5. Basic rights to the provision of living conditions that are
socially, technologically, and ecologically safeguarded, insofar as
the current circumstances make this necessary if citizens are to
have equal opportunities to utilize the civil rights listed in (1)
through (4).

One question will concern how far this "relative
justification" extends. Another will be whether these social
and ecological rights could fairly be called "basic" to modern
legal orders generally, when they are not recognized as
such in American constitutional law.
C. The ConstitutionalState
Habermas's reconstructive theory of the Rechtsstaat or
"constitutional state," like his reconstructive account as a
whole, is keyed to the issue of modern legal orders'
legitimacy. But the reconstructive theory itself incorporates
the more general tension between facticity and validity, and
so it, too, has a side that corresponds to "validity" and a side
that corresponds to "facticity." The system of rights occupies
the former position in Habermas's theory, setting out the
normative conditions required for any modern system of
law to count as legitimate. The rights set forth in that part
of Habermas's theory are "unsaturated placeholders," not
246. I say this with the proviso that the categories are, at this point in
Habermas's analysis, just "unsaturated placeholders," not fully specified legal
rights.
247. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 123. For the connection to
the welfare-state project, see id. at 77, 415; cf id. at 410 (introducing
Habermas's attempt to recast these rights in a new "procedural[ist]" paradigm
of law).
248. Id. at 123, 134.
249. Id. at 123.
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concrete legal rights. That is, they are seen as the
conditions that orient legitimate lawmaking, not as
elements of positive law. With the transition to the principles of the constitutional state, however, Habermas
considers the sorts of arrangements that would have to be
set forth in positive law for a legal order to count as
legitimate. And so at this point, with the idea of law's
positivity before us, we move to the "facticity" side of
Habermas's organizing distinction-even as we still
consider the more general issue of legal legitimacy.
Habermas's account of the constitutional state addresses
the institutions, procedures, and mechanisms that would be
required if the abstract categories of rights he has described
are to be implemented concretely through positive law.
The term Rechtsstaat, translated in Between Facts and
Norms as "constitutional state" or "rule of law," compounds
the German words for "law" and "state." Habermas's theory
of the Rechtsstaat first explores the implied connectionHabermas says an "internal connection" -between law
and political power. Then, by way of explaining the link
between the democratic idea that legitimates law and the
operation of political power, he develops a distinction between "communicative power" and "administrative power."
The idea of the democratic Rechtsstaat, or constitutional
state, Habermas claims, is that citizens' communicative
power is the source of legitimate law, and administrative
power-or, power as a steering medium-should remain
"tied" to that lawmaking power,"' in both the generation
and application of administrative power. Habermas sees the
separation of powers as a mechanism that guards against
the illegitimate use of administrative power. He explicates
that notion by distinguishing among different kinds of
discourse appropriate to the various governmental powers.
1. The InternalLink Between Law and PoliticalPower.
Habermas has said that the validity of a legal norm implies
its adequate enforcement. To that extent, law and the
exercise of power are conceptually-or, as Habermas likes

250. See id. at 133, 196, 289; see also id. at 137 (law and political power are
"internally connected"); id. at 336 ("internal relation between law and political
power"); id. at 320 (law and political power are "internally linked").
251. Id. at 150.

2002]

HABERMAS'S DISCOURSE THEORY

263

to say, "internally" 52 -linked. This connection of law and
political power appears in the enforcement of rights
through state-organized courts, with state personnel
imposing sanctions to enforce courts' judgments where
necessary. 253 Habermas's reconstructive theory of the
constitutional state goes further. Law and political power
are linked not just through enforcement, but in the
legislative process as well. Legitimate lawmaking requires
democratic procedure that is established with the "help of
governmental power."254 And the executive power implements enacted legal norms through the "organized
offices of a public administration."255 In all these ways,
Habermas says, "[p]olitical power is not externally
juxtaposed to law but is rather presupposed by law."256
The relation between law and political power is
reciprocal. Not only does law presuppose political power;
political power, at least in a constitutional state,
presupposes law. The system of state offices, through which
political power is exercised, is organized through law. And
political power is exercised largely through the form of
law.257 Political decisions, Habermas maintains, "owe their
collective bindingness to the legal form in which they are
clad." 258 Law and political power thus reciprocally perform
functions for one another.
Seen from a systems-theoretical point of view,
Habermas says, law and politics mutually constitute one
another's "codes." Here Habermas is flirting with Niklas
Luhmann's autopoietic theory-a surprising move, given
Habermas's frequently
expressed distaste for the
autopoietic (rather than Parsonsian) variant of systems
theory.2 According to Luhmann, modern societies are
252. In this context, the term "internal relation" seems to mean "conceptual
relation." See id. at 449 (referring to a "conceptual or internal relation," as
opposed to a "historically contingent association"); id. at 454 ("internal relation"
explained "at a conceptual level").
253. Id. at 134.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 134, 142.
258. Id. at 133.
259. See id., at 47-56, 74, 130-31, 330, 333-36, 341-53, 461, 481; see also
JURGEN HABERMAS, Excursus on Luhmann's Appropriationof the Philosophy of
the Subject Through Systems Theory, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF
MODERNITY 368 (Frederick Lawrence trans., 1987).
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differentiated into a plurality of functional subsystems,
such as the economy, politics, law, and science, each of
which is a self-producing and self-reproducing network of
communication. Each subsystem's communication is organized by a binary "code," or distinction between opposed
values, that demarcates the subsystem from its environment. Habermas follows Luhmann in taking law's binary
code to be the distinction between legal and illegal."' This
distinction, Habermas observes, is applied to particular
cases in state-organized courts and enforced through
governmental power. In this way, political power is
constitutive for law's binary code of legal and illegal.26 '
Habermas-like Luhmann-is much less clear on what the
binary "code" for politics might be. 6' Recalling his
discussion in Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas
describes the political "power code" in terms of the giving of
commands.6 ' Apparently, then, the binary power code is the
distinction between giving and following commands. And it
is law, Habermas argues, that specifies who has the power
of command and who has the obligation to follow.6 4
Habermas's reliance on this aspect of Luhmann's theory
is peculiar for at least three reasons. First, a system's
binary code, Luhmann argues, is what "closes" the system's
network of communication, and this idea of system closure
is, elsewhere in Between Facts and Norms, the main target
As mentioned in Part I.D, infra, Habermas's Theory of Communicative
Action relied heavily on systems theory. But Habermas developed his systemstheoretical concepts through a critical reading of Talcott Parsons, not Luhmann.
For an account of the Parsons-inspired systems theory that Habermas
developed, and its uncertain fate in Between Facts and Norms, see Baxter,
supra note 7. In my view, Luhmann's autopoietic theory is far more powerful
than the systems-theoretical conceptions Habermas developed in Theory of
Communicative Action, and judicious borrowing from Luhmann's work could
improve Habermas's "communication theory of society." See id. at Part IV.
260. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 143; Baxter, supra note
162, at 2004-09 (introducing Luhmann's general notion of binary coding and the
legal system's legal/illegal code in particular).
261. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 143.
262. See Baxter, supra note 162, at 2040, 2067-68 (describing and criticizing
Luhmann's equivocation between "government/opposition" and "governing/
governed" as the code for the political system).
263. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 143; cf. supra text
accompanying note 137.
264. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 143; see also id. at 169
("[L] aw is ... constitutive for the power code that steers administrative
processes.").
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of Habermas's anti-Luhmann polemics.265 I believe that
Habermas's polemics mischaracterize Luhmann's work
generally, and the idea of system closure in particular,266
but nevertheless, Habermas is appropriating an idea that,
in his view, has pernicious theoretical consequences. This
decision is difficult to explain. Second, because Luhmann
takes the binary code to be what defines both a system's
unity and its distinction from other systems, Habermas's
account of the different system codes for law and politics
would commit him-if he were serious about the idea of the
binary code-to the position that law and politics are
distinct (though closely linked) systems of communication.
While Habermas does not make his view on this point
entirely clear, he seems on the whole to favor treating law
as part of a more general political system, not as a separate
system.2"7 Appropriation of "binary coding," then is not easy
to reconcile with Habermas's main line of argument. Third,
while much in Luhmann's autopoietic theory is well worth
considering-even for Habermas's purposes"'-the idea of
the binary code is, for reasons I have explained elsewhere,
one of the least attractive (and also I think unnecessary)
aspects of his work.2"9
In fact, however, Habermas does not make systematic
use of Luhmann's "binary coding" idea. It appears
intermittently,27 ° but in each instance, it can be translated
into more familiar conceptions. In the passage we are now
considering, the point is that law and political power
reciprocally perform functions for one another. That point
does not presuppose that legal or political communication is
organized by a binary code.
Still, even with the notion of binary coding excised, the
idea of political power needs further analysis. As Habermas
points out, not all exercises of political power are
legitimate-not even when they are presented in legal
form.2 71 And so the idea of democracy, basic to law's
265. See Baxter, supra note 7, at Part IV.
266. See id.
267. See id. at Part III.B.1.
268. See id. at Part IV (arguing that a more judicious borrowing from
Luhmann's work could improve Habermas's communication theory of society).
269. See Baxter, supra note 162, at 2069.

270. See

BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS,

supra note 2, at 38, 55.

271. See id. at 145 ("[Tlhe legal form as such does not suffice to legitimate
the exercise of political power"); cf id. at 40 ("[Nlormatively unfiltered interest
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legitimacy, requires a differentiation in the notion of power
that can help distinguish between the legitimate and
illegitimate exercise of power. ' That differentiation in the
notion of power between is between "communicative" and
"administrative" power.
2. Communicative and Administrative Power. In
contrast to his interpretation of power as command in
Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas had developed
four years earlier a notion that he called a "communications
concept of power."" 3 What Habermas meant then, and what
he means now by "communicative power," is the
"motivating force" of common convictions reached through

unconstrained communicative action.2"4 Here Habermas

draws on the notion of "rational motivation" that he
developed in his account of the way that mutual recognition
of validity claims coordinates communicative action. 75
Habermas sees the communicative power of citizens as
"jurisgenerative," that is, as a way of "influenc[ing] the
production of legitimate law."276 The precondition for this
"jurisgenerative" power is the existence of "undeformed

positions [sometimes] ... carry the day only because they are stronger and use
the legitimating force of legal forms to cloak their merely factual strength.").
272. I say "mark a distinction between" rather than "distinguish" to make
clear that the idea of democracy is not by itself sufficient to classify particular
exercises of power as legitimate or illegitimate. What Habermas is after here is
a more general conception of what makes the exercise of power legitimate.
273. See Jtirgen Habermas, Hannah Arendt's Communications Concept of
Power, 4 Soc. RES. 3 (1977). Then and now, Habermas credits Hannah Arendt

with the insight. See

BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS,

supra note 2, at 146-49.

274. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 147.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 16-33.
276. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 147. The terms
"jurisgenesis" and "jurisgenerative" are most closely associated with the work of
Robert Cover. See Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4,
11, 25 (1983). Both Habermas and Cover emphasize the role of associations and
groups outside of official state institutions in producing law. Habermas,
however, is interested in how argumentative speech outside of formal state
institutions influences the production of state law. Cover's focus was more on
the production of non-state law, and not so much through argumentation as
through shared forms of life and shared narratives. From his perspective,
formal state institutions, and especially courts, are "jurispathic" as well as
jurisgenerative-that is, state law, armed with the power of state violence,
tends to impose imperial power over competing bodies of law that develop in
smaller communities. Habermas's idea of jurisgenesis is thus decidedly more
"statist" than Cover's.
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public spheres" 277 of political discussion that are linked to

the formal institutions in which law is made."' In turn, the
precondition for undeformed public spheres is a "vibrant"
civil society,279 or, network of voluntary associations that are
autonomous from state control. 2 " These associations,
Habermas maintains, are the social basis for the political
public sphere.2 81 Habermas's idea of democracy, then,
involves much more than formal governmental institutions
and periodic voting rituals. It requires broad, active, and
ongoing participation by the citizenry. In this sense,
Habermas's theory of law and democracy is not purely
state-centered. 82 It depends heavily upon communication
outside of formal governmental channels-communication
that, if it is to be "jurisgenerative," must influence official
governmental decisionmaking 83
This notion of communicative power is the basis for
Habermas's reinterpretation of popular sovereignty. From a
discourse-theoretical point of view, popular sovereignty
means that "all political power derives from the

277.

BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 148.
278. Id. at 185.
279. Id. at 461.
280. For Habermas's conception of civil society as a network of voluntary
associations, see id. at 175, 358, 359, 367. For his requirement that civil society
be independent from the state and the economic system, see id. at 269, 301, 367,
368-69.
281. Id. at 301.
282. See id. at 288 (Habermas's "proceduralist" conception of democratic
process "breaks with a holistic model of society centered in the state"); see also
id. at 296, 298, 372.
283. Habermas refers to these informal circuits of communication as
"subjectless" and "anonymous". Id. at 136 (" 'subjectless' forms of
communication"); id. at 299 ("subjectless communications"); id. at 301
("subjectless forms of communication"); see also id. at 171 ("anonymous circuits
of communication"); id. at 136 ("anonymous form" of popular sovereignty). The
likely reason he adopts this characterization is to avoid the assumption,
common in the "deliberative democracy" literature, that there is a single,
unified, deliberating subject of democracy. See Edward L. Rubin, Getting Past
Democracy, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 747-50 (2001) ("The image of civil society as a
whole deliberating about some issue is an unproductive metaphor driven by the
premodern image of democracy."); Bohmann, supra note 141, at 914 ("[A]
plausible concept of rational deliberation must somehow do justice to the
complex and dispersed reality of actual public discourse under contemporary
social conditions."). But see Bohmann, supra note 141, at 925-26 (arguing that
the "anonymous networks of communication" formulation is an inadequate
translation for "popular sovereignty").
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communicative power of citizens."284 Understood at full
strength, this idea of popular sovereignty would require all
exercises of power to be "oriented and legitimated by the
laws citizens give themselves in a discursively structured
opinion- and will-formation." 28 5 And ideally, all relevant
questions would be "processed in discourses and negotiations on the basis of the best available information and
arguments.
Despite the reference to "laws" that "citizens give
themselves," however, Habermas acknowledges that in
political communities of any size, there can be no
convocation of all the citizenry. Parliamentary bodies are
indispensable.287 But what Habermas insists upon is that
these bodies "must remain anchored in the informal
streams of communication emerging from public spheres
that are open to all political parties, associations, and
citizens."288 Only in this way can the communicative power
of public discussions among citizens influence the
production of legitimate law.
Habermas acknowledges further that the idea of
communicative power addresses only the generation of
political power, not the exercise of existing power. And even
if communicative power is the source of legitimate law, and
thus the source of legitimate political power, Habermas has
said that the idea of a legal norm's validity implies that the
norm is adequately enforced through sanctions. The
exercise of power in the form of sanctions, however, does
not itself conform to the model of communicative power.
Moreover, Habermas acknowledges that the idea of power
as command, not power as collective will-formation, is
essential to the organization and operation of governmental
entities. Politics, then, cannot be reduced to the jurisgenerative operation of communicative power. "The concept of
the political in its full sense," Habermas says, "also includes
the use of administrative power within the political system,
as well as the competition for access to that system.""
to
"Administrative power," the counter-concept
communicative power, is the notion of power as the
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

BETWEEN FACTS AND

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 150.

NORMS, supra note 2, at 170.
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"steering medium" of a self-regulating administrative
system." This systems-theoretical conception of power
appeared front and center in Theory of Communicative
Action.291 To recall that notion: power, conceived of as
official command backed by sanctions, allows actors to
circumvent the process of reaching communicative agreement over contested claims to validity. Communicative
power, then, develops through communicative action and
discourse; administrative power circumvents both. The
form of communicative power that is constitutive for
democracy emerges outside the formal bureaucratic
organizations; administrative power develops within those
bureaucracies. The relation between administrative and
communicative power is a central problem for democracy.
In Habermas's terms, how can the bureaucratic exercise of
administrative power be linked to, and constrained by,
citizens' communicative power?
That is one of the questions Habermas's theory as a
whole is designed to address. His preliminary answer is
general and equivocal. The idea of the Rechtsstaat, he says,
is that the administrative system must be "tied to the lawmaking communicative power .... Administrative power
should not reproduce itself only on its own terms but should
only be permitted to regenerate from the conversion of
communicative power." 9 At the same time, however, the
constitutional state must avoid "disrupting the power code
by interfering with the self-steering mechanism of the
administrative system."293 This preliminary answer moves
in two directions. The first part suggests that the
administrative system may not legitimately become
independent of citizens' communicative power. But
Habermas adds immediately that the administrative
system is "self-steering" and its "power code" must not be
"interfer[ed]" with. The two prescriptions are not
compatible.
290. See id. at 56 (referring to "the media of money and administrative
power"); id. at 343 (referring, in the context of a discussion of systems theory, to
"special languages like money or administrative power"); id. at 407 (referring to
"administrative power" as the "medium for state interventions" that produces
"state interventions"); id. at 469 (referring to "stubborn systemic logics of the
market and administrative power").
291. See supra Part I.D.
292. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 150.
293. Id.
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The problem, as I have argued elsewhere in more detail,
is that Habermas's systems-theoretical concepts are
incompatible with his present project: a normative theory of
democracy.294 The concepts of "systems" and "steering
media" developed in Theory of Communicative Action were
part of a more general model of modern societies in which
genuine democracy, as Habermas understands it, was
literally inconceivable. The axis of that model is the
distinction between system and lifeworld. On one side are
the economic and administrative systems, operating
through the steering media of money and power. On the
other is the "lifeworld," with its "structural components" of
culture, society, and personality29 -or,
as Habermas
alternatively conceives of the lifeworld, the "communicatively structured contexts of action" that are distinct from
the money- and power-driven economic and administrative
systems.2"6 Theory of Communicative Action presents the
relation between system and lifeworld systemstheoretically, as "interchange" controlled by "steering
media." But because, according to Habermas, only the
economic and administrative systems have such steering
media, the interchange model presents the relation between
system and lifeworld as steered only by money and power.
On this conception, the lifeworld's contribution to the
administrative system cannot be the "communicative
power" of a normative consensus among citizens; instead, it
must be assimilated to the "steering media" of money and
power. And so in Habermas's systems-theoretical model of
interchange, the lifeworld's inputs to the administrative
system are "mass loyalty" and taxes, with the administrative system outputting, in exchange, political decisions
and "organizational accomplishments." ' 7 This austere
model of system/lifeworld interchange has no place for the
294. See Baxter, supra note 7, at Part II.D.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 92-131.

296. 2 THEORY

OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION,

supra note 73, at 185; see also id.

at 304 (lifeworld as "communicatively structured areas of life"); id. at 309
(lifeworld as "communicatively structured" "spheres of action"); id. at 333
("communicatively structured life-contexts"); id. at 349 ("communicatively
structured domains of action"); id. at 356 ("communicatively structured areas of
action"); id. at 366 ("communicatively structured areas of action"); id. at 372
("communicatively structured action area").
297. Id. at 319-23. Habermas summarizes the "interchange" model
graphically. See id. at 320 fig.39.
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"jurisgenerative" communicative power Habermas now
attributes to citizens' discussions in the political public
sphere.
The passage from Between Facts and Norms that I
quoted two paragraphs above-noting that systems are
"self-steering," with their own "codes" that cannot be
"interfer[ed] with"-carries over the idea of systems'
imperviousness to normative influences. The passage is
typical of Habermas's official professions of commitment to
the system/lifeworld model of society. But in fact, as I argue
elsewhere, the social-theoretical model Habermas develops
toward the end of Between Facts and Norms is inconsistent
with the system/lifeworld model.298 It had to be. Otherwise,
Habermas could not maintain that communicative power
may influence and constrain the exercise of administrative
power.
This is not to deny that bureaucracies tend to insulate
themselves from democratic influences, nor is it to deny
that there may be good reasons to limit the extent of such
influences. My point instead is that to describe systems as
"self-steering," with "codes" that cannot be "interfer[ed]
with," presents a tension as if it were a contradiction.
Further-although this claim takes me beyond the scope of
the present article-the conception of the political system
that Habermas presents in Between Facts and Norms is
superior to the notion of the administrative system he
defended in Theory of Communicative Action. The more
recent idea of a "system," while incompletely theorized,
allows a more nuanced and balanced account of legal and
political processes."'
In any event, the administrative system cannot be
entirely "self-steering," on Habermas's premises, because
its "power code" is the product of law. Legitimate law, on
Habermas's view, is both the product of democratic
lawmaking and the mechanism that defines the structures
of official command and obedience that Habermas calls
"administrative power." Law, in other words, is a
mechanism for effecting, and regulating, what Habermas
calls the "conversion of communicative into administrative
power.""'
298. See Baxter, supra note 7, at Part III.B-C.
299. See id. at Parts III.C, IV.
300. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 169 ("legitimate law is
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The particular legal techniques for constraining the
official use of power that Habermas mentions are familiar:
an independent and impartial judiciary bound by the rule of
law, legal controls over the state administration, and the
separation of powers. What is interesting in Habermas's
account, however, is his explication of these familiar ideas,
practices, institutions and norms through discourse
theory-and in particular, through a typology of the
different forms of discourse and their relation to the
different forms in which political power is exercised. In the
Part II.C.3 below, I analyze Habermas's typology of
discourses, as well as the idea of bargaining that sits
uneasily at the boundary of Habermas's discourse theory.
Then, in Part II.C.4, I consider Habermas's recasting of the
ways in which the constitutional state binds administrative
power to communicative power.
3. The Typology of Discourse and Bargaining. I noted
earlier the "discourse principle" Habermas takes to govern
the process of justifying norms of action. 1 That principle,
he said, is neutral with respect to different kinds of norms
(moral and legal, for example). Habermas further suggested
that the general discourse principle operates differently in
different kinds of discourse. Specifically, he noted in
distinguishing between the "democracy principle" and "the
moral principle" the different "reference systems" for legal
and moral discourse-the legal community and "humanity
or a presupposed republic of world citizens," respectively.
This idea of a "reference system" is one basis for
Habermas's distinctions among the various kinds of
discourse related to norms and social action.0 " A second
concerns the kinds of reasons that are acceptable in the
various forms of discourse. Before his recent work on law,
Habermas had settled upon a tripartite division of
discourses in which "practical reason" may be employed:
moral, ethical, and pragmatic. ° Habermas's work on law
generated from communicative power and the latter in turn is converted into
administrative power via legitimately enacted law"); see also id. at 176, 327.
301. See supra text accompanying note 201.
302. I say "norms and social action" rather than "norms of action" because
some of the forms of discourse Habermas considers relevant to law are not
directly addressed to norms.
303. See JORGEN HABERMAS, On the Pragmatic, Ethical, and Moral
Employments of Practical Reason, in JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATION, supra
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now understands legal discourse-or rather, the various
kinds of legal discourse appropriate to different legal
institutions and practices-as drawing upon, but
irreducible to, each of these three types.
Pragmatic issues concern the selection of appropriate
means for achieving given goals, or, should the goals
become problematic, then the weighing of possible goals
against accepted preference standards, such as efficiency, or
against accepted values."°4 Pragmatic discourses are
directed toward justifying "technical and strategic recommendations.''
3°5 The validity of these recommendations

depends upon the accuracy of the empirical knowledge on
which they depend." 6 Habermas refers to the "purposive"
employment of practical reason in pragmatic discourses.0 7
Ethical issues arise when pragmatic preference
standards or value-orientations become questionable.0
Habermas distinguishes between ethical deliberation at the
individual and social levels. Individual ethical deliberation,
which Habermas refers to as "existential" or "clinical"
deliberation, concerns the significance of a choice to a
particular life-project, or, to "the kind of person one is and
would like to be." 09 This decision is not purely individual,
but depends to a considerable extent upon one's social

note 61, at 1, 2 [hereinafter HABERMAS, On the Pragmatic,Ethical, and Moral].
Habermas frames his analysis in this essay as the different ways an individual
might intend and answer the question "What should I do?" See id. at 2, 8.
Between Facts and Norms has a parallel discussion, though here framed in
terms of the question "What ought we to do?"-framed, that is, from the point of
view of collective rather than individual decisions. See BETWEEN FACTS AND
NORMS, supra note 2, at 158. The analysis in the two discussions is largely, but
not entirely, parallel.
304. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 159; see also HABERMAS,
On the Pragmatic, Ethical, and Moral, supra note 303, at 3 (pragmatic issues
are "a matter of making a rational choice of means in the light of fixed purposes
or of the rational assessment of goals in the light of existing preferences").
305. HABERMAS, On the Pragmatic, Ethical, and Moral, supra note 303, at
10.
306. Id. at 11.
307. Id. at 2.
308. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 160; HABERMAS, On the
Pragmatic,Ethical, and Moral, supra note 303, at 3-4.
309. HABERMAS, On the Pragmatic,Ethical, and Moral, supra note 303, at 4;
see also BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 96 (referring to "ethicalexistential or clinical discourses").
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circumstances and the collective form of life one inhabits. °
Nonetheless, the ethical deliberation that takes place at the
collective level-concerning not individual but collective
identity-has a "different meaning. 31 Habermas speaks in
this connection of "ethical-political questions."312 Discourse
aimed at establishing an "authentic" understanding of the
collectivity's identity-and realizing that identity through
collective decisions and courses of action-is "ethicalpolitical discourses. " "' The reference system here is a
"shared form of life,,34 and the standard is what is "good for
315
us," the reflecting community.

This hyphenated conjunction of "ethical" with
"political," however, tends to obscure a basic problem for
modern multicultural societies. Habermas ordinarily
conceives of "ethical," unmodified, as referring to a particular community that shares a form of life and a deep
consensus over substantive values.3

16

But as Habermas

notes in his criticism of "civic republican" theorists from
Rousseau to Michelman, one cannot conceive of modern
pluralistic societies as if they were this kind of close-knit
community. 317 The "we" who are (on Habermas's theory)
authors and addressees of legal norms are a legal community, not an ethically homogenous group.318
This point has significant implications for Habermas's
notion of "ethical-political discourse." Despite Habermas's
statement that the standard for such discourse is what is
310.

HABERMAS,

On the Pragmatic,Ethical, and Moral, supra note 303, at 5-

6.

311. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 160; see also HABERMAS,
On the Pragmatic,Ethical, and Moral, supra note 303, at 15-17 (discussing the
difference between the questions "What should I do?" and "What should we
do?").
312. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 160.
313. See id. at 108 (ethical-political discourse aims at "justifying decisions
that are supposed to express an authentic, collective self-understanding"); see
also id. at 97, 161.
314. Id. at 160.
315. Id. at 161.
316. See, e.g., id. at 101-02, 267-69, 276-79.
317. See id. at 267-69, 276-79.
318. Thomas McCarthy points out that, despite recognizing ethical
plurality, Habermas still refers in the singular to a legal community's "form of
life, self-understanding, and collective identity." Thomas McCarthy, Legitimacy
and Diversity: Dialectical Reflections on Analytical Distinctions, in HABERMAS
ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 130.
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"good for us," differences among conceptions of the good in
multicultural societies likely prevent consensus-in the
sense of substantive agreement on the merits-as to at
least many matters Habermas deems ethical. Further, if
consensus must be the universal (or near-universal)
agreement that Habermas's discourse principle seems to
require, then the problem for Habermas is more difficult
still. What Habermas must develop, then, is a way in
which, consistent with the discourse principle, modern
societies can deal with the problem of "ethical"
disagreement.
One option Habermas rejects would be to exclude, or at
least radically devalue, all contributions to political
discussion that presuppose the superiority of the speaker's
conception of the good. 19 That option, Habermas claims,
would bracket out ethical questions from politics and
advantage the "inherited background of settled traditions."
Further, it would eliminate the possibility that discursive
engagement might produce consensus as to ethical
matters.32
But what kind of consensus could be expected about
ethical matters? To the extent that these matters are
deeply rooted in competing conceptions of the good, and to
the extent that these conceptions constitute the identity of
communities and their members, then as Thomas
McCarthy has argued, "persistent ethical disagreements"
are likely.32 ' The standard that the discourse principle
sets-requiring, with respect to norms, that "all possibly
affected persons could agree as participants in [a] rational
discourse [ ""'-seems unattainable. And Habermas realizes
that it is.
For that reason, his response-on this issue and
elsewhere 23-- will be to reinterpret the discourse principle

319. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 308-14.
320. Id. at 309. Michel Rosenfeld notes, however, that Habermas's "postmetaphysical" theory may have the effect of excluding, or at least devaluing,
religious or otherwise "metaphysical" perspectives, as well as perspectives that
reject egalitarianism. See Michel Rosenfeld, Can Rights, Democracy, and
Justice Be Reconciled Through Discourse Theory? Reflections on Habermas's
ProceduralistParadigm of Law, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY, supra
note 6, at 82, 101.
321. See McCarthy, supra note 318, at 115.
322. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 107.
323. See infra text accompanying notes 331-40, 347-59.
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to require not consensus as to the substantive norm in
question, but instead, consensus as to the lawmaking
procedures through which discourse is to take place.24 This
is one sense in which Habermas's theory is, as he likes to
say, "proceduralist." A recurring issue throughout this
article, however, will be whether this proceduralist move is
consistent with the discourse principle, or whether, if it is
not, Habermas's statement of the discourse principle must
be modified. We are not quite yet in a position to address
that issue. We need the rest of Habermas's account of the
various forms of discourse.
The third form of discourse in Habermas's typology is
"moral discourse." Just as Habermas's use of the word
"ethical" required explanation, so does his use of the word
"moral." Unlike ethical (or ethical-political) discourse, moral
discourse refers not to a particular community or shared
form of life, but to an unlimited communication community.325 Moral norms, thus, are to be justified not in terms of
their coherence with this or that collective form of life, but
according to their consistency with "justice," where the term
"justice" is to be understood in a strongly universalistic
sense. On Habermas's interpretation of moral discourse, a
norm is morally justified only if it expresses a "categorical"
rather than "conditional" or "hypothetical" imperative.326 In
other words, a moral norm is justified only if all those
potentially affected-not just all members of a particular
collectivity-could agree to it in a rational discourse.327 It
must, then, express an entirely general interest.328
324. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 151 (the democratic
process institutionalizes the discourse principle "in such a way that the outcome
of a discourse enjoys a presumption of rational acceptability"); id. at 285
(referring to "the intrinsically rational character of a democratic process that
grounds the presumption of rational outcomes"); id. at 296 (results of
democratic procedure are presumptively reasonable or fair, provided that "the
flow of relevant information and its proper handling have not been obstructed").
325. See id. at 97 ("In contrast to ethical deliberations, which are oriented to
the telos of my/our own good (or not misspent) life, moral deliberations require a
perspective freed of all egocentrism or ethnocentrism."); see also HABERMAS, On
the Pragmatic, Ethical, and Moral, supra note 303, at 12 ("Moral-practical
discourses... require a break with all of the unquestioned truths of an
established, concrete ethical life, in addition to distancing oneself from the
contexts of life with which one's identity is inextricably interwoven.").
326. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 159-61; HABERMAS,
On the Pragmatic,Ethical,and Moral, supra note 303, at 8.
327. Habermas formulates his discourse principle in terms of the agreement
of "all possibly affected persons." By this quoted expression he means "anyone
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As Habermas acknowledges, one consequence of
conceiving of morality in this way is that norms will be
justifiable only if they are extraordinarily abstract.3 29 And
that raises the question as to how such abstract principles
could possibly be applied. Here Habermas follows the lead
of his former student, Klaus Gfinther, in distinguishing
between discourses of justification and discourses of application. While a moral norm is justified only if it passes the
discourse principle's universalization test, its application is
regulated instead by a "principle of appropriateness."
Determining which of various valid norms is "appropriate"
to a particular situation, and how it applies to that
situation, requires, Habermas allows, consideration of "all
the relevant features of the situation conceived as
exhaustively as possible."'3 3 We will return to this matter in
considering Habermas's analysis of adjudication. For now it
is sufficient to note that Habermas distinguishes between
the justification and application of moral norms, and that
he makes a parallel distinction with respect to legal norms
as well.
Alongside these forms of discourse, Habermas places
the idea of bargaining. With this notion, he begins to
address some of the issues I have raised above. "In complex
societies," Habermas contends-that is, in societies marked
by stratification, differentiation of interest positions, and a
priority on self-interested action-"it is often the case that"
neither moral nor ethical discourse will result in consensus.
This is so, he says, "whenever it turns out that ... the
proposed regulations touch on . . . diverse interests...
without any generalizable interest or clear priority of some
one value being able to vindicate itself."33' In such cases, he
observes, "there remains the alternative of bargaining, that
is, negotiation between success-oriented parties who are
willing to cooperate."332 The "aim[]" of bargaining is to
resolve conflicts not resolvable through discourse. And that
whose interests are touched by the foreseeable consequences of a general
practice regulated by the norms at issue." BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra
note 2, at 107.
328. See id. at 61.
329. HABERMAS, On the Pragmatic,Ethical, and Moral, supra note 303, at
13.
330. Id. at 14.
331. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 165.
332. Id.
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means that the compromise the parties negotiate (1) must
be preferable to no agreement at all; (2) must address the
problem of free riders; and (3) must exclude exploitation, or,
to the
a situation in which some parties "contributeit.more
333
cooperative arrangement than they gain from

Habermas does not make entirely clear whether these
three conditions are simply an explication of what we mean
by a legitimate compromise reached through bargaining, or
instead, criteria that are to be applied to evaluate whether
a given compromise is legitimate or illegitimate. My sense
is that he means the former. Supporting this interpretation
is the fact that Habermas turns immediately to the
question whether bargaining is inconsistent with the
discourse principle. And that, for Habermas's discourse
theory, is the question whether bargaining could be
considered legitimate. "[Tihe discursive chain of a rational
will-formation would snap at such points of compromise,"
Habermas says, "if the discourse principle could not be
brought to bear at least indirectly on bargaining
334
processes."
Habermas already has signaled the conclusion he will
reach. In stating the discourse principle, Habermas said
that the term "rational discourse" "refers indirectly to
bargaining processes insofar as these are regulated by
relation
The
procedures."33
grounded
discursively
Habermas forges between discourse and bargaining is
indirect at best. Discourse, he has said, imposes "symmetry
conditions": the participants must have equal opportunities
to raise topics, arguments, and criticisms. The parallel in
the bargaining situation is that the parties must have
"equal opportunity for pressure," that is, equal bargaining
power.3 3 Because generally this condition is not satisfied at
the outset, procedures must be devised that will equalize
the parties' opportunity for pressure. "To the extent that"
these conditions are satisfied, Habermas maintains, compromises that result from bargaining are presumptively
fair. 38 But whether the procedures are adequate is

333. Id. at 166.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 108.
336. See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.

337. See BETWEEN
338. See id.

FACTS AND NORMS,

supra note 2, at 165.
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according to Habermas a question for moral discourse.33 9
And so is the matter whether a given question is amenable
to bargaining or whether, instead, it is a question in which
generalizable interests are at stake. 4 ° In these ways, procedures for bargaining must be "discursively grounded," as
Habermas states in announcing the discourse principle.
And thus although bargaining involves pressure and appeal
to interests rather than to rational conviction, it is governed
"indirectly" by the discourse principle.
As a general matter, this concession to bargaining
rather than discourse is wise. Habermas, after all, is
"reconstructing" the idea of the constitutional state. And
because, as he acknowledges, the bulk of political decisionmaking involves compromise rather than purely discursive
agreement,341 an interpretation of the constitutional state
that branded bargaining as per se illegitimate would not be
a plausible reconstruction.
But the reconciliation between bargaining and
discourse that Habermas tries to establish raises two
questions. First, the idea of bargaining suggests a
refinement in the theory of action underlying Habermas's
discourse theory. The basic distinction in Habermas's
typology of social action, I said in Part I above, is between
communicative and strategic action. Habermas's difficulties
in characterizing open strategic action led him to allow that
most actual interactions are a "melange" of the two types.342
Bargaining seems a clear example of this "m6lange."
Habermas describes it as "success-oriented" and designed to
exert influence on one's opposite number through pressure.
In these respects, as Habermas says, it can be characterized
as strategic interaction.343 But on the other hand,
bargaining seeks to coordinate the bargainers' respective
plans of action through a communicatively achieved
agreement. In that respect, it resembles communicative
action. Habermas, of course, could reply that bargainers do
not necessarily act communicatively without reserve-in
colloquial terms, they do not necessarily place all their
cards on the table. Moreover, to the extent that bargainers

339.
340.
341.
342.

Id.
See id.
Id. at 282.
See supra text accompanying notes 46-47.
343. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 283.
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pursue different interests, they do not reach agreement for
the same reasons, as Habermas's notion of discursive agreement requires.344 But still, bargaining, to the extent it seeks
cooperation and a common plan, is distinct from other forms
of strategic action. Given its social significance, as well as
the place it occupies in Habermas's discourse theory of law
and democracy, Habermas likely should recognize bargaining as a distinct type of rational action, irreducible
either to communicative action or to strategic action in
which cooperation and common action are not envisioned.
The second question Habermas's account of bargaining
raises is whether he can plausibly claim that specifically
moral discourse must ground and legitimate bargaining
procedures. The procedural rules governing bargaining are,
in fact, legal rather than moral norms-that is, they bind
members of a legal community, not humanity as such.
345
While legal norms "may not contradict moral norms,"
rules governing bargaining would have to be far more
concrete and detailed than abstract moral principles. And
so for that reason, their justification would not be possible
in purely moral discourse. Perhaps Habermas means that
bargaining-related rules are applications of moral principles. But that seems inconsistent with the way Habermas
has presented the idea of "application discourses." Such
discourses apply general norms to particular circumstances.
Bargaining rules of course apply to particular circumstances, but as legal rules they must be of general
applicability.
The likely reason for this slip is Habermas's anxiety
about allowing compromise procedures to be governed by
rules that themselves are likely the products of
compromise. If that were so, then "the discursive chain of a
rational will-formation would snap at such points of
compromise.,,34' Thus his statement that, while bargaining
and compromise are not themselves forms of discourse, they
are "indirectly governed" by the discourse principle.
The problem, however, is that these practices are
indirectly governed by the discourse principle only in the
sense that the governing rules presumably are the product
of a discursive lawmaking process. But that is true of any
344. See, e.g., id. at 339.
345. Id. at 230.
346. Id. at 166.
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legally regulated activity, on Habermas's scheme: all legal
rules, if legitimate, must be the product of discursive
lawmaking. Habermas's recourse to moral discourse as the
alleged source of bargaining rules is designed to avoid the
conclusion that bargaining has no special connection to the
discourse principle. But his argument cannot be sustained.
Bargaining is not itself discourse, nor is it governed by
rules that are products of moral discourse alone, nor is it
"indirectly governed" by the discourse principle in any
special way.
4. Binding Administrative Power to Communicative
Power. This typology of discourse and bargaining is the
basis for Habermas's reading of the way that the
constitutional state binds administrative to communicative
power. While he speaks of "legal discourse" in the singular,
it turns out that the permissible scope of this discourse
varies, depending upon whether we are speaking of
democratic lawmaking, adjudication, or the "administration" of law more narrowly conceived. These activities
differ in their legitimate access to the "different sorts of
reasons" and to the "corresponding forms of communication."3 47 Habermas's reinterpretation of the separation of
powers incorporates this insight.
It is easiest to begin with the function of democratic
lawmaking, because lawmakers on Habermas's theory have
access to the "full range" of reasons.148 Here, despite his
lapse with respect to the grounding of bargaining and
compromise, Habermas is particularly attentive to the
differences between legal and moral norms that entail
differences in the respective modes of justification. Moral
arguments are relevant to the justification of legal norms,
Habermas says,3 but they do not exhaust the range of
permissible arguments. Legal norms govern a particular
legal community, not humanity as such. They are
teleological, not purely justice-oriented (in Habermas's
deontological sense of justice), involving "the cooperative
pursuit of collective goals and the safeguarding of collective

347. Id. at 190.
348. Id. at 192.
349. See, e.g., id. at 232 (legislation does not "rely only, not even in the first
instance, on moral reasons, but on reasons of another kind as well").
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For that reason the justification of legal norms

must be open to "ethical-political" concerns.351 Further, as
compared to moral norms (as Habermas conceives of them),
legal norms are much more concrete in content. 5 2 Some

legal norms respond only to the need for legal certainty.
The American rule of driving on the right is the most
obvious example, but other norms respond primarily to the
need for certainty. Even beyond these norms, the matters
law regulates are not necessarily ones upon which one could
expect universal agreement, and for reasons Habermas has
suggested, the possibility of compromises that balance
interests cannot be excluded altogether from the legislative
process.5 3 Finally, because the validity of legal norms
presupposes their adequate enforcement, "pragmatic"
issues may enter into legitimate lawmaking in this way as
well.354
In short, lawmaking implicates the various kinds of
issues Habermas has distinguished-moral, ethical, and
pragmatic-and accordingly, the corresponding forms of
discourse all may be permissible. To mark the special
character of legal justification, as well as the differences
between legal and moral validity, Habermas amends
slightly the tripartite division of validity claims that he
introduced with the concept of communicative action.3 56 The
validity claim relevant to legal norms is "legitimacy," in
distinction from the claim to "rightness" proper to moral
norms. 57 The standard Habermas suggests for measuring
this legitimacy is whether the norm expresses "a reasonable
consensus in view of all [the various] aspects and problem
types. "358

The fact that Habermas selects a new name for law's
validity claim-legitimacy, rather than rightness-is
significant. So, too, is his choice of name. We might take
350. Id. at 154.
351. Id.
352. See id. at 153-55.
353. See id. at 154-55.
354. See id. at 155.
355. I say "may be permissible" rather than "are permissible" because
whether a particular form of discourse is permissible, with respect to a
particular, depends upon whether that issue may be understood as pragmatic,
ethical, or moral.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 21-28.
357. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 156.
358. Id. at 155.
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many legal rules to be "legitimate" but still believe they are
unwise or suboptimal compared to alternatives. The term
"legitimacy" suggests greater focus on procedure and origins
than on substantive merit. This proceduralist turn responds
to the strength with which Habermas has formulated the
discourse principle. That principle, again, requires
universal assent in a discursive process. Even if we
understand universal assent in a somewhat relaxed
manner-emphasizing the "could" in the phrase "could
agree as participants in rational discourses"-the
requirement still seems excessive. To name just two
barriers to discursive consensus: Habermas has allowed the
possibility (even necessity) of compromise over pragmatic
issues, and he has said that "ethical" matters may not be
susceptible either of discursive consensus or compromise.
And so Habermas has to reinterpret the discourse principle,
taking it to apply not so much to the substance of legal
norms as to the procedure through which such norms are
justified and enacted. The new term, then, is "legitimacy"
rather than "rightness," and the burden of legitimacy, here
as elsewhere in Habermas's theory, is borne by democratic
procedure.359
One aspect of democratic procedure concerns the
process of lawmaking within formally organized legislative
bodies. As the idea of the constitutional state requires, this
lawmaking process is itself legally regulated. Habermas
mentions the standard issues here-periodic and secret
elections with equal representation,"' competition among
political parties, committee organization, generally public
deliberations, and various legislative formalities.36 ' He does
not argue that there is some uniquely correct way to
address these issues. He says, instead, that these procedural matters must be "regulated in the light of the
discourse principle," to ensure that "the necessary communicative presuppositions of pragmatic, ethical, and moral

359. See, e.g.,

Democracy, in

JORGEN HABERMAS,

On the InternalRelation Between Law and

THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER

253, 259 (Ciaran Cronin & Pablo

DeGrieff eds., 1998) (1996) (referring to "democratic procedure... which alone
provides legitimating force to the lawmaking process in the context of social and
ideological pluralism").
360. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 170, 181.
361. See id. at 170-71.
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discourses, on one hand, and the conditions for
3 2 fair
bargaining, on the other, can be sufficiently fulfilled."
In using the word "sufficiently," Habermas is
acknowledging that the idealized version of rational
discourse never will be fully realized within legislative
bodies. The principle of majority rule, for example, is an
important limit. The pressures of time and the need for
action require decision rather than endless discourse.
Habermas suggests that a majority vote does not
necessarily mean the end of discourse, just perhaps a
"caesura in an ongoing discussion" or "the interim result of
a

discursive

opinion-forming

process. " '6

But

he

acknowledges that legislative decisions, if revisable through
new legislation, are less revisable than discursive
conclusions upon which collective action does not
immediately depend. 64
What Habermas is wrestling with here is the tension
between two things he wants to affirm: his discourse
principle, with its requirement of universal assent among
all those affected, and the requirements of any imaginably
functioning political system. Habermas wants both to argue
that his discourse principle has been institutionalized, in
the form of the democracy principle, and also to claim that
he has "reconstructed," from a non-utopian point of view,
the "self-understanding" of existing Western constitutional
democracies.
This problem has come up in four contexts: (1)
Habermas's acknowledgement that lawmaking requires
representative government, not a discourse among all the
citizenry that by itself would produce binding law; (2) his
recognition that "ethical" disagreement may make discursive consensus impossible; (3) his acknowledgement that
the detailed nature of legislated norms, together with the
connection between legislation and interests, makes
bargaining and compromise unavoidable; and (4) his
recognition that the legislative procedures that are to cure
the problems mentioned in (1) through (3) above are
themselves not entirely consistent with an idealized notion
of discourse. In short, Habermas has to rely on an idealized
notion of discourse to support his "universal assent"
362. Id. at 171.
363. Id. at 179.
364. See id. at 178.
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requirement, but that idealized notion of discourse is
inconsistent with the requirements of any imaginably
existing political system. In (1) through (3), Habermas has
retreated from arguing that legislative outcomes must be
"legitimate" in his original sense-capable of receiving the
citizenry's universal assent in discourse-to arguing that
democratic procedure must carry the weight of legitimation.
With (4), however, he now has to confront that existing
democratic procedures are themselves far from what an
idealized notion of discourse would prescribe. But he cannot
reject the idealized notion of discourse without rejecting the
idea of universal assent that is at the heart of the discourse
and democracy principles.
Ultimately, the shift to a procedural focus cannot save
Habermas's discourse principle. Procedural norms are
positive legal norms, and as such, they are within the scope
of Habermas's discourse principle. The democracy
principle-the version of the discourse principle applicable
to specifically legal norms-provides that "only those [laws]
may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all
citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn
has been legally constituted., 365 Nothing in this statement

exempts procedural norms, and for good reason. If
procedure is to bear the weight of legal and political
legitimacy, then procedural norms, above all, would have to
qualify as legitimate. Given the discourse and democracy
principles, that seems to require that the legal norms that
constitute and regulate the democratic lawmaking process
must themselves be capable of receiving the citizenry's
universal assent. 6
We have here the same problem that prompted
Habermas to retreat to procedural justification in the first
place. The nuts and bolts of democratic procedure-whether
to have a bicameral or unicameral legislature, the number
of representatives, procedures for committee and leadership
assignment, etc.-hardly seem susceptible of universal
agreement in any non-idealized discourse. The maze of
procedural detail, like the maze of detail in substantive
legal norms, resists universal discursive consensus and
365. Id. at 110 (citation omitted).
366. Cf McCarthy, supra note 318, at 132-33 (noting that disagreement
may be expected even as to the interpretation of "such core elements of
procedural impartiality as equal consideration and equal treatment").
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calls, instead, for compromise at any number of points.
Habermas seems to recognize this point when he notes that
discourse theory cannot prescribe any set of uniquely
correct procedures. He does not seem to recognize, however,
that because procedural rules, too, are positive legal norms,
they would be subject to the universal assent requirement
of the discourse and democracy principles.
Habermas might try to stave off this conclusion by
arguing that only the most general
procedural
arrangements are susceptible of universal agreement (even
in idealized discourse), but that these arrangements suffice
to get the legislative machine in motion. This argument has
two problems. First, even the most basic constitutional
provisions for legislative process involve considerable
detail-the number of representatives, for example-and
for reasonsstated, universal discursive consensus on these
matters seems unlikely. Habermas perhaps recognizes this
point implicitly when he acknowledges that the "system of
rights"-the basis for any legitimate constitutional project,
and a system that includes democratic procedures within
its ambit-could be realized in a number of permissible
ways. The second problem with the argument that I am
considering is that it demonstrates further just how little
can be justified directly by Habermas's discourse principle.
Only the most general procedural arrangements could be
substantively justified; all other legal norms would enjoy
merely a presumption of rationality, so far as their
generation was procedurally proper.
This raises the question why Habermas makes such
strong claims for the discourse and democracy principles. I
mean that in two senses. First, why does he formulate these
principles so strongly, so that norms can be substantively
justified only if they are could command universal assent in
discourse? Second, why does he take the discourse and
democracy principles, so formulated, to be so central to
modern law, given how few legal norms can meet the
demanding standard of universal assent?
As to the first question, Habermas takes "our" practices
of justification to aim at universal assent, at least as a
regulative ideal. Possibly this might be so with respect to
scientific discourse, although I think there is much room for
doubt even there. And those who, like Habermas, are
committed to strict universalism in "moral" matters will
perhaps be sympathetic to the idea that moral norms must
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be susceptible of universal assent in an ideal discoursethough, as Habermas notes, the consequence of this
position is a dramatic shrinking of the moral domain, with
an equally strong trend toward increasing the abstractness
of "moral" norms. But with respect to the kind of discourse
that is the stuff of democratic lawmaking, the universal
assent requirement seems not even to be a regulative ideal.
As Habermas notes, legal norms touch on interests that
may conflict sharply in modern societies, as well as group
identities and forms of life that cannot be unified through
law without strenuous dissent. 67 The reasons Habermas
has given for why universal consensus on substantive
lawmaking issues likely cannot be expected suggest that
the "democracy principle," as Habermas has formulated it,
is external to lawmaking discourse, not immanent within it.
Habermas's account purports to be a "reconstruction" of
modern law and democracy, but conspicuously absent from
political and legal discourses in modern societies is the idea
that a norm is justified only if all could assent in an ideal
discourse. The few instances in which unanimity is required
in actual political discourses-such as the requirement of
"unanimous consent" to revise and extend lawmakers'
remarks, or otherwise to depart from prescribed
procedure-are taken to be the subject of bargain and
compromise. Such unanimity norms work, to the extent
that they do, only because each knows that the other can
sanction a refusal to assent by denying similar requests for
unanimous consent in the future. Any resulting unanimous
agreement is the result not so much of conviction with
respect to a normative validity claim as it is recognition
that the game is better played by withholding one's
objection.
The second question-why does Habermas cling to the
idea of universal assent, even as his account of legislative
discourse undermines it?-likely finds its answer in
Habermas's account of the "system of rights." The criterion
Habermas sets for a reconstruction of law and democracy is
that it must account for how the addressees of law are also
its authors. The universal assent requirement is a

367. McCarthy makes this point forcefully. See id. at 139 (arguing against
the analogy to truth discourses in Habermas's analysis of ethical-political
discourse); id. at 145 (referring to "persistent ethical-political disagreements as
an indelible feature of democratic public life").
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particularly strong way of accounting for establishing this
identity. If all legal norms could receive universal assent in
an ideal discourse, then no one could complain that the
legal order is coercive.
But Habermas's own shift to indirect or procedural
legitimation, rather than direct or substantive legitimation,
suggests that this defense of the "universal assent"
requirement is untenable. If laws are presumptively legitimate because of their procedural pedigree, then they may
well be substantively coercive-in the sense that at least
some members of society would not assent to them in
discourse. In shifting to procedural legitimation, Habermas
recognized that as to many legislative matters, universal
substantive agreement is unavailable. After that shift, the
sense in which law's addressees are also its authors is that
they, because of fidelity to recognized procedure, have
reason to accept legislative outcomes, even if they cannot
endorse them substantively. This sense in which law's
addressees are also its authors doubtless is more modest
than Habermas's original formulation of the discourse and
democracy principles seemed to promise. But it is the most
that can be sustained, given Habermas's (wise) concessions
to the realities of the legislative process. The addressee/
author identity, like the scope of the discourse and
democracy principles themselves, has to be reassessed and
reformulated to reflect Habermas's concessions about
"ethical" disagreement and the necessity of bargaining
and
compromise in lawmaking. That identity between addressee
and author is not an independent reason for supporting the
excessively strong version of the discourse and democracy
principles. Universal substantive assent really has no place
in Habermas's theory after the proceduralist turn.368
The contribution of Habermas's "discourse theory of law
and democracy" thus is not the idea of universal discursive
assent. Instead, it is Habermas's recognition that
discourse-not "the discourse principle" as originally
formulated-is institutionalized in the lawmaking process
368. See Bohmann, supra note 141, at 921-23 (arguing for replacement of
the democracy principle's unanimity requirement with the notion of
"deliberative majorities"); Rehg, supra note 209, at 265 (noting that Habermas's
decision to retain the requirement of universal assent in his "democratic
principle" is "somewhat odd"); cf McCarthy, supra note 318, at 152 ("Practical
rationality in the face of diversity is as much a matter of recognizing,
respecting, and accommodating differences as one of transcending them.").
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through legally prescribed procedures.369 The most novel
aspect of Habermas's account is the connection between
deliberation and decision in formal governmental institutions, on one hand, and informal discussion among
ordinary citizens, on the other. Popular sovereignty,
reinterpreted discourse-theoretically, is consistent with
legislative decisionmaking in representative bodies, but
only subject to an important caveat: If the citizens'
communicative power is to influence lawmaking, legislative
bodies must remain "porous, sensitive, and receptive to the
suggestions, issues and contributions, information and
arguments that flow in from a discursively structured
public sphere."37 ° In part this, too, is a matter of legal
regulation. Public spheres must be constitutionally
protected.37' Habermas suggests, also, that the procedures
for selecting representatives must "provide for the broadest
possible spectrum of interpretive perspectives, including the
views and voices of marginal groups.""
With this latter suggestion, Habermas likely implies a
criticism of the American system, in which the two-party
framework tends to limit the range of represented views.
But much of the work in ensuring that citizens' communicative power influences representative bodies depends upon
the citizenry itself, not the actions of representatives.373
Whether political public spheres are vibrant or moribund
depends in substantial part on the society's traditions and
political culture." 4 Habermas's theory of democracy places
great weight on the importance of active political public
spheres, and on their connection to the network 37of
5
voluntary associations that Habermas calls "civil society."
Habermas's account of law and democracy, then,
departs from an exclusive focus on state institutions. As he
recognizes, however, the claims he makes for the

369. Cf. Rehg, supra note 209, at 266-69 (arguing that decision procedures
are not necessarily to be ranked according to their degree of correspondence
with the discourse principle).
370. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 182. See generally id. at
181-86.
371. Id. at 171.
372. Id. at 183.
373. See id. at 302.
374. See id. at 130-31, 175, 184, 302, 317, 358, 371, 437, 461.
375. See id. at 175 (introducing the notion of civil society); see also id. at 7475 (detailing Parsons's perspective on civil society).
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importance of public spheres and civil society need to be
substantiated through social theory. That is a central task
of Habermas's "communication theory of society," which, as
I have explained, is the supplement in Habermas's larger
project to the discourse theory proper.376 For reasons of
space, I will not discuss here Habermas's attempt to ground
social-theoretically his ambitious normative claims; I have
considered that effort in a companion article.377
Such is Habermas's account of the ways in which
administrative power is bound to communicative power
with respect to legislation. This account, based in a
discourse-theoretical understanding of separation-of-powers
norms, extends also to the other two familiar branches of
government.
Lawmaking, Habermas has said, may rely on the full
range of reasons and discourses-moral, ethical, and
pragmatic-in discursively justifying and enacting legal
norms. Adjudication, by contrast, is limited on Habermas's
theory to the application of existing norms. Habermas
understands adjudication according to a civil-law model.
The "cornerstone" of modern law is the statute,378 enacted by
representative bodies. Habermas emphasizes the requirement of a "democratic genesis" for statutes more than did
the earlier German tradition. 79 But still, he sees the statute
as "the foundation for individual legal claims"38 taken up in
adjudication. Judicial decision, he says, involves "the
application of legal statutes to individual cases." 8'
The obvious question for American readers is whether
this idea of adjudication is a plausible "reconstruction" (in
Habermas's sense) of American practice. Common-law
decisionmaking involves the application of judge-made
rules, not just statutes, and further, it involves the
justification of new judge-made rules, not just the
application of existing rules as pregiven premises.
Habermas, oddly, nowhere discusses the idea of commonlaw adjudication. As we will see, 82 Habermas takes up
Dworkin's "constructive interpretation" approach in his
376. See supra text accompanying notes 152-63.
377. See Baxter, supra note 7.
378. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 189.
379. See id. at 190.
380. Id. at 172.
381. Id.
382. See infra Part III.A.
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"testing" of the discourse theory of law against legal theory
proper. That will allow Habermas to argue that in
interpreting and applying existing law, judges are at the
same time developing the law. But that does not address
the problem that judge-made rules, even if pregiven from
the individual judge's point of view, do not have the
democratic pedigree that Habermas's theory would require.
Habermas's reconstructive account of the constitutional
state focuses on what he calls "normative" and "systematic"
arguments why adjudication must be limited to the
application of existing legal norms rather than the
justification and announcement of new norms.383 In terms of
discourse theory, Habermas says, justification and
application involve "different logics of argumentation."3 "4 To
the extent this argument is not simply circular-assuming
that adjudication involves only the application of pregiven
norms-it is difficult to decipher. Habermas observes that
adjudication relies upon party presentation, with the judge
as "impartial representative of the legal community,"
whereas "in discourses of justification there are ... only
participants."385 That may be so, but its significance is not
immediately clear. What Habermas seems to be saying is
that adjudication cannot involve the justification of norms
because the only participants are the interested parties and
the disinterested judge. The justification and enactment of
legal norms, Habermas has argued, requires the participation of the citizenry through discussion in the public
sphere. Adjudication, therefore, lacks the democratic
warrant Habermas's theory would require. For that reason,
it cannot involve the genesis of new norms, and it must
confine itself to "a discourse of application aimed at
decisions consistent over time"386-or,
consistent until the
appropriate lawmaking power has changed the law.
Habermas's second argument sounds similar themes.
The judiciary has the coercive power of the state at its
disposal to enforce its judgments. If judges were free to act
as lawmakers, then they would be able to wield administrative power without connection to the communicative
383. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 172. He addresses
briefly the "pragmatic" reasons often given for separating lawmaking from lawapplying, having to do with judicial professionalization and specialization.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 192.
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power of democratic discussion. The separation of
lawmaking and law-applying power is a corollary of
Habermas's discourse theory of law and democracy. The
conclusion is not novel-a basic argument against judgemade law always has been that it is undemocratic. What
remains to be seen, though, is whether Habermas's
inflection of this standard point through discourse theory
solves the standard difficulties. Is the distinction between
justification and application any less manipulable and
unsatisfying than the distinction between making and
finding the law? Is it an improvement on Dworkin's attempt
to escape this choice with the notion of constructive
interpretation? I will take up these issues in Part III below,
where I consider Habermas's "testing" of his theory against
legal theory proper, and also against the theory and
practice of constitutional decisionmaking.
As should be apparent by now, Habermas intends his
discourse theory as a recasting of separation-of-powers
notions. One branch of government remains to be
discussed-the executive branch, or as Habermas refers to
it, "the administration" (Verwaltung). As one would expect,
Habermas argues that there must be legal controls over the
administration to prevent it from deploying administrative
power in a way disconnected from communicative power.387
He mentions the usual such controls-the requirement of
statutory authorization, ongoing legislative oversight, and
judicial review.388 The administration may not substitute
itself for the lawmaking power. 89 That much is obvious.
More difficult is Habermas's distinction between
adjudication and administration, both of which seem to
involve the application of democratically enacted law.
Habermas admits a further difficulty: given increasing
legislative reliance on general clauses and goal-oriented
programs, the administration is left "considerable room for
discretion."39 ° These recent developments, Habermas
suggests, undermine traditional conceptions of administrative tasks as merely the technical implementation of
norms established elsewhere. 9'
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

See id. at 169.
See id. at 173, 187-88.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 190.
See id.
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Discourse theory, according to Habermas, offers a way
to account for the separation of administration from both
legislative and judicial decisionmaking. Legislatures have
access to the full range of "normative, pragmatic, and
empirical reasons, including those constituted through the
results of fair compromises," provided that they access
these reasons "within the framework of a democratic
'
The
procedure designed for the justification of norms."392
application,
in
the
context
judiciary engages in discourses of
of particular cases, and it is bound to apply enacted law. A
court is not free to "make whatever use it likes of the
reasons packaged in, and linked to, statutes." Anticipating
his discussion of Dworkin, however, Habermas implies that
in applying law, courts may engage in constructive
interpretation-or, as he later puts it, that they may
"justify the individual decision by its coherence with a
rationally reconstructed history of existing law."393 The
administration, however, is limited to "pragmatic
discourses," where the normative premises are "pregiven."
It is "not permitted to deal with normative reasons in either
a constructive or reconstructive manner," nor is it free to
"follow [its] own interests or premises." 94 What it is to
contribute is "empirically informed purposive-rational
decision making" in pragmatic issues.
Habermas's general idea here is to account for the
separation of powers not so much in terms of differences
among functional tasks,3 96 or in terms of a logic of general
and specific, 397 as in terms of differences in access to reasons
and kinds of discourse. From this point of view, the
significance of the separation of powers is that it is "a way
to secure both the priority of democratic legislation and the
recoupling
of administrative power with communicative
398
power."

This general sketch, developed through Habermas's
"reconstructive" analysis of law and democracy, is of course
no substitute for detailed analysis of particular legal and
political systems. Presumably Habermas would allow-as
392.
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

Id. at 191.
Id. at 211.
Id. at 191.
Id. at 192.
Id. 186.
See id. at 189-92.
Id. at 187.
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he has with respect to earlier work-that its merit depends
upon whether, in the future, it proves fruitful for more
empirically oriented research.399 In fact, the rest of
Habermas's work on law seeks to bring the ideas developed
reconstructively into closer contact with ideas generated
through different approaches. The "communication theory
of society," which I discuss in a separate article,4 °° situates
the discourse theory's conclusions in a model of contemporary societies, testing whether those conclusions
"connect[] with the social reality of highly complex
societies." 40 1 And before developing that theory of society,

Habermas seeks to "test and elaborate the discourse
concept of law and democracy" against, first, contemporary
discussions in legal theory, and second, contemporary
controversies in constitutional law.402
III. DISCOURSE THEORY AND THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
ADJUDICATION

With his "testing" of the reconstructively developed
discourse theory, Habermas shifts from a "philosophical"
4 °
standpoint to "the perspective of legal theory proper."

From this latter standpoint, the focus is on adjudication,
and in particular, on adjudication as seen from "the judge's
Certainly, as Habermas notes, this is the
perspective.
dominant perspective in legal scholarship. According to
Habermas, this is not simply a matter of parochialism or
traditionalism, but a legitimate theoretical decision. His
stated reason is as follows: "Because all legal communications refer to actionable claims, court decisions provide
the perspective from which the legal system is analyzed."0 5
That reason does not sufficiently support a methodological commitment to court-centered legal theory.
399. See, e.g., 1 THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 9, at 396400.
400. See Baxter, supra note 7.
401. Habermas, Reply to Symposium Participants,supra note 158, at 444;
see id. (arguing the turn to social science is "meant to make it plausible that the
reconstructed normative self-understanding of modern legal orders does not
hang in mid-air").
402. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 7.
403. Id. at 195.
404. See id. at 196.
405. Id. at 196-97.
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Habermas's strategy is particularly strange given his
statement, in the same general discussion, that on his
approach "political legislation" is "central,""6 and his
acknowledgement that one can analyze political legislation
from the standpoint of legislators, agencies, citizens, and
interest groups.4° Certainly one also could investigate law's
effects (or lack of effects) outside the courtroom, even if one
sees law primarily as creating "actionable claims."
But Habermas is correct that if discourse theory is to
"prove itself' 48 as a theory of law, then it must provide an
account of adjudication. To be sure, adjudication need not
be understood only from "the judge's perspective." The
perspectives of lawyers, the parties, and jurors are obvious
alternatives, or better, supplements. But Habermas is right
that one basic question of legal theory concerns how judges
do and should decide cases. That question is indeed one
against which a legal theory must prove itself, even if it is
not obviously
and necessarily the central question of legal
40 9
theory.

Habermas considers, first, the general nature of
adjudication, approaching it through a critical reading of
familiar perspectives that is informed by his own guiding
distinction between facticity and validity. He turns, then, to
the special case of constitutional adjudication.
A. Discourse Theory and Dworkin's "Constructive
Interpretation"
In the context of adjudication, the tension between
facticity and validity appears as a tension between
"certainty" and "legitimacy."' With the "certainty" requirement, Habermas connects not just the general need for
adequate and predictable enforcement of legal standards,
but also, the more particular need for consistency in judicial
decisionmaking.4 11 With "legitimacy," Habermas associates
406. Id. at 195.
407. See id. at 196.
408. Id.
409. James Bohmann, a philosopher, finds it "odd that Habermas spends so
much time" discussing adjudication rather than legislation. See Bohmann,
supra note 141, at 910 n.20. His different perspective probably reflects the
disciplinary difference.
410. See, e.g., BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 197, 198.
411. See id. at 198.
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the need for judicial decisions to be normatively justifiable
and thus worthy of respect apart from the presence of
sanctions.412 Habermas describes the basic problem of
adjudication as follows: "[Hiow can the application of a
contingently emergent law be carried out with both internal
consistency and rational external justification, so as to
guarantee simultaneously the certainty of law and its
4 3
rightness?""
Two aspects of this formulation deserve comment. First,
the word "application" reflects Habermas's position,
developed in his analysis of the separation of powers, that
adjudication is about the application of legal norms, not
their creation and justification.4"4 The words "external
justification" express the same idea. The justification for
the norms applied in judicial decisions must come from
without-from the reasons "packaged in, and linked to,
statutes.""' Second, the references to "internal consistency"
and "emergent law" express the idea that present judicial
decisions link to a past and future of legal decisionmaking.
The certainty requirement thus mandates consistency with
past institutional history and, at the same time, prescribes
that present judicial decisions must be points of connection
for future judicial decisions.
With this idea of the double requirement for judicial
decisionmaking as the backdrop, Habermas distinguishes
his discourse-theoretical approach from three prominent
theories of judicial decisionmaking. As one by now might
expect, Habermas maintains that each of these theories
fails to reconcile the certainty and legitimacy requirements.
According to Habermas, legal realism416 revokes the
certainty requirement by denying that past decisions are
sufficiently determinate to constrain present decision. This
effectively negates "the very function of law," which is "to
stabilize expectations."417 Further, Habermas argues,
412. See id. at 198-99.
413. Id. at 199.
414. See supra text accompanying notes 378-86; see also BETWEEN FACTS
AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 197 (adjudication's legitimacy claim as "the claim
to a legitimate application of law, that is, to render correct or right decisions").
415. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 192.
416. Under the heading of "legal realism," Habermas considers American
legal realism, interest jurisprudence (Interessenjurisprudenz),and the "Free
Law" school (Freirechtsschule).See id. at 201, 538 nn.10-11.
417. Id. at 201.
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realism pursues the legitimacy goal only by assimilating
judicial decisionmaking to other kinds of political decision.
On this view, cases are correctly decided only if the judge
wisely uses her discretion to pursue utilitarian or socialwelfare goals. In both respects, Habermas thinks, realists
skeptically debunk the necessary "idealizing suppositions"
of participants in the judicial process."'
Legal positivists, Habermas thinks, commit a symmetrical error. According to Habermas, positivists see law
as a closed system of norms, with legitimation coming only
through fidelity to legally prescribed procedures. The basic
norm-whether Hart's "rule of recognition" or Kelsen's
Grundnorm-bearsthe weight of legitimation but "without
itself being capable of rational justification. ' 19 Instead, "as
part of a historical form of life, it must be factually accepted
as settled custom." 42 0 The emphasis on identifying unambiguously what is or is not law, and the concern with
"pedigree" rather than rational justification, promotes the
certainty guarantee at the expense of the legitimacy or
"rightness" guarantee. Positivism's treatment of "hard
cases," Habermas argues, reflects this "priority of legal
certainty." In such cases, Habermas maintains, positivists
claim that law has run out and commit the decision to
judicial discretion. Here the "rightness" standard is
extrinsic to law.42'
"Legal hermeneutics" fares somewhat better in
Habermas's assessment. The insight here is that a "case" is
defined by the relevant norm, whose relevance criteria
select some aspects of the factual situation and exclude
others. The decision reached by applying the rule counts as
a further development of the rule. A decision's legitimacy
derives from the ethical tradition that shapes both the
judge's "preunderstanding" of the case and the interpretive
maxims that aid in application. But this connection of
legitimacy to a particular tradition is insufficient in a
pluralistic society, Habermas argues. 2
The encounters Habermas stages with these three
theories of law do not amount to much of a "test" for

418.
419.
420.
421.
422.

See id.
Id. at 201-02.
Id. at 202.
See id. at 202-03.
See id. at 199-200.
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discourse theory. All three sketches are too brief to develop
the theory in question, and the account of "realist"
thinkers-attributing to them "a flat revocation of any
guarantees of legal certainty"-is particularly crude."'
Habermas would have done better either to encounter the
three theories in something other than cardboard-cutout
form or to omit the discussion entirely.424 The purpose of his
encounter, however, probably is not so much a "testing" of
his own theory as a setup for a theory he will consider at
some length: the theory of adjudication Ronald Dworkin
developed in work up to and including Law's Empire.
The connections between Dworkin's account of
adjudication and Habermas's ideas are easy to see. Both
focus on the decision of legal rather than factual issues, and
both assume the "internal" perspective of the judge.425 Both
see judicial decisionmaking as bound by the certainty and
423. One problem, of course, is that the body of work referred to as "legal
realism"-or even "American legal realism"-is diverse in style of thought,
subject matter, and conclusions. Habermas would have done better to select one
or another "realist" rather than try to characterize "realism" generally in two
paragraphs. But the idea that "realism" flatly revoked the certainty guarantee
seems consistent only with Jerome Frank's account, in Law and the Modern
Mind, of the quest for legal certainty as (in part) a projection of infantile needs.

See

JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND

46-52 (Anchor Books 1970)

(1930). But much "realist" work could be seen as reinterpreting rather than
"revoking" the idea of legal certainty. A characteristic argument is not that we
cannot predict the outcome of most legal disputes, but instead, that such
predictive capacity depends less on analysis of officially recognized black-letter
legal rules than commonly has been thought. At least a significant body of
"realist" work was directed toward increasing the predictability and certainty of
legal rules-partly by verbal reformulation, but also by improving the
information available to decisionmakers (through procedural and other
changes), by finding better decisionmakers than generalist judges and juries,
and to some extent, by crafting different systems of rules that would more
closely track reasonable procedures in the field being regulated. This list of
"realist" reform strategies suggests also that the concern for "rightness" was not
simply a matter of trusting judges to take on a policymaking role. A
characteristic "realist" argument was that judges always had been performing
that role, but usually covertly, sometimes unconsciously, and often badly. And
at least for some important "realist" thinkers, both procedural changes and
incorporation of reasonable extra-legal norms could improve the rightness of
adjudicative decisions.
424. William Forbath argues that a better understanding of legal-realist
thinking would have improved Habermas's account of the economic and
administrative system. See William A. Forbath, Short Circuit: A Critique of
Habermas's Understandingof Law, Politics, and Economic Life, in HABERMAS
ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 272, 279-83, 286.
425. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 14-15 (1986).
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legitimacy guarantees.426 Both emphasize the requirement
of principled judicial decision.
Habermas, in fact, could make more of the connection
between his own approach and Dworkin's theory of
"constructive interpretation." The linkage is easiest to see if
we consider first the "chain novel" device that Dworkin uses
to illustrate judicial decisionmaking. A new chapter for a
chain novel, Dworkin observes, must "fit" the prior chapters
that other authors have crafted.2 7 Further, among the
possible ways of continuing the story that survive some
threshold test of "fit," the author must consider which
"makes the work in progress best, all things considered."428
Dworkin, of course, notes that the two "dimensions" of
interpretation-"fit" and "justification"4 29 -are not entirely
separable. Questions of fit are relevant also in the second
dimension of interpretation, both in the chain novel
example and in the practice of judicial decisionmaking that
the example illustrates.43 °
Put in terms of judicial decisionmaking, the "fit"
requirement means that a present decision must
sufficiently cohere with relevant past decisions. Habermas,
oddly, describes this only as a matter of justification,
maintaining that Dworkin would "justify the individual
decision by its coherence with a rationally reconstructed
history of existing law."' 1 Perhaps he is trying to say only
that, on Dworkin's theory, the degree of fit is relevant to the
matter of justification. In any event, the requirement of
coherence with past decisions is part of what Habermas
"certainty" requirement.3 2
means
by adjudication's
Dworkin's second dimension of interpretation, referring to
the decision's justifiability, corresponds to Habermas's
"legitimacy" or "rightness" requirement. Put in terms of
Habermas's overarching distinction between facticity and

426. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 203 (regarding
Dworkin).
427. See DWORKIN, supra note 425, at 229-30.
428. Id. at 231.
429. Dworkin does not always describe this second dimension of
interpretation as "justification," but sometimes he does. See id. at 239, 255. He
refers on other occasions to the dimension of "substance" or (in discussing legal
interpretation) "justice."
430. See id. at 239.
431. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 211.
432. See id. at 198-99.
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validity: Dworkin's "fit" requirement treats past decisions
as authoritative ("facticity"), but at the same time, he sees
the present decision's justifiability ("validity") as not
entirely reducible to its degree of fit. Neither the interpretive dimensions of fit and justification, nor the
guarantees of certainty and legitimacy, collapse into one
another.
Habermas is more critical, however, of Dworkin's
decision to elaborate "constructive interpretation" through
the device of Hercules, the idealized judge with "superhuman intellectual power and patience" whose cogitations
and decisions we witness throughout the second half of
Law's Empire. Habermas asks the obvious questions. Does
Dworkin's reliance on an idealized judicial figure indicate
that the interpretive tasks he sets for ordinary judges are
excessively demanding? If no judge, by definition, can equal
Hercules' capacities, then can the theory Dworkin is
defending serve as even a regulative ideal'?33
Habermas approaches these issues by way of Dworkin's
reception in critical legal studies. Accordingly-and because
of his own views about the central issues in adjudicationHabermas takes the basic problem to be one of indeterminacy. What reason, he asks, do we have for thinking that
Dworkin-style judging would not simply substitute the
political prejudices of flesh-and-blood judges, and unacknowledged influences in the judicial system's environment, for determination by law?"" And if the law is "shot
through with contradictory principles and policies," then
could Dworkin's judge possibly complete the "rational
reconstruction" that his interpretive method requires?435
To some extent, Habermas defends Dworkin against
these charges. He notes Dworkin's own reply, to the effect
that the objections confuse rules with principles.436 Rules,
understood as concrete norms that apply directly to
particular fact-situations, cannot conflict without either
invalidating one of the rules or requiring an exception.
Principles, by contrast, may "compete" within a coherent
normative theory without the competition being a theory-

433.
434.
435.
436.

See id. at 212-13.
See id. at 213-14.
Id. at 216.
See id. at 216-17.
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defeating "contradiction." 37 This reply is correct as far as it
goes, Habermas thinks, but it can be deepened by considering Habermas's own distinction between justification
and application. "[Alll norms" except for the most rule-like
rules, Habermas claims, "are inherently indeterminate" in
their application. 438 This is because most norms do not
specify, in detail and in advance, the factual situations to
which they do and do not apply. And so in many cases, more
than one norm may be potentially applicable. A discourse of
application is required to determine which valid norm is
"appropriately" applied in the particular context, given all
the relevant facts and circumstances. 43 9 But because the
relevance of facts and circumstances depends upon which
norm one is considering, discourses of application require
one to work back and forth between the norm and its
situation of application. This uncertainty of application,
however, does not affect the norms' validity. And so the
"indeterminacy" objection Habermas attributes to critical
legal studies confuses justification with application, not just
principles with rules.
As Habermas acknowledges, however, this reply to the
indeterminacy objection does not sufficiently address the
requirement of legal certainty. He makes this acknowledgement in the context of evaluating Dworkin's theory,44 ° but it
applies equally to his own. The standard of "appropriateness" in discourses of application is empty. It does not
assist the judge either in selecting a governing norm or in
applying the norm to the factual situations that the norm
illuminates.441 It simply tells the judge to decide the case
correctly. "Appropriateness" is a term of praise rather than
a criterion or instruction.
Habermas's responses to this problem are surprising.
He suggests, first, that "legal certainty" is only "itself a
principle that must be weighed against other principles in
the case at hand."42 This response seems, first, to misstate
the logical status Habermas has given to "certainty." It is
437. DWORKIN, supra note 425, at 268-71; BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra
note 2, at 208-09.
438. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 217.
439. Id. at 217-18.
440. See id. at 219.
441. See Robert Alexy, Jiirgen Habermas's Theory of Legal Discourse, in
HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 226, 231.
442. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 220.
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not a "principle," in the sense of a general norm that, in
particular cases, helps specify the justification for decision.
Instead, it is one of two basic functional requirements that
a legal system as a whole must satisfy: the course of
decision must be sufficiently certain (i.e. predictable in view
of past institutional history, with adequate enforcement),
and decisions must be sufficiently justified to count as
correct. Doubtless the point Habermas is trying to make is
that these two requirements, which he has identified as in
tension,443 may be traded off against each other. What he
suggests is a reinterpretation of the certainty requirement
that trims back its demands to a more manageable level.
Again, his recourse is to procedure. Instead of focusing on
the certainty of outcome, Habermas says, we should focus
on the certainty of procedures. Sound procedures, he
contends:
guarantee[] the certainty of law at a different level. Procedural
rights guarantee each legal person the claim to a fair procedure
that in turn guarantees not certainty of outcome but a discursive
clarification of the pertinent facts and legal questions. Thus
affected parties can be confident that in procedures issuing in
judicial decisions only relevant reasons will be decisive, and not
arbitrary ones.444

This reinterpretation and relocation, however, responds
to neither of the reasons that motivated Habermas to
postulate "certainty" as a requirement for adjudication. The
"very function of law," he said, was to "stabilize
expectations."44 That function requires predictability of
outcome, not just predictability that litigation procedures
will be fair. Nor does the fairness of procedures by itself
guarantee continuity in a legal system's institutional
history. The question of legal certainty concerns outcomes,
not procedures. While good procedures may help produce
more consistent outcomes, the more salient factor seems to
be the character of legal norms applied in a particular
system. As we have known at least since legal process
theory: "rules," which specify their applicability and
443. See id. at 197 (referring to the "tension between the principle of legal
certainty and the claim to a legitimate application of law"); id. at 198 (the
"guarantees" of certainty and legitimacy "do not easily harmonize").
444. Id. at 220.
445. Id. at 201.
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application relatively precisely, are generally more certain
in their outcome than open-ended "standards" or "principles." It may be, as Habermas suggests in the final
chapter of Between Facts and Norms, that contemporary
conditions make classical ideas of legal certainty unrealizable.446 But then why does Habermas not make that
clear at the outset of his discussion of adjudication? Why is
certainty (of outcome) a basic function of law, and why is
realism faulted for "revoking" the guarantee of legal
certainty?
Habermas's further response to the "indeterminacy of
application" problem is no more satisfying. He suggests that
legal "paradigms" can operate to limit the indeterminacy of
adjudication. What he means by this term is not entirely
clear. His most common usage of this term-beginning with
the opening of his first chapter on adjudication and
continuing throughout Between Facts and Norms-presents
"paradigms" as highly abstract interpretations of a legal
system as a whole. Borrowing from systems theory, he
describes a legal paradigm as "something like the implicit
social theory of the legal system, and hence the image this
system forms of its social environment."447 Understood in
this way, Habermas claims, "the legal paradigm determines
how basic rights and constitutional principles are to be
understood and how they can be realized in the context of
contemporary society."4 " Habermas usually identifies these
paradigms in a trio of competing conceptions-with his own
conception drawing from but superseding the other two. In
order of historical occurrence, these are the "liberal" (or
"bourgeois formal-law") paradigm, the "social-welfare" (or
"welfarist" paradigm), and his own "proceduralist"
paradigm.449
If Habermas has these paradigms in mind, then he has
no solution to the problem of indeterminacy in application.
They are far too abstract to provide guidance in concrete
acknowledges, these paracases. 45 Further, as Habermas
digms presently compete with one another, and so even if
446. See id. at 433, 435.
447. Id. at 194-95.
448. Id. at 195.
449. See, e.g., id. at 195, 221-22, 389-91, 409-10, 414-15, 437. Sometimes
Habermas refers only to the former two paradigms, but usually when viewing
them from the perspective of his own. See id. at 250-51, 401-02, 407, 418-19.
450. See Alexy, supra note 441, at 231.
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any one of them provided clear guidance in a particular
question, the question of paradigm selection would remain.4 1' Habermas's usual trio of paradigms, then, are more
indeterminate in application than the legal norms they
purportedly clarify.
As Habermas acknowledges in another context, the
complexity of judicial decisionmaking may be reduced with
less abstract "paradigms." In discussing Cass Sunstein's
proposed seven "canons" for interpreting regulatory
statutes, Habermas first remarks that the proposal is an
"exemplary contribution to the paradigm discussion,"
largely because the canons cohere with the discourse
theory's "radical-democratic meaning of the system of
rights.,, 45 2 But while Habermas agrees that "background
norms" are necessary for judicial interpretation (at least in
cases of ambiguity), " and while he approves of Sunstein's
proposal on the merits, he draws back from endorsing fully
this solution to the problem of indeterminacy. These canons
at least verge on "a politically inspired 'creation of law,"'
and in that respect they offend the requirement that
judicial activity be limited to discourses of application, not
justification. 4 Further, canons of construction, and
interpretive norms more generally, tend to be the property
of legal experts,455 and so they may become ideological4 and

451. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 221.
452. Id. at 252 (quoting CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS

REVOLUTION

170-

71 (1990)). Sunstein's proposal is as follows:
Where there is ambiguity, courts should construe regulatory statutes
so that (1) politically unaccountable actors are prohibited from deciding
important issues; (2) collective action problems do not subvert
statutory programs; (3) various regulatory statutes are, to the extent
possible, coordinated into a coherent whole; (4) obsolete statutes are
kept consistent with changing developments of law, policy, and fact; (5)
procedural qualifications of substantive rights are kept narrow; (6) the
complex systemic effects of regulation are taken into account; and most
generally, (7) irrationality and injustice, measured against the
statute's own purposes, are avoided.
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 252.
453. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 252 (referring to
"important judicial dcision[s]"); see also id. (quoting Sunstein's proviso that the
canons apply when the text is ambiguous).
454. See id. at 253.
455. See id. at 221, 224-25. But cf. id. at 393 (cautioning against taking the
"legal paradigm" idea as just part of "the conceptual economy of [law's]
professional custodians").
456. See id. at 221.
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resistant to change.457 Habermas should add that typically
they are contested, both in the abstract and in their
application to particular cases.'
Because they are contested, professionalized rules, Habermas could add further,
interpretive canons may not materially assist in producing
legal certainty: they do not guarantee substantive
consistency with past cases, nor do they provide much
guidance for law-conforming primary conduct.
Ultimately, Habermas addresses the indeterminacy
problem through a "theory of legal discourse" that, as one
by now would expect, gives pride of place to procedure. He
begins this theory by renewing his objections to Dworkin's
"Hercules" device. The theory is "monological," Habermas
459 meaning that Hercules develops his interobserves,
pretations not in discourse with others-whether attorneys
in the case, his fellow judges, or both-but through his own
solitary cognitive efforts. "Monological" is a term of
opprobrium in a discourse theory that relies on "dialogue"
(or, discursive engagement) in the search for "appropriate"
applications of legal norms. And so rather than "anchor the
ideal demands on legal theory in... the ideal personality of
a judge who is distinguished by her virtue and her
privileged access to the truth," Habermas suggests, better
to have recourse to "the political ideal of an 'open society of
interpreters of the constitution.'""
This move, however, has little if anything to do with
promoting legal certainty or reducing indeterminacy in the
law's application. If the law, as applied, were what an "open
society of interpreters" decided after some discursive
procedure, then the distinction between adjudication and
legislation in fact would be leveled out. Habermas will put
the idea of the "open society" to other uses, but his
invocation of that idea in addressing the indeterminacy
problem makes little sense.46'

457. See id. at 221.
458. See supra text accompanying note 451.
459. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 222-24.
460. Id. at 223. Andrew Arato defends this idea of a public sphere that
would constrain courts, particularly in their exercise of constitutional
jurisdiction, but notes that Habermas has not gone far in addressing questions
of institutional design. See Andrew Arato, Procedural Law and Civil Society:

Interpreting the Radical Democratic Paradigm, in

HABERMAS ON LAW AND

DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 26, 32-34.
461. Habermas's contention is that to the extent indeterminacy is reduced
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Besides, what Habermas addresses under the heading
of "legal procedures" involves, for the most part, something
other than democratic influence on legal outcomes. His aim
is to show how legal procedures, especially litigation procedures, incorporate-more or less-the discourse principle.
The "more or less" qualification is important. As with
legislative procedures, judicial procedures impose time and
relevance constraints. Pretrial procedures, and rulings
during trial, limit the issues that may be raised and the
time that may be devoted to them.462 The parties, Habermas
acknowledges, pursue interests strategically-that is, their
contribution to courtroom discourse is not disinterested
pursuit of the right answer but advocacy.463 The burden of
proof asymmetrically distributes discursive roles.464
Habermas sees the role of the judge as compensation for
these divergences from the discourse model. "The legal
discourse of the court," Habermas writes, "is played out in a
procedural-legal vacuum, so that reaching a judgment is
left up to the judge's professional ability."4 In the German
system, Habermas points out, the judge is required to set
out the reasons for decision.466 In Anglo-American trials,
however, jury decisions may simply be answers as to
ultimate issues, with no explanation and no real checks to
see whether the conclusions are discursively warranted.
And as to factual matters, as Habermas notes, appellate
review is sharply limited.467 The same is true of most
ordinary trial rulings on (for example) the admission of
evidence. Further, voting procedures in multimember
decisionmaking bodies, whether judge or jury, may further
by "paradigms," then better to employ paradigms that all share. But if
Habermas means the trio of large-scale paradigms identified in text above, then
he faces the problem of competing paradigms. If he is referring to the humbler
kind of "paradigm"-canons, background norms, etc.-then his own argument
suggests that ordinary citizens have little to say about such matters.
The real use of this "open society of interpreters" idea is to provide a check,
called for by discourse theory's pro-democracy tilt, in cases where courts engage
in what might be considered lawmaking rather than law-application. We will
see, however, that Habermas's account of when that happens is not altogether
clear. And in any event, this has nothing to do with reducing indeterminacy.
462. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 235-36.
463. See id. at 235.
464. See id.
465. Id. at 237.
466. Id. at 236.
467. See id.
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deviate from the discourse model. This is less true in jury

cases, perhaps, to the extent that the law requires unanimity or at least a strong supermajority. In cases with multimember judicial panels, however, a simple majority will
suffice. As with rules establishing legislative majority rule,
"consensus" among decisionmakers is a less stringent
requirement than Habermas's statement of the discourse
principle first would suggest.
To this list of limits that legal procedure imposes on the
discourse principle, one should consider also the overwhelming percentage of cases that are settled or (in
criminal cases) plea-bargained. In such cases, we see
bargaining rather than something that meets the general
requirements of discourse. True, as I mentioned above,
Habermas's account of the constitutional state's principles
leaves room for bargaining and compromise. But it requires
that the conditions of bargaining be fair, with power more
or less symmetrically distributed. Do the conditions of legal
bargaining meet this requirement? Certainly there is an
imbalance of power in most criminal cases between prosecution and defense, and the same is true in many civil
cases. The requirement of appointed counsel in criminal
cases is partial compensation for the imbalance of power,
but given the realities of at least many American systems of
criminal justice, doubtless it is not full compensation.
One accomplishment of legal procedure is, as Habermas
claims, the structuring of a space in which arguments can
be exchanged and relevant information brought forward.
The requirement of judicial impartiality, and such
requirements as there may be for reasoned explanation of
judgments, compensate in part for divergences from the
discourse principle's usual requirements. But the differences between actual judicial procedures and the idealized
requirements of discourse are as important as the similarities. Here, as with similar restrictions on discourse in
legislative matters, Habermas sensibly realizes that the
discourse principle, taken full-strength, would be unworkable. The question remains, however, whether a discourse
theory can make those concessions without systematically
revising the original statement of the discourse principle.
Habermas sees his recourse to procedure as a
reformulation of Dworkin's theory of judicial interpretation.
Rather than place "idealizing demands" on the judge, with
the rhetorical device of Hercules as superhuman intellect,
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Habermas locates those demands in "the necessary
pragmatic presuppositions of legal discourse."468 But just as
Dworkin concedes that ordinary judges do not match but
can only emulate Hercules, so the procedures actually
applied in adjudication can only partially realize the
demands of the full-strength discourse principle.
But there is a further difference. More is not always
better when it comes to realization of the discourse
principle. Adjudicative procedures necessarily, and wisely,
stop far short of fully institutionalizing ideal discourse
requirements. Competing with the demands of the
discourse principle ("validity" or "legitimacy") are the
pragmatic requirements of decisionmaking ("facticity").
Habermas is right that these are in tension. But these
pragmatic requirements are not just a moment of "facticity"
that limits the discourse principle. They are conditions
without which no attempt to institutionalize discourse even
could be made.
One further aspect of Habermas's general theory of
adjudication remains to be discussed: the status of commonlaw decisionmaking. A significant part of Dworkin's
analysis in Law's Empire is devoted to that issue. But
throughout the course of Between Facts and Norms,
Habermas barely mentions the topic of common-law
decision and never considers it systematically." 9 One
reason, likely, is Habermas's greater familiarity with the
civil-law tradition. Still, Habermas had significant contact
with American legal scholars over the years, and his
account of constitutional adjudication refers frequently to
American constitutional practice and theory. Further, the
common-law tradition is hardly unknown to German
sociology of law. Max Weber discussed it,"' and Niklas
Luhmann, Habermas's main rival for the title of
preeminent German social theorist, begins his autopoietic

468. Id. at 238.
469. See Catherine Kemp, Habermas Among the Americans: Some
Reflections on the Common Law, 76 DENV. U. L. REV. 961 (1999). One place at
which Habermas mentions common law is in his commentary on Dworkin. See
BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 212-13 (describing Dworkin's
account as ranging "through individual constitutional norms, ordinary statutes,
and common laws to precedents, commentaries, and other legal sources").
470. See, e.g., 2 WEBER, supra note 146, at 641-900.
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study of law by noting that he learned much from
considering common-law systems.47 '
Habermas's account of law in fact invites consideration
of common-law adjudication. As noted in Part II.C.4 above,
the core principle of Habermas's theory of the constitutional
state is that administrative power must be bound to the
communicative power that originates in discussion among
the citizenry and "circulates" through legislative bodies.
Habermas recognizes that courts wield administrative
power.47 2 In cases of statutory or constitutional interpretation-Habermas's paradigm cases of judicial interpretation-the connection to the citizenry's communicative
activity and its legislative product is apparent. Not so,
however, in the case of common-law decisionmaking.
The problem of squaring common-law adjudication with
democratic theory is of course not unique to Habermas. But
some of the usual escapes available to other thinkers are
not open to Habermas. It is not enough, on his principles, to
argue that the people and the legislature tacitly have
approved common-law decisionmaking, retaining (and
sometimes exercising) the power to override such judicial
decisions. Further, even if a jurisdiction had a statute that
bestowed this power on courts, this delegation of
lawmaking power to courts still would be problematic for
Habermas. Despite Habermas's references to an "open
society" of interpreters, and despite his statements that a
critical public needs to develop to evaluate court
decisions, 73 the fact remains that common-law courts have

471. See LUHMANN, supra note 162, at 8. In his commentary on Between
Facts and Norms, Luhmann notes that Habermas places "a very traditional
emphasis on legislation, thereby underestimating judicial lawmaking."
Luhmann, Quod Omnes Tangit, supra note 162, at 166.
472. Cf BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 172-74.
473. Cf BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 440 (referring to
"obligations for courts to justify opinions before an enlarged critical forum
specific to the judiciary," i.e., "a legal public sphere that goes beyond the
existing culture of experts and is sufficiently sensitive to make important court
decisions the focus of public controversies."); id. at 280 (referring, in the context
of constitutional decisions, to "the critical gaze of a robust legal public spherea citizenry that has grown to become a 'community of constitutional
interpreters' "). For a suggestion that Habermas needs to think further about
questions of institutional design, see Arato, supra note 460, at 32-34. A basic
problem is that the lay public probably is less interested in the constraints
Habermas would place on judicial activity and more interested in politically
desirable outcomes.
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few if any of the procedures that ensure public participation
in legislative decisionmaking. It is not enough, in other
words, for the people and their legislative representatives to
tolerate common-law decisionmaking, or even to authorize
it once and for all. Habermas's theory of lawmaking requires popular participation, not just tacit authorization or
after-the-fact criticism. 7 '
Nor can Habermas escape the problem by noting that,
in each case, judges do not make law afresh but only apply
and develop the work of their judicial predecessors. Not
only is the distinction between justification and application
elusive-as I argue below, in discussing Habermas's theory
of constitutional adjudication 47 -but further, at some point
in this chain of common-law decisions, courts have engaged
in lawmaking. And here, too, the problem is that the
citizenry's communicative power has (and has had) little if
anything to do with that lawmaking. The "web" '76 of law
that common-law courts make and apply is relatively
unconnected to citizens' communicative power.
One option for Habermas might be to argue,
straightforwardly, that common-law decisionmaking is
simply illegitimate. Courts inevitably fill gaps, clarify
ambiguity, and correct vaguenesses in statutes and
constitutions, the argument might go, but they may not
take the lead in creating legal norms. This would be a
straightforward application of Habermas's distinction
between justification and application, together with his
separation-of-powers contention that the courts may do only
the latter and not the former.
The problem, however, is that Habermas is purporting
to "reconstruct" the "normative self-understanding" of
modern legal orders. Some of those legal orders take
common-law decisionmaking to be basic. Treating this as a
"mistake"-an option in Dworkin's theory of constructive
interpretation upon which Habermas remarks"-seems
implausible. The practice of common-law decisionmaking is
too basic to Anglo-American jurisprudence to count as
474. Cf BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 120-21 (identity
between law's authors and addressees not established by "moral approval in
hindsight"; without participation in "politically autonomous lawmaking" we
have "paternalism").
475. See infra text accompanying notes 490-521.
476. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 198.
477. See id. at 212, 214.
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simply an erroneous application of the constitutional state's
recognized principles.
Common-law adjudication, in short, is a serious
omission from Habermas's discourse theory of law, and one
not easy either to reconcile with, or exclude from as illegitimate, his account of adjudication and the separation of
powers.
B. ConstitutionalAdjudication
Habermas's theory of constitutional adjudication rests
heavily on the distinction between discourses of justification and discourses of application. The critical side of his
account is directed toward the "value jurisprudence" he
discerns in German constitutional practice and the
paternalism he sees in some constitutional theories
(especially those of the "civic republican" variety). The
positive side of his discussion is to develop a "proceduralist"
account of constitutional courts' legitimate role, which he
develops through his critique of "liberal" and "republican"
models.
1. Value Jurisprudence in Constitutional Practice.
Habermas makes clear that the separation of powers does
not, in his view, necessarily preclude constitutional review
of legislation or settling of intragovernmental disputes.4 8
Nor, he says, does he take the "liberal" model of
constitutional-court adjudication to be incontestably
binding-where by "the liberal model" he means the idea
that the only enforceable individual constitutional rights
are "negative" rights against the state.479
This latter position follows from Habermas's account of
the "system of rights." He introduces his five categories of
basic rights prior to considering the principles of the
constitutional state, taking these categories to be necessary
conditions for any legal community's attempt to constitute
itself through legitimate law. 4 ° Nothing in Habermas's
formulation implies that his categories of basic rights, when
"saturated" and enacted as binding legal norms, apply only
as against the state. The fourth and fifth categories,
478. See id. at 240-41, 243-44.
479. See id. at 174, 245, 249-50, 263, 269, 407.
480. See supra text accompanying note 235.
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particularly-involving rights to participation in democratic

lawmaking and (relatively justified) rights to "social and
ecological" security-clearly envision "positive" rights.
Further, the abstractness with which Habermas specifies
his categories of basic rights means, as he says, that there
are many different ways in which they might legitimately
be implemented. The "liberal" model of the constitution is
one possibility, but it is not uniquely legitimate. 8'
Habermas argues, further, that the social conditions
that made the liberal model attractive have eroded. The
assumptions about "economic society" that underlie the
liberal model, Habermas states, "no longer hold for
developed, postindustrial societies in the West." 82 The first
category of rights-taking, from Kant, the idea that law
must ensure "the compatibility of each one's liberty with an
equal liberty for all"-shrinks in the liberal model to a
picture of negative rights against the state. And so,
"[m]easured against Kant's principle of law, it is only the
shift to the social-welfare paradigm that again brings out
the objective legal contents of individual liberties that have
always already been implicit in the system of rights. '""S
The question, though, is how a constitutional court can
legitimately enforce the system of rights-or, more properly
put, enforce the version of that system that has been
implemented through positive law. We know, from
Habermas's conception of the separation of powers, that the
court must apply constitutional provisions rather than
create law. Habermas argues, however, that the German
constitutional court has tended toward the latter, and
thereby has overstepped its legitimate authority.
The catchphrase Habermas uses to designate the
problem is "value jurisprudence." By that term (which he
borrows from critics of the German constitutional court),484
Habermas means the idea that the constitution is "not so
481. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 250 ("[Tjhe principles
of the constitutional state must not be confused with one of its context-bound
historical modes of interpretation.").
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Bernhard Schlink, German constitutional-court judge and law
professor, argues that the German high constitutional court's alleged "Valueorientation" is a "myth" and "fiction." See Bernhard Schlink, The Dynamics of
ConstitutionalAdjudication, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND DEMOCRACY, supra note
6, at 371.
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much... a system of rules structured by principles, but...
a 'concrete order of values.' ,,48 On this view, principles

express values, and where principles compete, the problem
of application should be resolved by weighing and balancing
the underlying values. This is a "conceptual" error,
according to Habermas.4'6 He catalogues various differences

between values and principles. Values are "teleological,"
reflect "intersubjectively shared preferences," and are only
"relatively binding," while principles are "deontological" and

"absolutely binding.""' Values "recommend," while prin-

ciples "command."" These conceptual differences notwithstanding, Habermas has to tread lightly here. He has, after
all, allowed that through pragmatic and ethical-political
discourses, values and preferences legitimately may be
incorporated into legislation. So too might they be incorporated into constitutional provisions. Still, according to
Habermas, "[no doubt values or teleological contents also
find their way into law, but law defined through a system of
rights domesticates, as it were, the policy goals and value
orientations of the legislator through the strict priority of
normative points of view." 89
Habermas's position has a number of difficulties. First,
the distinction between justification and application on
which he relies is less sharp and more malleable than he
allows. This problem is particularly difficult with respect to
the most general constitutional norms, such as "due
process" or "equal protection," and particularly difficult also
in cases of first impression. Suppose, for example, that a
court is deciding, as a matter of first impression, whether
due process requires a government agency to grant a
hearing before issuing a particular kind of adverse decision.
Certainly one can say that the court must apply the due
process clause rather than simply weigh and balance values
or interests or equities. But in this case, it is unclear what
it means to "apply the law." One way to accomplish this
task-and a standard way for the U.S. Supreme Court4°-is
485. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 254.

486. Id. at 255.
487. Id.
488. See id. at 256.
489. Id.
490. The Court's constitutional-law opinions in particular are littered with
"tests" that are not expressly stated in the governing legal text. A recent
example is the Court's decision in Kyllo v. United States, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001).
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The question in that case was whether warrantless use of a "thermal-imaging
device" to detect unusual heat patterns emanating from a residence-probative
of the resident's use of high-intensity lamps to cultivate marijuana-violated
the Fourth Amendment. In an opinion written by Justice Scalia, the Court
began its analysis by quoting the relevant portion of the Fourth Amendment's
text: "[tihe right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated." Id. at
2041. By itself, of course, the language does not obviously require a decision
either way. The Court proceeded to justify its decision-that the police activity
was unconstitutional-by relying on (what I call in the text above)
"subordinate" or "auxiliary" rules that are not stated explicitly in the
constitutional text. The first, found in the Court's prior cases, was that "[wlith
few exceptions," a "warrantless search of a home" is unreasonable and hence
unconstitutional. Id. at 2042. The Court explained that prior decisions had
treated privacy interests in the home as " '[alt the very core' of the Fourth
Amendment." Id. at 2041 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505
(1961)); see also id. at 2043 (describing "the interior of homes" as "the
prototypical... area of protected privacy"); id. at 2045 (distinguishing a case
that "involved enhanced aerial photography of an industrial complex, which
does not share the Fourth Amendment sanctity of the home"); id. at 2046
(quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980), to the effect that "the
Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at the entrance to the house' ").
That left open, however, the question whether what had occurred in this
case was a "search" or, instead, simply observation constitutionally indistinguishable from the instances of warrantless visual surveillance that had been
permitted in prior cases. See id. at 2042. The Court's analysis considers four
possible auxiliary rules, none explicit in constitutional text, that might
determine whether a search had occurred. The first-common-law trespass
doctrine-had been used "well into the 20th century," the Court noted, but
recent cases had "decoupled" the Fourth-Amendment meaning of "search" from
traditional "trespass" notions. See id. A second was the Government's proposed
rule, endorsed by the Kyllo dissenters, that the distinction should be between
observations (whether technologically aided or not) of a building's exterior
surface, on one hand, and " 'through-the-wall surveillance,' " on the other. The
Court rejected this proposed rule as inconsistent with prior cases and as
"leav[ing] the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology." Id. at 2044. A
third possible auxiliary rule, also rejected by the Court, would have distinguished between observation of "intimate details" or "private activities in
private areas," on one hand, and the observation of (for example) heat emissions
as measured on the building's surface. The Court explained: "In the home, our
cases show, all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe
from prying government eyes." Id. at 2045.
Noting the significance prior cases had given " 'actual [physical] intrusion
into a constitutionally protected area,' " id. at 2043 (quoting Silverman, 365
U.S. at 512), the Court selected a fourth possible auxiliary rule to define
whether a "search" has occurred: "Where, as here, the Government uses a
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance
is a "search" and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant." Id. at
2046. The Court relied not just on the idea that the Fourth Amendment gives
special "sanctity" to the home, and to "details" therein, but on two further
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for the court to fashion a subordinate rule or standard that
not only will decide the present case but will govern a
relevant category of cases in the future. For example:
government employment or welfare benefits (in general or
of a certain kind) are or are not "property" for purposes of
due process analysis; or, for cases of a certain kind in which
due process protections are triggered, the following are the
minimum procedural standards that the government must
observe. The court will need to provide justifications for its
choice of an auxiliary rule or standard. Its justification will
be convincing as legal argument only if it marshals
evidence of text, history, structure, and purpose, that
demonstrably connects to the more general norm or
principle the court is interpreting.
The point is not that this kind of decision involves a
"discourse of justification" rather than a "discourse of
application." The point, instead, is that in the application of
abstract principles or other general norms, justification and
considerations. The first was the idea that the Fourth Amendment must be
understood to "assure[] preservation of that degree of privacy against
government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted." Id. at
2043. While the Court noted cases that had applied this "criterion," see id. at
2046, it seems to come also from a more general interpretive principle: The
purpose of protecting liberties with a written constitution is to ensure that
those liberties, as understood at the time the Constitution was adopted, are not
eroded. The Court's second consideration in selecting its "criterion" was the
need to provide advance guidance to law enforcement officials as to which
techniques are permitted and which are forbidden (at least without a warrant).
See id. at 2046.
Kyllo, in other words, illustrates that (what I call) "auxiliary" or
"subordinate" rules or standards-unstated in the governing legal text-are a
standard part of deciding legal questions. None of the auxiliary rules (or
standards, or criteria) considered in Kyllo is the product of democratic
enactment, as Habermas's account of judicial "discourses of application" would
seem to require. Yet, as I explain in text both above and below, they seem to me
indispensable. I select Kyllo partly because the opinion is authored by a Justice
who has made very clear that constitutional courts have no legitimate lawmaking function.
Obviously Habermas might respond by saying that these auxiliary rules are
consistent with his idea of "discourses of application." My point is simply that
they complicate greatly the distinction between "justification" and "application."
The Court in Kyllo is applying a pre-given constitutional norm. In so doing,
however, it creates a more particularized rule-stated in the holding quoted
above-that will govern decisions in future Fourth Amendment cases. The
particularized rule, which on its face lacks a clear democratic pedigree, needs to
be justified. And as I argue in text, this process of justification can be seen as
participating in both a "discourse of application" and a "discourse of
justification," as Habermas has explicated those terms.
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application, as Habermas has described them, are not
entirely distinguishable. One could say, with Habermas,
that the selection of a more specific auxiliary rule or
standard is a matter of determining which norm
"appropriately" governs in a given factual context. One
could emphasize, also, that what the court is doing involves
the application of a general norm in a particular case. In
these respects, we have Habermas's "discourse of
application." But at the same time, if the court is fashioning
a more specific auxiliary rule or standard-one that (we
assume) is not stated expressly in the general norm-then
it is engaged in creating a new norm that will apply not just
to the decision of this case but also to relevantly similar
cases in the future. Not so much the particular facts of the
case, as the facts that make it typify a foreseeable class of
cases, would be relevant. In these respects, the court is
engaging in what Habermas describes as a "discourse of
justification."91 This analysis holds even if the court takes
"original meaning" or "settled tradition" to guide its
decision. That, too, amounts to the choice of an interpretive
rule, in addition to any auxiliary rule or standard selected
under its aegis, that presumably is not stated expressly in
the constitutional provision. And so the choice of
interpretive rule would require justification.
Habermas seems to recognize, at least in one passage of
Between Facts and Norms, that the distinction between
justification and application discourses, with the judiciary
limited to the latter, may not be so simple to maintain.
Writing in terms not limited to constitutional adjudication,
Habermas acknowledges:
To the extent that legal programs are in need of further
specification by the courts-because decisions in the gray area
between legislation and adjudication tend to devolve on the
judiciary, all provisos notwithstanding-juristic discourses of

491. Habermas's account of application discourses emphasizes strongly the
singularity of decision. In determining which norm is appropriate to regulate a
situation, he says, the notion of general interests of all affected-used in
justification discourses--"take[s] second place to the particular interests of the
immediately affected parties." BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMs, supra note 2, at 229.
Application discourses, he says, require "highly contextualistic interpretations
of the situation," that "depend on the different self-understandings and
worldviews of the actual participants." Id.
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application must be visiblA2supplemented by elements taken from
discourses of justification.

This point, however, seems to be more generally
significant than Habermas usually allows. Here Habermas
might better have followed Dworkin, from whom he borrows
the idea of "constructive interpretation." "[L]aw as
integrity," Dworkin writes, "rejects as unhelpful the ancient
question whether judges find or invent law; we understand
legal reasoning, it suggests, only by seeing the sense in
which they do both and neither."' The same may be said of
the closely parallel distinction between applying and
justifying legal norms. 94
To be sure, Habermas is right that-as he praises
Dworkin for recognizing-courts are not in the same
position as legislatures. 9 This of course is the real purpose
in "binding" courts, constitutional or otherwise, "to existing
law" 96 and confining them to "discourses of application."
But aside from the question whether justification and
application are sharply distinguishable, Habermas's
account of application discourses, with its standard of
"appropriateness," provides no guidance as to how, in
particular cases, one should resolve the competition among
potentially applicable principles. Habermas, clearly,
believes that principles may not be treated as if they were
mere values and straightforwardly balanced-as if the
court were a legislative body resolving conflicts among the
various values and preferences in a pluralistic society. But
what instead? Habermas suggests, at one point, that norms
have passed a "universalization test"4 97 and therefore have
priority over mere values. This criterion does not work. On
Habermas's own account, the universalization test applies
only to moral norms, not to legal norms. 98 Further, his

492. Id. at 439.
493. DWORKIN, supra note 425, at 225.

494. Cf Frank Michelman, Family Quarrel, in HABERMAS ON LAW AND
DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 309, 321-22 (noting that the distinction between
application and justification is difficult in constitutional practice).
495. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 212-13.
496. Id. at 172.
497. Id. at 259.
498. See id. at 109 (in moral discourses of justification, the discourse
principle "takes the form of a universalization principle"); id. at 230 (same). But
see id. at 153-54 (distinguishing between the universalization test for justifying
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analysis of the constitutional state makes clear that legal
principles and rules govern only a concrete legal
community, not humanity as such, and he argues further
that legal principles are not necessarily susceptible of
universal agreement.499 Legal norms are logically different
from values, but the difference is not that the former
necessarily have passed a universalization test. Here
Habermas seems to be treating legal discourse as if it were
moral discourse-notwithstanding his position that the
"validity dimension" of legal norms is more complex than
that of moral norms because it includes pragmatic and
"ethical-political" reasons, not purely moral reasons.
Let us return to the passage, quoted above, in which
Habermas acknowledges that "[n]o doubt values or
teleological contents also find their way into law." 500 He
continues by saying that "law defined through a system of
rights domesticates, as it were the policy goals and value
orientations of the legislator.""°1 What he should say is that
the legislative process-whether for ordinary statutes or
constitutional provisions--"domesticates" competing policy
goals and conflicting values. Courts are bound by law in
that they are not free to rework this domestication process
afresh, as if they were legislators. Instead, they are limited
to "the reasons packaged in, and linked to, statutes" 50 2 (or,
as the case may be, constitutional provisions). A court,
Habermas says in the passage just quoted, is not free just to
"make whatever use it likes" of those reasons.0 3
But that, by itself, does not get us very far. The
question is, what are the reasons that are "packaged in, and
linked to, statutes" or constitutional provisions? The
question is particularly acute when the norm to be
interpreted is general, when the "policy goals and value
orientations" are socially contested and the statutory or
constitutional text is unclear, or when more than one norm
is potentially applicable without clear priority of one over
the other. In short, the question is one of interpretation.
And Habermas has surprisingly little to say about thatmoral principles and the less stringently justice-oriented standards applicable
to legal norms).
499. See supra Part II.C.4.
500. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 256.
501. Id. (emphasis added).
502. Id. at 192.
503. Id.
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surprisingly, that is, given the fact that he developed his
account of adjudication in dialogue with Dworkin's theory of
constructive interpretation.
Habermas's discourse theory in fact translates
Dworkin's account of adjudication-as-interpretation into a
theory of the "pragmatic presuppositions of legal
discourse."5 4 The chapter of Between Facts and Norms that
addresses general issues of adjudication is entitled "The
Indeterminacy of Law and the Rationality of Adjudication."
The central problem for Habermas is not how judges
interpret texts, but the more abstract "rationality problem"
of securing, in the application of law, both "the certainty of
law and its rightness."5 Certainty and rightness are, for
Habermas, properties of a body of law as a whole, or
structural features of a legal system's operation, not just
features of particular successful judicial interpretations.
Even Habermas's summary of Dworkin's "constructive
interpretation" suggests that he may not be so interested in
the details: he first collapses Dworkin's interpretive
dimension of "justification" into the dimension of "fit," by
reading Dworkin's account of "rightness" as "coherence with
a rationally reconstructed history of existing law."0 6 And
with his criticism of Dworkin's use of the "Hercules" device,
we turn away from an account that-whatever defects its
"monological" quality might induce-explicates the notion
of constructive interpretation through consideration of
particular cases.0 7 Instead, we have a theory of the
"pragmatic presuppositions of legal discourse," in which the
problem of indeterminacy is to be addressed by a theory of
adjudicative procedure and "paradigms."

504. Id. at 238; see also id. at 230 (discourse theory "captures Dworkin's
basic norm of equal concern and respect" in an account of the "pragmatic
presuppositions" of argumentation).
505. Id. at 199.
506. Id. at 211.
507. See DWORKIN, supra note 425, at 15-30 (describing various well-known
cases that serve as "extended examples for the various arguments and
discussions of later chapters"); id. at 238-54 (Judge Hercules considers a case
involving negligent infliction of emotional distress); id. at 317-337 (Hercules's
mythical colleague Hermes considers the "snail darter case" under the
Endangered Species Act); id. at 337-54 (Hercules considers the snail darter
case); id. at 379-92 (Hercules considers and decides Brown v. Board of
Education); id. at 393-97 (Hercules decides Regents of the University of
Californiav. Bakke).
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I do not mean to suggest that nothing can be gained by
analyzing the pragmatic presuppositions of legal discourse.
My point is simply that it is difficult for Habermas to
address the questions raised by his critique of "value
jurisprudence" without a more thorough account of judicial
interpretation. The criterion of "appropriateness," relatively
unelaborated in Habermas's discussion,.. 8 is not helpful.
Further, Habermas equivocates between two incompatible
positions. On one hand, he criticizes, as illicit "value
jurisprudence," the idea that competing principles or
general norms are applied by considering and attempting to
order rationally and optimize the "values"--or goals, or
purposes 5 9-that they are said to express. According to
Habermas, this practice, advocated by Robert Alexy,
"break[s] down the fire wall" that separates norms from
values and thereby threatens to establish the constitutional
51 In these passages,
court as an "authoritarian agency.""
Habermas treats the competition of principles as an
either/or matter. One is appropriate, and the others are
inappropriate. 1'
On the other hand, perhaps due to the emptiness of his
unelaborated notion of "appropriateness" in application
discourses, Habermas sometimes allows courts to do what
seems practically indistinguishable from Alexy's proposal.
He describes legal norms as a "package" of reasons51
. that
constitutional courts may unpackage for purposes of
applying the norm, so long as they do not assume the
position of a legislator:

508. Klaus Gtinther, from whom Habermas borrows the notion of
"application discourses" and "appropriateness," has sought to develop a "logic of
appropriateness argumentation." See KLAus GONTHER, THE SENSE OF
APPROPRIATENESS: APPLICATION DISCOURSES IN MORALITY AND

LAW 203-84 (John

Farrell trans., 1993). Habermas does not discuss this elaboration of
"appropriateness" in any detail.
509. Habermas takes values, as well as goals and purposes, to be
"teleological," while norms are deontological. See BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS,

supra note 2, at 255.
510. Id. at 257-58. For a short statement of Alexy's theory, see Alexy, supra
note 441, at 229-31; for a fuller version, see ROBERT ALEXY, THEORIE DER
GRUNDRECHTE (1985).
511. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 260.

512. Id. at 192; see also id. at 283 ("[Llegal adjudication unwraps, for the
purposes of application, these variegated arguments that have already entered
into the lawmaking process and provided a rational basis for the legitimacy
claims of established law.").
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The legitimating reasons available from the constitution are given
to the constitutional court in advance from the perspective of the
application of law .... The court reopens the package of reasons
that legitimated legislative decisions so that it might mobilize
them for a coherent ruling on the individual case in agreement
with existing principles of law; it may not, however, use these
reasons in an implicitly legislative5 13manner that directly elaborates
and develops the system of rights.

Perhaps Habermas intends a distinction between
"reasons," on one hand, and "purposes," "goals," or "values,"
on the other. But it is difficult to see what meaning general
principles have if one bars consideration of the purposes,
goals, or values these principles could be said to advance
(or, on another view, were thought by their authors, or
contemporaries of their authors, to advance). Further, the
idea that a "fire wall" separates norms and values perhaps
makes sense for "moral" norms, at least as Habermas
conceives of them. Those norms are to be justified not
through their coherence with a particular collective form of
life, but through a strict universalization test that takes
humanity as such to be the "reference system."1 4 Legal
norms, by contrast, are justified not just in universalistic
moral discourse, Habermas has said, but also through
pragmatic and ethical-political discourse. As Habermas has
explained, interests, values, and collective goals all are
relevant, even dominant, in pragmatic and ethical politicaldiscourse. Given this conception of legal norms' "validity
basis," then, it seems peculiar to exclude, in an "application
discourse" that interprets a legal norm, the very
considerations that were relevant to its justification.515
Apart from his critique of value jurisprudence,
Habermas recognizes this point. As I have noted, Habermas
argues at least intermittently that courts must work with,
and interpret, the "package" of reasons relevant to a legal
norm's justification. He also has acknowledged the point in
outlining his distinction between legal and moral norms.
513. Id. at 262.
514. See supra text accompanying notes 301-02, 325-29.
515. Gunther Teubner acknowledges the various distinctions Habermas
invokes between principles and values, see supra text accompanying notes 48688, but argues that legal practice, including judicial practice, is indifferent to
the distinction in its "balancing" procedures. See Gunther Teubner, De
Collisione Discursuum: Communicative Rationalities in Law, Morality, and
Politics, in HABERMAS ON LAw AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 6, at 186.
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There Habermas states that legal "discourses of
justification and application" cannot focus only on the
"justice" considerations of moral discourse, but "also have to
be open to a pragmatic and ethical-political use of practical
reason."516 Habermas is right that legal principles are not
themselves values, goods, or collective goals. But surely the
values, goods, and collective goals relevant to a principle's
justification are relevant in concretizing it for application to
a particular case or in resolving a competition among
competing principles.517
Habermas presents his critique of value jurisprudence
as a critique of the
German constitutional court's
"methodological" error. 18 For reasons stated, I am not convinced by his account of proper judicial methodology. Still,
apart from the methodological critique, Habermas could
demonstrate that the court had in fact become an
"authoritarian agency" if he could show that the court had
grossly and repeatedly misinterpreted, and enforced its
misinterpretation, of the German constitution. 51 9 That
would be a matter of substantive constitutional interpretation, not something that a general theory of legal
discourse, with an "appropriateness" standard, could
decide.
A substantive critique-howevever undeveloped in
Habermas's
exposition-would
be
consistent
with
Habermas's general aims. The account of judicial methodology is only part of Habermas's more general separation-ofpowers theory. The basic principle of the constitutional

516. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 154 (emphasis added). No
doubt Habermas is nervous about interpreting constitutional provisions as
compromises among interests, so that they could be seen as deals to be
enforced. But if that is his concern, it seems more plausible to argue, as a
"reconstruction" of modern democracies' "normative self-understanding," that
constitutional norms are to be interpreted in a public-regarding way, not as
deals. One might or might not find this convincing, but it seems to me more
plausible than Habermas's idea of a "fire wall" between legal norms and values
or collective goals.
517. Cf Michelman, supra note 494, at 321 ("[Tjhe practical-institutional
logic of constitutionalism precludes anything like a strict working dissociation
ofjustification from application.").
518. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at vi. The title to section 6.2
of Between Facts and Norms is "Norms versus Values: Methodological Errors in
the Self-Understanding of the Constitutional Court."
519. As very much a non-expert in German constitutional law, I express no
view on this matter.
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state, Habermas has said, is that the connection between
communicative and administrative power must be maintained-or, more specifically, that the priority of democratic
legislation, understood to include constitutional provisions
along with ordinary statutes, must be preserved. From that
point of view, judicial rulings that decisively change the
meaning of statutes or constitutional provisions amount, in
Habermas's terminology, to the triumph of judges'
administrative power over democratically legitimate expressions of citizens' communicative power. That concern is
what animates Habermas's claim that courts must be
bound "to existing law"5 2' and his statements that a court

may not "make whatever use it likes" of the reasons that
are "packaged in, and linked to, statutes." 2'

2. The Proceduralist Model of Constitutional Courts'
Legitimate Role. Habermas develops his "proceduralist"
account of constitutional courts' role in contrast to what he
characterizes as "liberal" and "republican" models of law
and politics. His idea is to appropriate from each what is
useful. This strategy is unsurprising: it relies on contrasts
developed throughout his discourse theory of law. His
account of the two "ideas that can justify modern law"
connects "human rights" with liberalism and "popular
sovereignty" with republicanism."' In his system of rights,
the categories of rights devoted to private autonomy
respond to the "liberal" side of the liberal/republican divide,
and the categories of rights that secure public or civic
autonomy respond to the "republican" side. Critical as
Habermas is of republican theories-and, I will argue, not
always fairly critical-his sympathies lie closer to that side
than to the liberal model.
sketches of both models are, as he says,
Habermas's
5 23
"stylized."

In the liberal model, he has said, basic

individual rights obtain only as negative rights against

BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 172 (emphasis omitted).
521. Id. at 192.
522. Id. at 99-100.
523. Id. at 268. Habermas explains that he is borrowing this contrast among
"stylized" positions from Frank Michelman. See id. I attribute the contrast to
Habermas because I find his account of Michelman's "republicanism" suspect
and because much of what he says about these models he has said elsewhere in
Between Facts and Norms.

520.
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state interference.524 These rights create a sphere in which
individuals may pursue private ends." The political process
involves a competitive struggle for power among
strategically acting groups,526 with citizen participation,
through voting, necessary primarily as a check on
government, and primarily for the sake of protecting
citizens' private ends.527 The measure of legitimacy is
quantitative-votes, understood as the aggregation of
preferences.52 In terms of Habermas's system of rights, the
emphasis is much more strongly on private autonomy, with
citizens' public autonomy figuring primarily as an instrument for securing private autonomy.
Given this characterization of the "liberal" model, we
see immediately that Habermas cannot accept it as his own.
Habermas designed his "system of rights" so that private
and public autonomy would be "co-original" and would
receive equal weight. If the "liberal" view is that public
autonomy has value only as an instrument for securing
private autonomy, then Habermas cannot accept that view.
Further, Habermas's conception of citizen participation
involves considerably more than just voting. He emphasizes
the constitutive role of citizens' discussion in the political
public sphere-constitutive for the generation of legitimate
law, but constitutive also for personal and group identities.
Within formal governmental institutions, Habermas has
emphasized the importance of discourse, not just bargaining and compromise. The separation-of-powers theory
Habermas has urged is designed not just to protect private
interests from government encroachment but also to bind
administrative power to citizens' communicative power.
Partly for these conceptual reasons, but partly because
of changing social conditions, Habermas argues against a
"liberal" conception of basic rights and their enforcement.
The "classical scheme for the separation and interdependence of government branches," he says, "no longer
corresponds to" the constitutional court's mission of
"keep [ing] watch over just that system of rights that makes
524. See id. at 174, 245, 249-51, 263. But cf id. at 269-70 (citizenship, on
liberal view, "defined primarily by negative rights against the state and other
citizens").
525. See id. at 268-69, 269-70.
526. Id. at 272.
527. See id. at 270, 298.
528. Id. at 272, 273-74.
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citizens' private and public autonomy equally possible."529
The most pertinent change in social circumstances that
Habermas describes is a tendency toward greater
concentration of power. And so while "liberal" models see
the danger to private autonomy exclusively (or at least
primarily) in government intervention, for Habermas the
danger to private autonomy comes as much from "positions
of economic and social power" as from the state." ° From his
perspective, the "liberal" prescription of formally equal
freedoms to vote and otherwise participate cannot be sufficient. The effective exercise of "communicative and
participatory rights"-public autonomy-is threatened,
according to Habermas, by unequal social power." 1 Thus the
task of "keep[ing] watch over" the system of rights cannot
mean that the constitutional court should be attentive only
to threats from the state and the infringement of formally
equal liberties. In ways we will soon consider, Habermas
argues that the constitutional court must be attentive to
the danger that concentrated social and economic power
poses to both private and public autonomy.
Habermas acknowledges similarities between the
modern republican model-particularly Michelman's-and
his own conception. As does Habermas, modern republicans
emphasize the "procedural conditions" 32 of modern
democracy that include deliberation within formal political
institutions. But more characteristically, and in common
with Habermas, neorepublicans see democracy's basic
operations outside those formal institutions. They emphasize, Habermas notes, the importance of citizens' public
autonomy, 3 with communication and participation rights
"preeminent[]" among civil rights.534 The link between the
democratic process and law's legitimacy depends upon
robust, potentially preference-changing, political discussion
among citizens in the political public sphere.3 5 And with
Habermas, Michelman sees the social basis of this public
sphere in the voluntary associations of civil society.3 6 These
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.

Id. at 263.
Id
Id. at 263-64.
Id. at 268.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1531 (1988).
Id. at 1531.
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civil-social organizations occupy the "margins" of the officially organized political system. By virtue of that location,
they are ideally situated to produce novel "initiatives,
'
A
issues and contributions, problems and proposals."537
prime role for constitutional courts, according to the neorepublican essays of Michelman and Sunstein, is the
promotion of deliberative democracy, conceived as operating
inside and outside formal political institutions.3
These similarities between Habermas's theory of democracy and neorepublican theory-especially Michelman's
version-are striking. In distancing his "proceduralist"
conception from the republican view, however, Habermas
works up (and in my view exaggerates) two differences.
First, Habermas asserts repeatedly, neorepublican theory A
la Michelman assumes a deep "ethical" consensus that
"does not sit well with the conditions of cultural and
societal pluralism that distinguish modern societies."539 For
that reason, Habermas argues, neorepublican theory
operates with an idealized and even premodern conception
of politics. 4 ° According to Habermas, neorepublican theory
therefore tends to see actual politics as "fallen" and
defective. 4 ' And therefore, Habermas claims, republicans
resort, necessarily, either to an activist constitutional court
as substitute for the absent people or to a romanticized but
ritualized "symbolic politics."4
The first part of this diagnosis depends upon largely
overlooking the "neo" in "neorepublican." Habermas places
537. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 275 (citing Michelman,
supra note 535, at 1529, 1531).
538. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 275-76.
539. Id. at 279.
540. See id. at 267-68, 279 (discussing classical republican notions of politics
without distinguishing Michelman's neorepublican view).
541. Id. at 277.
542. Id.
Michelman models politics in general on the symbolic politics
expressed, say, in bicentennial celebrations of the Declaration of
Independence. He thereby accepts the gap between these ceremonial
acts, essential for the political integration of a nation of citizens, and
the business of everyday political life. The tension between facticity
and validity, a tension that was supposed to be stabilized within the
legal medium itself, once again reappears between the ideal of an
ethical republic and the harsh reality of routine politics. The form of
ethical-political argumentation is all that remains as the narrow bridge
between originary and "fallen" politics.
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great emphasis on republicanism, unmodified, as a theory
of ethically unified communities, with full exercise of
citizenship to be expected only from the most virtuous
members of those communities."' He reads Michelman to
continue this presupposition of strong ethical consensus.544
This reading is mistaken, in my view. Michelman explicitly
poses, as a central problem for any neorepublican theory,
the tension between, on one hand, traditional republicanism's assumptions of deep consensus among members of an
ethically integrated elite of a small community, and on the
other hand, the modern American realities of ethical and
cultural plurality.545 He inquires whether, starting from
543. See id. at 268 (for seventeenth and eighteenth century republicanism,
"[1]aw and legal statute are secondary in comparison to the ethical life context of
a polis in which the virtue of active participation in public affairs can develop
and stabilize"); id. at 269 (in the republican view, " '[plolitics[] is conceived as
the reflexive form of substantial ethical life-as the medium in which the
members of more or less naturally emergent solidary communities become
aware of their dependence on one another and, acting with full deliberation,
further shape and develop existing relations of reciprocal recognition into an
association of free and equal citizens"); id. at 278 (the republican tradition
presupposes "the ethos of an already integrated community" with "the prior
convergence of settled ethical convictions," holding that "[olnly virtuous citizens
can do politics in the right way").
544. See id. at 279 ("Michelman, like other 'communitarians,' understands
citizenship not primarily in legal but in ethical terms."); id. (Michelman's
account of political agreement presupposes "the ethical particularism
characteristic of an unproblematic background consensus," but this
particularism "does not sit well with the conditions of cultural and societal
pluralism that distinguish modern societies").
545. See Michelman, supra note 535, at 1505-06:
It is certainly true that not all historical versions of republicanism
have reflected the inclusory, plurality-protecting ideal that arguably
characterizes the tradition at its best. It is also true that extension of
the circle of citizens to encompass genuine diversity greatly
complicates republican thinking about the relation between rights (or
law) and morality. For if republican jurisprudence depends on
jurisgenerative politics, jurisgenerative politics in turn seems to
depend on the existence of a normative consensus that can hardly
survive the diversification of the political community by inclusion of
persons of widely and deeply differing experiences and outlooks.
What, after all can jurisgenerative politics be, if not a process of
disclosing a latent, pre-existent, actual societal consensus respecting
the right terms of social ordering? What are the social conditions of
such an effective, pre-existent consensus? Historically, those conditions
have been conceived as devices for avoiding or denying plurality in the
political sphere, usually involving some combination of political
hierarchy, civic regimentation, and organicist culture. Modem
American political culture is militantly anti-organicist, committed to

328

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

modern conditions, his revised version of republicanism
could account for how an ethically plural and interestdivided public of citizens could democratically produce law,
such that each could accept that law.54 One might not like
Michelman's answer to that question. Or one might, as I do,
take the question concerning universal acceptance to be the
wrong one.547 But Habermas is not in any position to make
that latter objection. The question is exactly the one that he
asks. 48 And Habermas's accusation that Michelman
assumes deep ethical consensus from the outset unfairly
chains Michelman to elements of the republican tradition
that he is attempting to revise."'
The idea that Michelman resorts to "symbolic politics,"
on the order of "bicentennial celebrations of the Declaration
of Independence," is baffling. In making this charge,
Habermas refers specifically to Michelman's statement that
a modern, large-scale, democratic political community's
identity-made, by the way, not found-depends upon
"remembrance" of the community's origins "in public acts of
But what Michelman is talking
deliberate creation.""
about, I think, is something closely akin to Habermas's own
"reconstructive" account of how a legal community constitutes itself as a self-governing legal community, under law
with both private and public autonomy secured."'
Michelman's inquiry is, to be sure, historical in a way that
Habermas's is not: he speaks of the origins of specifically
American constitutionalism, not the principles of the
constitutional state in general. But the idea of politics as
political democracy, hostile to social-role constraint, and broadly
reconciled to deep and conflictual diversity of social experience and
normative perspective. If any social condition defines modem American
politics, plurality does. How, then, might modem American politics be
jurisgenerative? What is it, in particular, that we might think that
could make a jurisgenerative virtue of plurality?
Id.
546. Id. at 1526.
547. See supra text accompanying notes 363-68.
548. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 199-205, 240-41.
549. See Michelman, supra note 535, at 1526 (referring to "the challenge of
reclaiming the idea of jurisgenerative politics from its ancient context of
hierarchical, organicist, solidaristic communities for the modem context of
equality of respect, liberation from ascriptive social roles, and indissoluble
plurality of perspective").
550. Id. at 1508.
551. See id. at 1508-09.
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periodic return to origins is not Michelman's conception.
After noting that the founding of the American republic was
an act of "popular self-creation,"552 Michelman adds, with
respect to the idea of self-governance: "Once, however, is
hardly enough."553 He goes on to criticize the "myth of the
Founder" in "classical republican" thinking, in which
politics is a cycle between forgetting and recollecting the
founder's unique virtue.554 Democratic politics for
Michelman is an ongoing and uncertain matter, with a
tension between the original act of popular self-creation and
subsequent developments of the constitutional project. It is
hardly a matter either of ritually celebrating origins and
founders or of returning, without mediation, to the
founders' wisdom. The notion of deliberative politics with
which Michelman operates is, to be sure, idealized. But
certainly the same is true for Habermas's own discoursetheoretical account of the connections between citizens'
communicative power and the administrative power of the
state apparatus. 5'
That leaves the question of the constitutional court's
legitimate authority. According to Habermas, Michelman,
sees the danger of
perhaps more than other neorepublicans,
"constitutional-court paternalism." 556 But given Habermas's
interpretation of Michelman-the assumption of a deep
ethical consensus and an understanding of politics only as
"symbolic" politics-Habermas has to conclude that
Michelman tends toward the paternalism he tries to resist.
That conclusion, after all, was what was supposed to follow
from Michelman's misunderstanding of ethical consensus
and politics. Habermas's claim was that neorepublican
theory, including Michelman's work, leaves a vacuum in the
idea of deliberative democracy that requires substitution of
courts for the people.

552. Id. at 1515.
553. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 265.
554. Michelman, supra note 535, at 1515-18.
555. Michelman points out in a reply to Habermas that if one believed
society to be totally and consensually integrated, then a cross-section of the
population, not full engagement of the citizenry, would suffice. And so the
alleged connection between the "deep consensus" assumption, on one hand, and
republicanism's demanding notion of participation, on the other, seems lacking.
Full participation makes more sense on the assumption of ethical plurality. See
Michelman, supra note 494, at 314-15.
556. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 278.
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Habermas is on somewhat firmer ground with this conclusion than he was with the premises of his argument. As
Habermas notes, Michelman recognizes that constitutionalcourt "activism" is suspect on his premises. In fact,
Michelman sees also that any form of judicial review is
difficult for him to justify.557 That difficulty motivates and
structures his essay Law's Republic. Michelman begins
with an account of the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers
v. Hardwick, which relied on notions of deference to
democratic legislation and "majority sentiments about...
morality" to sustain application of an antisodomy criminal
statute to same-sex sexual conduct."' Classical republicanism, Michelman observes, would seem to speak in favor of
the Bowers decision."' And so, given Michelman's commitment to opposing Bowers, he needs to find resources in
neorepublican theory that amend the classical republican
emphasis on "normative unity."' Even in his last paragraph of the essay, however-after he has presented his
constitutional argument for a different result in BowersMichelman notes that "[tihe difficulty remains of explaining
how it can be right to address such a non-demonstrative
argument about the impermanent meaning of the people's
' Michelman's
law to any body other than the People."561
answer to this difficulty is tentative, relying in the first
instance on the idea that judges "perhaps" have some
special cognitive or normative advantage:
Judges perhaps enjoy a situational advantage over the people at
large in listening for voices from the margins. Judges are perhaps
better situated to conduct a sympathetic inquiry into how, if at all,
the readings of history upon which those voices base their
complaint can count as interpretations of that historyinterpretations which, however re-collective or even trans-

557. Michelman, supra note 535, at 1525 ("How... does my work-up of
these implications of republican constitutionalism not end by subverting the
entire practice of judicial review-implying its total subordination to popular
politics-rather than by emboldening the independent spirit in which that
practice sometimes is carried on?").
558. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986).
559. Michelman, supra note 535, at 1495.
560. Id. at 1495.
561. Id. at 1537.
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formative, remain true to that history's informing commitment56to
politics. 2
the pursuit of political freedom through jurisgenerative

As Michelman recognizes, however, this kind of answer
raises serious questions for a theory that, at its core,
presents popular political engagement as jurisgenerative
and the source of legal legitimacy. "[A] judicial constitutional convention," Michelman admits, "is not
equivalent-indeed it is contrary-to actual democracy."56
Michelman's ultimate answer is "pragmatic." "Actual
democracy is not all there is to political freedom," he says in
the essay's final sentence,5 64"and Hardwick is before us,
appealing to law's republic."

This passage, together with a related passage that
Habermas quotes,565 makes the best case for Michelman's
slippage into "constitutional-court paternalism." But if he is
guilty of that offense, he is not driven to it for the reason
Habermas thinks. The passages show that Michelman
precisely does not assume a deep ethical consensus that is
binding on all interpreters of law. Part of his idea of
"political freedom," invoked in the last lines, is freedom
from a political community's consensus, and the passage
that Habermas quotes assigns judges the task of
"challeng[ing] 'the people's' self-enclosing tendency to
assume their own moral completion as they now are. '" 6'
Further, Michelman hesitates to rely on "actual
democracy," in the context of Bowers, not because he has a
premodern notion of politics that both demands total
engagement from a virtuous people and, for that reason,
cannot be realized under modern conditions. Instead,
Michelman's concern-that "voices from the margins" will
a structural problem in
go unheeded-identifies
majoritarian political institutions that is recognized in both
562. Id.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. The passage Habermas quotes is as follows:
The Court helps protect the republican state-that is, the people
politically engaged-from lapsing into a politics of self-denial. It
challenges "the people's" self-enclosing tendency to assume their own
moral completion as they now are and thus to deny to themselves the
plurality on which their capacity for transformative self-renewal
depends.
Id. at 1532, quoted in BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 278.
566. Michelman, supra note 535, at 1532.
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American constitutional law and constitutional theory.567
Whether or not Michelman is right that the Georgia statute
unconstitutionally denies rights of privacy and equal
citizenship is an interpretive question that can be answered
only by addressing the substantive merits of Michelman's
constitutional argument.568
To be sure, Michelman's final paragraph betrays
considerable anxiety about his constitutional argument.
Voices heard from the margin are not necessarily to be
given authority, and majoritarian democracy is not always
to be distrusted. But Michelman is not alone in trying to
sort out these difficulties. He has, in fact, the company of
Habermas. Consider Habermas's initial characterization of
legitimate judicial review:
[Jiudicial review should refer primarily to the conditions for the
democratic genesis of laws. More specifically, it must start by
examining the communication structures of a public sphere
subverted by the power of the mass media; go on to consider the
actual chances that divergent and marginal voices will be heard
and that formally equal rights of participation will be effectively
exercised; and conclude with the equal parliamentary representation of all the currently relevant groups, interest positions, and
value orientations. Here it must also refer to the range of issues,
arguments and problems, values and interests that find their way
into parliamentary deliberation and are considered in the
justification of approved norms.569

This passage is surprising in a number of respects.
Perhaps most surprising is that Habermas offers it as an
endorsing interpretation of John Hart Ely's theory of judicial review. While the main themes of Ely's "representationreinforcing" theory come through-"clearing the channels of
political change" and "facilitating the representation of
minorities"57 -William Forbath is right that Ely "might be

567. The work of John Hart Ely is important here, particularly the part of
his "representation-reinforcing theory" directed toward "facilitating the
representation of minorities." JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 135-79 (1980). Ely's connection to Supreme Court

caselaw is of course the famous footnote four. United States v. Carolene
Products Co., 304 U.S. 141, 152 n.4 ("discrete and insular minorities").
568. For Michelman's substantive argument, see Michelman, supra note
535, at 1532-36.
569. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 265.
570. See ELY, supra note 567, at 105-80.

2002]

HABERMAS'S DISCOURSE THEORY

333

amazed" to see his theory characterized in this way. 71
Conclusions about exactly what Habermas would have the
Supreme Court do are difficult to draw, from this or any of
Habermas's other discussions of a constitutional court's
legitimate powers.572 But the picture that emerges suggests,
in Habermas's own characterization, a "rather bold

constitutional adjudication" 7 ' that would make not just Ely

but perhaps even Michelman uncomfortable.
In developing Ely's themes of representation reinforcement, Habermas suggests that the "power of the mass
media" operates to "subvert[]" the political public sphere.
Elsewhere in Between Facts and Norms he explains what
he means by this charge. Concentration of editorial control
in the hands of a few induces a centrist bias574 that does not
facilitate the representation of "divergent and marginal
voices." Habermas criticizes also the fragmentation of
issues and the presentation of politics as entertainment, as
well as the accommodating response among party and
political leaders to these very developments. 75 While
Habermas notes research suggesting that the public's
critical capacity may not be as low as often is alleged,576 he
sees the "social power" of large media organizations as a
571. Forbath, supra note 141, at 995.
572. Forbath notes, in the context of Habermas's theory more generally, the
different interpretations Habermas has received from Richard Posner and
Frank Michelman:
Just how ambiguous and ambivalent-how uncertainly modest or
transformative are the book's implications for institutional change-is
mirrored in two American reviews. To Richard Posner, Habermas
"intimates, without quite saying, that the political process in
democratic nations such as the United States and Germany is
sufficiently deliberative"-a view that "will not endear him to radicals."
But for Frank Michelman, Habermas's argument is about reconstructing a vast array of social institutions, including the workplace, the
media, the welfare state, and prevailing property norms.
Forbath, supra note 141, at 998 n.27 (quoting Richard Posner, Law's Reason,
Review of Facts and Norms, NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 1996, at 28 and citing Frank
Michelman, What is Constitutional Democracy? (Thomas Sealey Lecture,
delivered at University of Texas Law School, 1997)). I think Michelman is
clearly more right about Habermas's views on institutional change pursued
through democratic lawmaking. How much of the agenda Michelman describes
can legitimately be pursued through adjudication, however, is likely another
matter.
573. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 280.
574. Id. at 377.
575. See id. at 376-77.
576. See id. at 378.
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threat to "nullify[]" the "constitutionally regulated system
of power"-and thus as a threat to the legitimacy of the
political system and its decisions.577 Habermas does not
make clear what a constitutional court is supposed to do
about these problems, and in part his criticisms are
directed to media organizations themselves.'
But
Habermas also notes that in Germany one finds the
beginnings of "constitutional regulation" that would reduce
the social power of media organizations and, presumably,
diminish their agenda-setting capacity. Mentioning both
media self-regulation and mass-communications law,...
Habermas endorses the proposal that
political and social actors would be allowed to "use" the public
sphere only insofar as they make convincing contributions to the
solution of problems that have been perceived by the public or
have been put on the public agenda with the public's consent. In a
similar vein, political parties would have to participate in the
opinion- and will-formation from the public's own perspective,
rather than patronizing the public and extracting mass loyalty
from the public sphere for the purposes of maintaining their own
power.

This proposal, however, would seem to outfit
government officials with the power of selecting among
speakers and the content of speech. Even with the aim of
ensuring "convincing contributions" and upgrading the level
of political discourse, the constitutional problem here is
obvious-especially in the American context, where
government selection among speakers is regarded as
perhaps the chief evil addressed by the Constitution's freespeech and free-press clauses. Certainly one can imagine a
constitutional argument that would support the proposals
Habermas is discussing. Whether that argument connects
with the body of free-expression doctrine in this country,
however, is doubtful.
Habermas, of course, does not err simply by rejecting
implicitly the received wisdom of American constitutional
doctrine, and Between Facts and Norms is not intended as a
577. Id. at 386.
578. See id. at 378 ("[T]he mass media ought to understand themselves as
the mandatary of an enlightened public whose willingness to learn and capacity
for criticism they at once presuppose, demand, and reinforce.").
579. Id.
580. Id. at 379.
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treatise on American constitutional law. But the tension
between mass-media-dominated political discussion and
deliberative democracy is relatively easy to identify. What
would be more interesting would be consideration, also, of
the other side of the free-expression question. Habermas's
proposal raises obvious problems, and not just under
prevailing American doctrine. His own theory suggests that
civil-social organizations and the political public sphere
need to be constitutionally protected and not dominated by
government. 81 It is hardly obvious, however, that his
proposal would not undermine the public sphere, albeit
through state administrative power rather than through
the social power of media organizations.
Habermas sounds also the second theme of Ely's
"representation-reinforcing" theory. A constitutional court's
judicial review, he says, must "consider the actual chances
that divergent and marginal voices will be heard and that
formally equal rights of participation will be effectively
exercised.""' This kind of position follows from Habermas's
rejection of the "liberal" paradigm and its emphasis on
purely formal equality. Disparities of social and economic
power, Habermas has said, threaten full and effective
participation in the democratic process, and accordingly,
these disparities threaten the legitimacy of official
decisionmaking. But Habermas is short on details. How
should the divergence between full and actual participation
be taken into account? Presumably the court is not free to
rewrite legislative norms, reasoning that they would have
been different had the political process been genuinely and
effectively open on equal terms. But under what circumstances can it invalidate, or refuse to enforce, legislation on
those grounds? Should it, instead, remand the issue to the
legislature? 83 Given that social and economic power always
is unequally distributed in some measure, how serious must
the imbalance be to justify the court's solicitude? The
answers to these questions would help explain just how
assertive Habermas's constitutional court would be. But

581. See id. at 368-69.
582. Id. at 265.
583. This is Ely's suggestion for the case of groups whose access to the
political process, once effectively blocked, no longer is so-but who cannot
reasonably be expected to exhaust their political capital on repealing outdated
statutes. See ELY, supra note 567, at 169.
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here, too, Habermas's account is584maddeningly short on the
kind of detail that matters most.
Most surprising in Habermas's account of judicial
review is his reference to "equal parliamentary representation" for all "currently relevant groups, interest positions,
and value orientations." 585 By "equal" he means, presumably, equal in proportion to their influence in the public
sphere. But how is that influence to be measured? If, as in
this country, the political system operates largely under a
two-party scheme, then voting outcomes, and even public
opinion polls, will be biased against smaller parties. The
proportional representation system seems to need to be
already in place for there to be measures adequate for
implementation.
Further, and more fundamentally, how should the court
go about ensuring that all currently relevant groups and
positions receive parliamentary representation? Habermas
doubtless is thinking here of European systems in which his
ideas already are reflected in present political organization.
Whether he could make the same recommendation in the
very different context of American politics is doubtful.
Legislation, such as the Voting Rights Act, goes some small
way toward Habermas's proposal. But it is difficult to
imagine an American court, on its own, mandating proportional parliamentary representation for all "currently
relevant groups, interest positions and value orientations."
The connection between this kind of representation and a
laudable system of democracy is evident-though hardly
indisputable. But without any firm basis in politics as it
now is practiced, the power of a court to mandate this kind
of change, even in the name of sound democratic procedure,
seems at least doubtful. It is a long way from Baker v.
Carr's "one person, one vote"586 ruling to a constitutionally
mandated system of proportional representation for groups,
interests, and value-orientations.
Habermas's most general statement of the constitutional court's legitimate role is that it must "keep watch
over just that system of rights that makes citizens' private

584. William Forbath reaches a similar conclusion. See Forbath, supra note
141, at 995-96.
585. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 265.
586. 389 U.S. 186 (1962).
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and public autonomy equally possible."587 And this
statement raises the issue that has been at least implicitly
present in the preceding discussion. Habermas's reconstruction of the "system of rights" develops general categories of
rights that, he says, a modern legal system must recognize
if it is to be legitimate. He acknowledges, however, that
there is more than one way to implement those categories of
rights, and he emphasizes that the abstract categories are
not enforceable legal rights until they have been
"saturated" through democratic lawmaking. That means
that even if we retain the idea that the "reconstruction" has
some critical potential-it allows us to evaluate the relative
legitimacy of particular implementations-still, Habermas
cannot expect courts to do anything other than enforce the
legal norms that in fact have been enacted. On Habermas's
theory, courts are "bound to existing law." While a
reconstructive account of the system of rights and
constitutional state might be instructive in interpreting a
particular legal system's legal norms, nonetheless, courts
must tether their decisions not directly to that account but
directly to the governing legal norms.
Thus the role of judicial review is not, strictly speaking,
to "keep watch over just that system of rights that makes
citizens' private and public autonomy equally possible. 588
The role of judicial review, instead, is to keep watch over
the version of the system of rights that govern in a
particular legal community. The discourse theory of law is
not itself a charter that is to be enforced directly. A critical
account of how courts have fulfilled their mission cannot
content itself with references to a reconstructive theory.
Instead, it must engage directly the texts that authoritatively govern in a particular legal community.
Understandably, Habermas saw that as beyond the scope of
his project in Between Facts and Norms. But even on the
premises of that project, critical evaluation of existing legal
systems cannot avoid engaging the particular ways that-in
authoritative legal texts-those systems have implemented
the "system of rights" and "principles of the constitutional
state."
That raises, at least in the American context, the
problem of Habermas's fifth category of basic rights,
587. Id. at 263.
588. Id.
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consideration of which I deferred. 89 This category consists
of "[blasic rights to the provision of living conditions that
are socially, technologically, and ecologically safeguarded,
insofar as the current circumstances make this necessary if
citizens are to have equal opportunities to" exercise their
private and public autonomy. ° Even the statement of this
category of rights raises a problem discussed earlier: how
equal must the opportunities be made? And, given the
"relative" rather than "absolute" justification of this category of rights, Habermas has to face an additional question:
how close a connection should be required between new
social and ecological rights, on one hand, and private and
public autonomy, on the other? These questions are
particularly pressing in the context of judicial review. If a
court is convinced that the legislature has not done enough
to implement social or ecological protection, what remedy
should it order? The question is difficult because the
legislative programs implementing these sorts of rights
typically are detailed, with complex enforcement schemes.
The more fundamental question, however, is whether
Habermas can claim plausibly to have reconstructed
modern legal systems generally when the American system
offers so little in the way of basic protection-i.e. constitutional protection-for social and ecological rights. True,
Habermas assigns a significant role to legislatures in
implementing the system of rights. 9' But the near total
absence of specific protection for these rights in American
constitutional law poses a challenge to Habermas's reconstructive theory. Perhaps it is simply a mistake-a failure
to recognize deeper commitments implied by the system of
law that we have. But if so, then that argument would need
to be made.592
589. See supra text accompanying notes 246-49.
590. BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 2, at 123.

591. See id. at 154 ("It must be possible to interpret even ordinary
legislation as serving to realize and specify the system of rights elaborated in
the constitution.").
592. One version of such an argument is offered by Giinter Frankenberg.
See Ginter Frankenberg, Why Care? The Trouble with Social Rights, 17
CARDOzO L. REV. 1365 (1996). Frankenberg objects to Habermas's treatment of
social rights as justified only so far as they are necessary for private or public
autonomy. He proposes that social rights be justified independently, based on
notions of social solidarity and empowerment. He is clear, however, that social
rights are "a project that has to stand the test of public controversy." Id. at
1385.
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It is difficult to know quite what to make of Habermas's
account of the constitutional court's legitimate role. His
positive statements on the subject are both brief and
general. A strong reading of these statements would give
the constitutional court considerable latitude to remake the
democratic process. Further, because Habermas sees the
democratic process as threatened by inequality in social and
economic power, his proceduralist theory could be understood to authorize large-scale redistribution of power. On
the other hand, however, his critique of "value jurisprudence," while not strictly applicable in this context,
suggests a conception of judicial restraint.
Part of the difficulty in interpreting his views may be
German
and
American
between
difference
the
of free
issues
to
respect
with
particularly
law,
constitutional
social-welfare
for
basis
expression and the constitutional
rights. The commitments of the "proceduralist paradigm"
would be easier to discern if Habermas left the level of
reconstructive theorizing and, in his "testing" of the
discourse theory against the world of adjudication,
encountered more concretely the particular ways in which
and "principles of the constitutional
the "system of rights"
state" have been institutionalized.
CONCLUSION

Habermas's discourse theory of law and democracy is
extraordinarily ambitious. It investigates the necessary
conditions of legitimacy for any modern legal order, seeing
those conditions in the recognition of his "system of rights"
and their implementation through the "principles of the
constitutional state" that he identifies. I have taken issue
with significant parts of Habermas's discourse theory: the
formulation of the democracy principle to require universal
assent, the thinness of his theory of judicial interpretation
and the emptiness of the "appropriateness" standard for
judicial application discourses, the underestimation of the
affinities between his theory and Michelman's neo-

593. See Schlink, supra note 484, at 377 (arguing that without attention to
the historical differences among constitutions, and the differences between
German and American constitutionalism, prescriptions for constitutional-court
practice can be only unhelpfully general).
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republicanism, and the abstractness of his account of
constitutional courts' legitimate role.
But the reverse side of Habermas's abstractness is his
comprehensiveness of scope. He covers an extraordinary
amount of ground in his work on law and democracy,
ranging from a social-theoretically inspired account of
modern law's basic problematic, to an account of the
categories of rights necessary for law's legitimacy, to a
recasting of separation-of-powers notions through discourse
theory, to a critical account of contemporary constitutional
theory and practice. Much of his project is attractive. The
idea of communicative power, and the location of basic
democratic processes outside formal governmental
institutions-in the political public sphere and civil-social
associations-are important contributions. So, too, is the
emphasis on the legitimating role that procedure can play
when it operates democratically. Perhaps most suggestive is
the link Habermas establishes between legitimate law and
a more thoroughgoing democracy.

